(Strong) Multi-Designated Verifiers Signatures Secure against Rogue Key Attack

Designated verifier signatures (DVS) allow a signer to create a signature whose validity can only be verified by a specific entity chosen by the signer. In addition, the chosen entity, known as the designated verifier, cannot convince any body that the signature is created by the signer. Multi-designated verifiers signatures (MDVS) are a natural extension of DVS in which the signer can choose multiple designated verifiers. DVS and MDVS are useful primitives in electronic voting and contract signing. In this paper, we investigate various aspects of MDVS and make two contributions. Firstly, we revisit the notion of unforgeability under rogue key attack on MDVS. In this attack scenario, a malicious designated verifier tries to forge a signature that passes through the verification of another honest designated verifier. A common counter-measure involves making the knowledge of secret key assumption (KOSK) in which an adversary is required to produce a proof-of-knowledge of the secret key. We strengthened the existing security model to capture this attack and propose a new construction that does not rely on the KOSK assumption. Secondly, we propose a generic construction of strong MDVS

A provably secure really source hiding designated verifier signature scheme based on random oracle model

A lot of designated verifier signature (DVS) schemes have been proposed. However, all of them only provide the basic security requirement that only the designated verifier can check the validity of the signature. They are either not secure enough or lacking source hiding. Hence, in this article, we design a provably secure DVS scheme. It not only can attain the basic security requirement but also hide the original signer’s identity which makes our scheme more suitable for the applications in an electronic voting system

IoT-REX: A Secure Remote-Control System for IoT Devices from Centralized Multi-Designated Verifier Signatures

IoT technology has been developing rapidly, while at the same time, notorious IoT malware such as Mirai is a severe and inherent threat. We believe it is essential to consider systems that enable us to remotely control infected devices in order to prevent or limit malicious behaviors of infected devices. In this paper, we design a promising candidate for such remote-control systems, called IoT-REX (REmote-Control System for IoT devices). IoT-REX allows a systems manager to designate an arbitrary subset of all IoT devices in the system and every device can confirm whether or not the device itself was designated; if so, the device executes a command given from the systems manager. Towards realizing IoT-REX, we introduce a novel cryptographic primitive called centralized multi-designated verifier signatures (CMDVS). Although CMDVS works under a restricted condition compared to conventional MDVS, it is sufficient for realizing IoT-REX. We provide an efficient CMDVS construction from any approximate membership query structures and digital signatures, yielding compact communication sizes and efficient verification procedures for IoT-REX. We then discuss the feasibility of IoT-REX through cryptographic implementation of the CMDVS construction on a Raspberry Pi. Our promising results demonstrate that the CMDVS construction can compress communication size to about 30% and thus its resulting IoT-REX becomes three times faster than a trivial construction over typical low-power wide area networks with an IoT device. It is expected that IoT-REX can control 12,000 devices within a second.Comment: Updated as a whole. 26 page

Cryptography in privacy-preserving applications.

Tsang Pak Kong.Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2005.Includes bibliographical references (leaves 95-107).Abstracts in English and Chinese.Abstract --- p.iiAcknowledgement --- p.ivChapter 1 --- Introduction --- p.1Chapter 1.1 --- Privacy --- p.1Chapter 1.2 --- Cryptography --- p.5Chapter 1.2.1 --- History of Cryptography --- p.5Chapter 1.2.2 --- Cryptography Today --- p.6Chapter 1.2.3 --- Cryptography For Privacy --- p.7Chapter 1.3 --- Thesis Organization --- p.8Chapter 2 --- Background --- p.10Chapter 2.1 --- Notations --- p.10Chapter 2.2 --- Complexity Theory --- p.11Chapter 2.2.1 --- Order Notation --- p.11Chapter 2.2.2 --- Algorithms and Protocols --- p.11Chapter 2.2.3 --- Relations and Languages --- p.13Chapter 2.3 --- Algebra and Number Theory --- p.14Chapter 2.3.1 --- Groups --- p.14Chapter 2.3.2 --- Intractable Problems --- p.16Chapter 2.4 --- Cryptographic Primitives --- p.18Chapter 2.4.1 --- Public-Key Encryption --- p.18Chapter 2.4.2 --- Identification Protocols --- p.21Chapter 2.4.3 --- Digital Signatures --- p.22Chapter 2.4.4 --- Hash Functions --- p.24Chapter 2.4.5 --- Zero-Knowledge Proof of Knowledge --- p.26Chapter 2.4.6 --- Accumulators --- p.32Chapter 2.4.7 --- Public Key Infrastructure --- p.34Chapter 2.5 --- Zero Knowledge Proof of Knowledge Protocols in Groups of Unknown Order --- p.36Chapter 2.5.1 --- The Algebraic Setting --- p.36Chapter 2.5.2 --- Proving the Knowledge of Several Discrete Logarithms . --- p.37Chapter 2.5.3 --- Proving the Knowledge of a Representation --- p.38Chapter 2.5.4 --- Proving the Knowledge of d Out of n Equalities of Discrete Logarithms --- p.39Chapter 2.6 --- Conclusion --- p.42Chapter 3 --- Related Works --- p.43Chapter 3.1 --- Introduction --- p.43Chapter 3.2 --- Group-Oriented Signatures without Spontaneity and/or Anonymity --- p.44Chapter 3.3 --- SAG Signatures --- p.46Chapter 3.4 --- Conclusion --- p.49Chapter 4 --- Linkable Ring Signatures --- p.50Chapter 4.1 --- Introduction --- p.50Chapter 4.2 --- New Notions --- p.52Chapter 4.2.1 --- Accusatory Linking --- p.52Chapter 4.2.2 --- Non-slanderability --- p.53Chapter 4.2.3 --- Linkability in Threshold Ring Signatures --- p.54Chapter 4.2.4 --- Event-Oriented Linking --- p.55Chapter 4.3 --- Security Model --- p.56Chapter 4.3.1 --- Syntax --- p.56Chapter 4.3.2 --- Notions of Security --- p.58Chapter 4.4 --- Conclusion --- p.63Chapter 5 --- Short Linkable Ring Signatures --- p.64Chapter 5.1 --- Introduction --- p.64Chapter 5.2 --- The Construction --- p.65Chapter 5.3 --- Security Analysis --- p.68Chapter 5.3.1 --- Security Theorems --- p.68Chapter 5.3.2 --- Proofs --- p.68Chapter 5.4 --- Discussion --- p.70Chapter 5.5 --- Conclusion --- p.71Chapter 6 --- Separable Linkable Threshold Ring Signatures --- p.72Chapter 6.1 --- Introduction --- p.72Chapter 6.2 --- The Construction --- p.74Chapter 6.3 --- Security Analysis --- p.76Chapter 6.3.1 --- Security Theorems --- p.76Chapter 6.3.2 --- Proofs --- p.77Chapter 6.4 --- Discussion --- p.79Chapter 6.5 --- Conclusion --- p.80Chapter 7 --- Applications --- p.82Chapter 7.1 --- Offline Anonymous Electronic Cash --- p.83Chapter 7.1.1 --- Introduction --- p.83Chapter 7.1.2 --- Construction --- p.84Chapter 7.2 --- Electronic Voting --- p.85Chapter 7.2.1 --- Introduction --- p.85Chapter 7.2.2 --- Construction . --- p.87Chapter 7.2.3 --- Discussions --- p.88Chapter 7.3 --- Anonymous Attestation --- p.89Chapter 7.3.1 --- Introduction --- p.89Chapter 7.3.2 --- Construction --- p.90Chapter 7.4 --- Conclusion --- p.91Chapter 8 --- Conclusion --- p.92A Paper Derivation --- p.94Bibliography --- p.9

A lightweight blockchain based framework for underwater ioT

The Internet of Things (IoT) has facilitated services without human intervention for a wide range of applications, including underwater monitoring, where sensors are located at various depths, and data must be transmitted to surface base stations for storage and processing. Ensuring that data transmitted across hierarchical sensor networks are kept secure and private without high computational cost remains a challenge. In this paper, we propose a multilevel sensor monitoring architecture. Our proposal includes a layer-based architecture consisting of Fog and Cloud elements to process and store and process the Internet of Underwater Things (IoUT) data securely with customized Blockchain technology. The secure routing of IoUT data through the hierarchical topology ensures the legitimacy of data sources. A security and performance analysis was performed to show that the architecture can collect data from IoUT devices in the monitoring region efficiently and securely. © 2020 by the authors. Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland

Secure Lightweight Stream Data Outsourcing for Internet of Things

The epoch of the Internet of Things (IoT) has come by enabling almost everything to gather and share electronic information. Considering the unreliable factors of public IoT, how to outsource huge amounts of indispensable stream data generated by the nodes to the remote storage efficiently and securely is one of the most challenging issues. In this paper, we propose a secure lightweight stream data outsourcing framework for IoT based on identity and blockchain. Taking advantage of identity-based cryptography and blockchain, for public IoT containing untrusted communication channels, nodes, remote storage, and even verifiers, we introduce a private mobile network and multiple verifiers to ensure that the stream data are stored intact and updated correctly, without the costs and risks brought by the Public Key Infrastructures (PKI). Meanwhile, the framework can also achieve privacy-preserving checking, by revealing no data to the other entities besides the remote storage, even in the blockchains. Our comprehensive analysis and experiments demonstrate that the proposed framework is suitable for lightweight devices and practical for IoT

Simple Schnorr Multi-Signatures with Applications to Bitcoin

We describe a new Schnorr-based multi-signature scheme (i.e., a protocol which allows a group of signers to produce a short, joint signature on a common message) called MuSig, provably secure in the plain public-key model (meaning that signers are only required to have a public key, but do not have to prove knowledge of the private key corresponding to their public key to some certification authority or to other signers before engaging the protocol), which improves over the state-of-art scheme of Bellare and Neven (ACM-CCS 2006) and its variants by Bagherzandi et al. (ACM-CCS 2008) and Ma et al. (Des. Codes Cryptogr., 2010) in two respects: (i) it is simple and efficient, having the same key and signature size as standard Schnorr signatures; (ii) it allows key aggregation, which informally means that the joint signature can be verified exactly as a standard Schnorr signature with respect to a single ``aggregated\u27\u27 public key which can be computed from the individual public keys of the signers. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first multi-signature scheme provably secure in the plain public-key model which allows key aggregation. As an application, we explain how our new multi-signature scheme could improve both performance and user privacy in Bitcoin

Authentication and Message Integrity Verification without Secrets

Embedding network capabilities in a plethora of new devices and infrastructures--the Internet-of-Things, vehicular and aviation networks, the critical national infrastructure, industrial plants--are dramatically transforming the modern way of living. The rapid deployment pace of these emerging applications has brought unprecedented security challenges related to data confidentiality, user privacy, and critical infrastructure availability. A significant portion of these threats is attributed to the broadcast nature of the wireless medium, which exposes systems to easy-to-launch passive and active attacks. The slow security standards rollout combined with the ever-shrinking time-to-market, the device heterogeneity and the lack of user-friendly input interfaces (screen, keyboard, etc.) only exacerbate the security challenges. In this dissertation, we address the fundamental problem of trust establishment in the context of emerging network applications. We present techniques integrating physical layer properties with cryptographic primitives to guarantee message integrity and bootstrap initial trust without relying on any prior secrets. We present the ``helper'' security paradigm in which security is outsourced to one or more dedicated devices to allow for the scalable pairing of off-the-shelf heterogeneous devices. In addition, we present our work on message integrity verification of navigation information for aircrafts (speed, location, and heading) by exploiting the Doppler spread of the wireless channel. Finally, we develop a secure and fast voting technique for distributed networks which allows fast coordination of a group of devices without the overhead of messaging