SEW-ing a Simple Endorsement Web to incentivize trustworthy participatory sensing

Two crucial issues to the success of participatory sensing are (a) how to incentivize the large crowd of mobile users to participate and (b) how to ensure the sensing data to be trustworthy. While they are traditionally being studied separately in the literature, this paper proposes a Simple Endorsement Web (SEW) to address both issues in a synergistic manner. The key idea is (a) introducing a social concept called nepotism into participatory sensing, by linking mobile users into a social \u27web of participants\u27 with endorsement relations, and (b) overlaying this network with investment-like economic implications. The social and economic layers are interleaved to provision and enhance incentives and trustworthiness. We elaborate the social implications of SEW, and analyze the economic implications under a Stackelberg game framework. We derive the optimal design parameter that maximizes the utility of the sensing campaign organizer, while ensuring participants to strictly have incentive to participate. We also design algorithms for participants to optimally \u27sew\u27 SEW, namely to manipulate the endorsement links of SEW such that their economic benefits are maximized and social constrains are satisfied. Finally, we provide two numerical examples for an intuitive understanding

Quality of Information in Mobile Crowdsensing: Survey and Research Challenges

Smartphones have become the most pervasive devices in people's lives, and are clearly transforming the way we live and perceive technology. Today's smartphones benefit from almost ubiquitous Internet connectivity and come equipped with a plethora of inexpensive yet powerful embedded sensors, such as accelerometer, gyroscope, microphone, and camera. This unique combination has enabled revolutionary applications based on the mobile crowdsensing paradigm, such as real-time road traffic monitoring, air and noise pollution, crime control, and wildlife monitoring, just to name a few. Differently from prior sensing paradigms, humans are now the primary actors of the sensing process, since they become fundamental in retrieving reliable and up-to-date information about the event being monitored. As humans may behave unreliably or maliciously, assessing and guaranteeing Quality of Information (QoI) becomes more important than ever. In this paper, we provide a new framework for defining and enforcing the QoI in mobile crowdsensing, and analyze in depth the current state-of-the-art on the topic. We also outline novel research challenges, along with possible directions of future work.Comment: To appear in ACM Transactions on Sensor Networks (TOSN

Incentive Mechanisms for Participatory Sensing: Survey and Research Challenges

Participatory sensing is a powerful paradigm which takes advantage of smartphones to collect and analyze data beyond the scale of what was previously possible. Given that participatory sensing systems rely completely on the users' willingness to submit up-to-date and accurate information, it is paramount to effectively incentivize users' active and reliable participation. In this paper, we survey existing literature on incentive mechanisms for participatory sensing systems. In particular, we present a taxonomy of existing incentive mechanisms for participatory sensing systems, which are subsequently discussed in depth by comparing and contrasting different approaches. Finally, we discuss an agenda of open research challenges in incentivizing users in participatory sensing.Comment: Updated version, 4/25/201

Incentive mechanism design for citizen reporting application using Stackelberg game

The growing utilization of smartphones equipped with various sensors to collect and analyze information around us highlights a paradigm called mobile crowdsensing. To motivate citizens’ participation in crowdsensing and compensate them for their resources, it is necessary to incentivize the participants for their sensing service. There are several studies that used the Stackelberg game to model the incentive mechanism, however, those studies did not include a budget constraint for limited budget case. Another challenge is to optimize crowdsourcer (government) profit in conducting crowdsensing under the limited budget then allocates the budget to several regional working units that are responsible for the specific city problems. We propose an incentive mechanism for mobile crowdsensing based on several identified incentive parameters using the Stackelberg game model and applied the MOOP (multi-objective optimization problem) to the incentive model in which the participant reputation is taken into account. The evaluation of the proposed incentive model is performed through simulations. The simulation indicated that the result appropriately corresponds to the theoretical properties of the model

Mechanisms for improving information quality in smartphone crowdsensing systems

Given its potential for a large variety of real-life applications, smartphone crowdsensing has recently gained tremendous attention from the research community. Smartphone crowdsensing is a paradigm that allows ordinary citizens to participate in large-scale sensing surveys by using user-friendly applications installed in their smartphones. In this way, fine-grained sensing information is obtained from smartphone users without employing fixed and expensive infrastructure, and with negligible maintenance costs. Existing smartphone sensing systems depend completely on the participants\u27 willingness to submit up-to-date and accurate information regarding the events being monitored. Therefore, it becomes paramount to scalably and effectively determine, enforce, and optimize the information quality of the sensing reports submitted by the participants. To this end, mechanisms to improve information quality in smartphone crowdsensing systems were designed in this work. Firstly, the FIRST framework is presented, which is a reputation-based mechanism that leverages the concept of mobile trusted participants to determine and improve the information quality of collected data. Secondly, it is mathematically modeled and studied the problem of maximizing the likelihood of successful execution of sensing tasks when participants having uncertain mobility execute sensing tasks. Two incentive mechanisms based on game and auction theory are then proposed to efficiently and scalably solve such problem. Experimental results demonstrate that the mechanisms developed in this thesis outperform existing state of the art in improving information quality in smartphone crowdsensing systems --Abstract, page iii

Incentive Mechanism Design for Crowdsourcing: An All-pay Auction Approach

Crowdsourcing can be modeled as a principal-agent problem in which the principal (crowdsourcer) desires to solicit a maximal contribution from a group of agents (participants) while agents are only motivated to act according to their own respective advantages. To reconcile this tension, we propose an all-pay auction approach to incentivize agents to act in the principal\u27s interest, i.e., maximizing profit, while allowing agents to reap strictly positive utility. Our rationale for advocating all-pay auctions is based on two merits that we identify, namely all-pay auctions (i) compress the common, two-stage bid-contribute crowdsourcing process into a single bid-cum-contribute stage, and (ii) eliminate the risk of task nonfulfillment. In our proposed approach, we enhance all-pay auctions with two additional features: an adaptive prize and a general crowdsourcing environment. The prize or reward adapts itself as per a function of the unknown winning agent\u27s contribution, and the environment or setting generally accommodates incomplete and asymmetric information, risk-averse (and risk-neutral) agents, and a stochastic (and deterministic) population. We analytically derive this all-pay auction-based mechanism and extensively evaluate it in comparison to classic and optimized mechanisms. The results demonstrate that our proposed approach remarkably outperforms its counterparts in terms of the principal\u27s profit, agent\u27s utility, and social welfare