Energy Efficiency in Multi-hop CDMA Networks: A Game Theoretic Analysis

A game-theoretic analysis is used to study the effects of receiver choice on the energy efficiency of multi-hop networks in which the nodes communicate using Direct-Sequence Code Division Multiple Access (DS-CDMA). A Nash equilibrium of the game in which the network nodes can choose their receivers as well as their transmit powers to maximize the total number of bits they transmit per unit of energy is derived. The energy efficiencies resulting from the use of different linear multiuser receivers in this context are compared, looking at both the non-cooperative game and the Pareto optimal solution. For analytical ease, particular attention is paid to asymptotically large networks. Significant gains in energy efficiency are observed when multiuser receivers, particularly the linear minimum mean-square error (MMSE) receiver, are used instead of conventional matched filter receivers.Comment: To appear in the Proceedings of the Workshop on Multi-Layer Modelling and Design of Multi-Hop Wireless Networks (MLMD 06), Minneapolis, MN, July 12 - 15, 200

A Non-Cooperative Game Theoretical Approach For Power Control In Virtual MIMO Wireless Sensor Network

Power management is one of the vital issue in wireless sensor networks, where the lifetime of the network relies on battery powered nodes. Transmitting at high power reduces the lifetime of both the nodes and the network. One efficient way of power management is to control the power at which the nodes transmit. In this paper, a virtual multiple input multiple output wireless sensor network (VMIMO-WSN)communication architecture is considered and the power control of sensor nodes based on the approach of game theory is formulated. The use of game theory has proliferated, with a broad range of applications in wireless sensor networking. Approaches from game theory can be used to optimize node level as well as network wide performance. The game here is categorized as an incomplete information game, in which the nodes do not have complete information about the strategies taken by other nodes. For virtual multiple input multiple output wireless sensor network architecture considered, the Nash equilibrium is used to decide the optimal power level at which a node needs to transmit, to maximize its utility. Outcome shows that the game theoretic approach considered for VMIMO-WSN architecture achieves the best utility, by consuming less power.Comment: 12 pages, 8 figure

Non-cooperative Feedback Rate Control Game for Channel State Information in Wireless Networks

It has been well recognized that channel state information (CSI) feedback is of great importance for dowlink transmissions of closed-loop wireless networks. However, the existing work typically researched the CSI feedback problem for each individual mobile station (MS), and thus, cannot efficiently model the interactions among self-interested mobile users in the network level. To this end, in this paper, we propose an alternative approach to investigate the CSI feedback rate control problem in the analytical setting of a game theoretic framework, in which a multiple-antenna base station (BS) communicates with a number of co-channel MSs through linear precoder. Specifically, we first present a non-cooperative feedback-rate control game (NFC), in which each MS selects the feedback rate to maximize its performance in a distributed way. To improve efficiency from a social optimum point of view, we then introduce pricing, called the non-cooperative feedback-rate control game with price (NFCP). The game utility is defined as the performance gain by CSI feedback minus the price as a linear function of the CSI feedback rate. The existence of the Nash equilibrium of such games is investigated, and two types of feedback protocols (FDMA and CSMA) are studied. Simulation results show that by adjusting the pricing factor, the distributed NFCP game results in close optimal performance compared with that of the centralized scheme.Comment: 26 pages, 10 figures; IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications, special issue on Game Theory in Wireless Communications, 201

A Comprehensive Survey of Potential Game Approaches to Wireless Networks

Potential games form a class of non-cooperative games where unilateral improvement dynamics are guaranteed to converge in many practical cases. The potential game approach has been applied to a wide range of wireless network problems, particularly to a variety of channel assignment problems. In this paper, the properties of potential games are introduced, and games in wireless networks that have been proven to be potential games are comprehensively discussed.Comment: 44 pages, 6 figures, to appear in IEICE Transactions on Communications, vol. E98-B, no. 9, Sept. 201

Intervention in Power Control Games With Selfish Users

We study the power control problem in wireless ad hoc networks with selfish users. Without incentive schemes, selfish users tend to transmit at their maximum power levels, causing significant interference to each other. In this paper, we study a class of incentive schemes based on intervention to induce selfish users to transmit at desired power levels. An intervention scheme can be implemented by introducing an intervention device that can monitor the power levels of users and then transmit power to cause interference to users. We mainly consider first-order intervention rules based on individual transmit powers. We derive conditions on design parameters and the intervention capability to achieve a desired outcome as a (unique) Nash equilibrium and propose a dynamic adjustment process that the designer can use to guide users and the intervention device to the desired outcome. The effect of using intervention rules based on aggregate receive power is also analyzed. Our results show that with perfect monitoring intervention schemes can be designed to achieve any positive power profile while using interference from the intervention device only as a threat. We also analyze the case of imperfect monitoring and show that a performance loss can occur. Lastly, simulation results are presented to illustrate the performance improvement from using intervention rules and compare the performances of different intervention rules.Comment: 33 pages, 6 figure