Failure Localization in Power Systems via Tree Partitions

Cascading failures in power systems propagate non-locally, making the control and mitigation of outages extremely hard. In this work, we use the emerging concept of the tree partition of transmission networks to provide an analytical characterization of line failure localizability in transmission systems. Our results rigorously establish the well perceived intuition in power community that failures cannot cross bridges, and reveal a finer-grained concept that encodes more precise information on failure propagations within tree-partition regions. Specifically, when a non-bridge line is tripped, the impact of this failure only propagates within well-defined components, which we refer to as cells, of the tree partition defined by the bridges. In contrast, when a bridge line is tripped, the impact of this failure propagates globally across the network, affecting the power flow on all remaining transmission lines. This characterization suggests that it is possible to improve the system robustness by temporarily switching off certain transmission lines, so as to create more, smaller components in the tree partition; thus spatially localizing line failures and making the grid less vulnerable to large-scale outages. We illustrate this approach using the IEEE 118-bus test system and demonstrate that switching off a negligible portion of transmission lines allows the impact of line failures to be significantly more localized without substantial changes in line congestion

Less is More: Real-time Failure Localization in Power Systems

Cascading failures in power systems exhibit non-local propagation patterns which make the analysis and mitigation of failures difficult. In this work, we propose a distributed control framework inspired by the recently proposed concepts of unified controller and network tree-partition that offers strong guarantees in both the mitigation and localization of cascading failures in power systems. In this framework, the transmission network is partitioned into several control areas which are connected in a tree structure, and the unified controller is adopted by generators or controllable loads for fast timescale disturbance response. After an initial failure, the proposed strategy always prevents successive failures from happening, and regulates the system to the desired steady state where the impact of initial failures are localized as much as possible. For extreme failures that cannot be localized, the proposed framework has a configurable design, that progressively involves and coordinates more control areas for failure mitigation and, as a last resort, imposes minimal load shedding. We compare the proposed control framework with Automatic Generation Control (AGC) on the IEEE 118-bus test system. Simulation results show that our novel framework greatly improves the system robustness in terms of the N-1 security standard, and localizes the impact of initial failures in majority of the load profiles that are examined. Moreover, the proposed framework incurs significantly less load loss, if any, compared to AGC, in all of our case studies

Geodesic vulnerability approach for identification of critical buses in power systems

One of the most critical issues in the evaluation of power systems is the identification of critical buses. For this purpose, this paper proposes a new methodology that evaluates the substitution of the power flow technique by the geodesic vulnerability index to identify critical nodes in power grids. Both methods are applied comparatively to demonstrate the scope of the proposed approach. The applicability of the methodology is illustrated using the IEEE 118-bus test system as a case study. To identify the critical components, a node is initially disconnected, and the performance of the resulting topology is evaluated in the face of simulations for multiple cascading faults. Cascading events are simulated by randomly removing assets on a system that continually changes its structure with the elimination of each component. Thus, the classification of the critical nodes is determined by evaluating the resulting performance of 118 different topologies and calculating the damage area for each of the disintegration curves of cascading failures. In summary, the feasibility and suitability of complex network theory are justified to identify critical nodes in power systems

Mining and analysis of real-world graphs

Networked systems are everywhere - such as the Internet, social networks, biological networks, transportation networks, power grid networks, etc. They can be very large yet enormously complex. They can contain a lot of information, either open and transparent or under the cover and coded. Such real-world systems can be modeled using graphs and be mined and analyzed through the lens of network analysis. Network analysis can be applied in recognition of frequent patterns among the connected components in a large graph, such as social networks, where visual analysis is almost impossible. Frequent patterns illuminate statistically important subgraphs that are usually small enough to analyze visually. Graph mining has different practical applications in fraud detection, outliers detection, chemical molecules, etc., based on the necessity of extracting and understanding the information yielded. Network analysis can also be used to quantitatively evaluate and improve the resilience of infrastructure networks such as the Internet or power grids. Infrastructure networks directly affect the quality of people\u27s lives. However, a disastrous incident in these networks may lead to a cascading breakdown of the whole network and serious economic consequences. In essence, network analysis can help us gain actionable insights and make better data-driven decisions based on the networks. On that note, the objective of this dissertation is to improve upon existing tools for more accurate mining and analysis of real-world networks --Abstract, page iv