Incompleteness of boundedly axiomatizable theories

Our main result (Theorem A) shows the incompleteness of any consistent sequential theory T formulated in a finite language such that T is axiomatized by a collection of sentences of bounded quantifier-alternation-depth. Our proof employs an appropriate reduction mechanism to rule out the possibility of completeness by simply invoking Tarski's Undefinability of Truth theorem. We also use the proof strategy of Theorem A to obtain other incompleteness results (as in Theorems A+; B and B+).Comment: 6 pages; in this version reference to MathOverflow work of Emil Je\v{r}\'{a}bek has been added, and the author list of [AGLRZ] is now up-to-dat

Current research on G\"odel's incompleteness theorems

We give a survey of current research on G\"{o}del's incompleteness theorems from the following three aspects: classifications of different proofs of G\"{o}del's incompleteness theorems, the limit of the applicability of G\"{o}del's first incompleteness theorem, and the limit of the applicability of G\"{o}del's second incompleteness theorem.Comment: 54 pages, final accepted version, to appear in The Bulletin of Symbolic Logi

On the relationship between meta-mathematical properties of theories

In this work, we understand incompleteness in an abstract way via metamathematical properties of formal theories. We systematically examine the relationship between the following twelve important metamathematical properties of theories: Rosser, EI (Effectively inseparable), RI (Recursively inseparable), TP (Turing persistent), EHU (essentially hereditarily undecidable), EU (essentially undecidable), Creative, $\mathbf{0}^{\prime}$ (theories with Turing degree $\mathbf{0}^{\prime}$), REW (all RE sets are weakly representable), RFD (all recursive functions are definable), RSS (all recursive sets are strongly representable), RSW (all recursive sets are weakly representable). Given any two properties $P$ and $Q$ of these properties, we examine whether the property $P$ implies the property $Q$, and whether the property $Q$ implies the property $P$.Comment: 23 page

How to Say Things with Formalisms

Recent attention to "self-consistent" (Rosser-style) systems raises anew the question of the proper interpretation of the Gödel Second Incompleteness Theorem and its effect on Hilbert's Program. The traditional rendering and consequence is defended with new arguments justifying the intensional correctness of the derivability conditions

Godel's Incompleteness Phenomenon - Computationally

We argue that Godel's completeness theorem is equivalent to completability of consistent theories, and Godel's incompleteness theorem is equivalent to the fact that this completion is not constructive, in the sense that there are some consistent and recursively enumerable theories which cannot be extended to any complete and consistent and recursively enumerable theory. Though any consistent and decidable theory can be extended to a complete and consistent and decidable theory. Thus deduction and consistency are not decidable in logic, and an analogue of Rice's Theorem holds for recursively enumerable theories: all the non-trivial properties of such theories are undecidable

Max Dehn, Axel Thue, and the Undecidable

This is a short essay on the roles of Max Dehn and Axel Thue in the formulation of the word problem for (semi)groups, and the story of the proofs showing that the word problem is undecidable.Comment: Definition of undecidability and unsolvability improve