Cyber-Resilient Self-Triggered Distributed Control of Networked Microgrids Against Multi-Layer DoS Attacks

Networked microgrids with high penetration of distributed generators have ubiquitous remote information exchange, which may be exposed to various cyber security threats. This paper, for the first time, addresses a consensus problem in terms of frequency synchronisation in networked microgrids subject to multi-layer denial of service (DoS) attacks, which could simultaneously affect communication, measurement and control actuation channels. A unified notion of Persistency-of-Data-Flow (PoDF) is proposed to characterise the data unavailability in different information network links, and further quantifies the multi-layer DoS effects on the hierarchical system. With PoDF, we provide a sufficient condition of the DoS attacks under which the consensus can be preserved with the proposed edgebased self-triggered distributed control framework. In addition, to mitigate the conservativeness of offline design against the worst-case attack across all agents, an online self-adaptive scheme of the control parameters is developed to fully utilise the latest available information of all data transmission channels. Finally, the effectiveness of the proposed cyber-resilient self-triggered distributed control is verified by representative case studies

Self-triggered Coordination over a Shared Network under Denial-of-Service

The issue of security has become ever more prevalent in the analysis and design of cyber-physical systems. In this paper, we analyze a consensus network in the presence of Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks, namely attacks that prevent communication among the network agents. By introducing a notion of Persistency-of-Communication (PoC), we provide a characterization of DoS frequency and duration such that consensus is not destroyed. An example is given to substantiate the analysis

On Resilient Control of Nonlinear Systems under Denial-of-Service

We analyze and design a control strategy for nonlinear systems under Denial-of-Service attacks. Based on an ISS-Lyapunov function analysis, we provide a characterization of the maximal percentage of time during which feedback information can be lost without resulting in the instability of the system. Motivated by the presence of a digital channel we consider event-based controllers for which a minimal inter-sampling time is explicitly characterized.Comment: 7 pages, 1 figur