Advisor Choice in Asia-Pacific Property Markets

This paper examines advisor choice decisions by publicly traded REITs and listed property companies in Asia-Pacific real estate markets. Using a sample of 168 firms, we find robust evidence that firms strategically evaluate and compare the increased agency costs associated with external advisement against the potential benefits associated with collocating decision rights with location specific soft information. Our empirical results reveal real estate companies tend to hire external advisors when they invest in countries: 1) that are more economically and politically unstable, 2) whose legal system is based on civil law, 3) where the level of corruption is perceived to be high, and 4) when disclosure is relatively poor. Additionally, we find the probability of retaining an external advisor is directly related to the expected agency costs. Lastly, we find evidence of return premiums in excess of 13 % for firms whose organizational structure matches their investment profile. As such, we conclude that the decision to hire an external advisor represents a value relevant trade-off between the costs and benefits of this organizational arrangement

Modeling the Use of Nonrenewable Resources Using a Genetic Algorithm

This paper shows, how a genetic algorithm (GA) can be used to model an economic process: the interaction of profit-maximizing oil-exploration firms that compete with each other for a limited amount of oil. After a brief introduction to the concept of multi-agent-modeling in economics, a GA-based resource-economic model is developed. Several model runs based on different economic policy assumptions are presented and discussed in order to show how the GA-model can be used to gain insight into the dynamic properties of economic systems. The remainder outlines deficiencies of GA-based multi-agent approaches and sketches how the present model can be improved.

The simple micro-economics of public-private partnerships

We build a unified theoretical framework to analyze the main incentive issues in Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) and the shape of optimal contracts in those contexts. We present a basic model of procurement in a multitask environment in which a risk-averse agent chooses unobservable efforts in cost reduction and quality improvement. We begin by studying the effect on incentives and risk transfer of bundling building and operation into a single contract, allowing for different assumptions on the contractual framework and the quality of the information held by the government. We then extend the basic model in several directions. We consider the factors that affect the optimal allocation of demand risk and their implications for the use of user charges and the choice of contract length. We study the relationship between the operator and its financiers and the impact of private finance. We discuss the trade-off between incentive and flexibility in long-term PPP agreements and the dynamics of PPP contracts, including cost overruns. We also consider how the institutional environment, and specifically the risk of regulatory opportunism, affects contract design and incentives. We conclude with some policy implications on the desirability of PPPs

Governing partnerships

Public private partnerships (PPPs) are instruments of the public interest, yet bodies that actively engage private actors. As a result, questions of governance are particularly important. Here, governance refers to the rules that prescribe who should make, execute and be accountable for the conduct of a PPP, and in what way that conduct should be exercised, for example through consultation with interested parties, transparency in decision-making, and so on. This chapter explores four facets of PPP governance: legal, regulatory, democratic, and corporate governance. Legal governance has implications for the allocation of roles and responsibilities between the parties to the PPP, the PPP entity itself, and the state and citizens more widely. Regulatory governance covers the legal and contractual obligations on parties, the procedures through which they are enforced, and the softer norms that operate around these. Democratic governance concerns the empirical and normative question of what is, and what should be, the level and form of constitutional oversight of PPPs. Corporate governance concerns itself with ensuring that the enterprise is managed in a manner that does not put the future of the business and investors funds at undue risk. The chapter concludes that the key task in developing the governance of PPPs is less to do with their financial probity, and more with aligning their mode of operating to the fundamental democratic values of the wider public service

The Simple Micro-Economics of Public-Private Partnerships

We build a unified theoretical framework to analyze the main incentive issues in Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) and the shape of optimal contracts in those contexts. We present a basic model of procurement in a multitask environment in which a risk-averse agent chooses unobservable efforts in cost reduction and quality improvement. We begin by studying the effect on incentives and risk transfer of bundling building and operation into a single contract, allowing for different assumptions on the contractual framework and the quality of the information held by the government. We then extend the basic model in several directions. We consider the factors that affect the optimal allocation of demand risk and their implications for the use of user charges and the choice of contract length. We study the relationship between the operator and its financiers and the impact of private finance. We discuss the trade-off between incentive and flexibility in long-term PPP agreements and the dynamics of PPP contracts, including cost overruns. We also consider how the institutional environment, and specifically the risk of regulatory opportunism, affects contract design and incentives. We conclude with some policy implications on the desirability of PPPs.Contracting out, public-private partnerships, public-service provision

Diversification, convex preferences and non-empty core in the Choquet expected utility model

This paper explores risk-sharing and equilibrium in a general equilibrium set-up wherein agents are non-additive expected utility maximizers. We show that when agents have the same convex capacity, the set of Pareto-optima is independent of it and identical to the set of optima of an economy in which agents are expected utility maximizers and have same probability. Hence, optimal allocations are comonotone. This enables us to study the equilibrium set. When agents have different capacities, matters are much more complex (asin the vNM case). We give a general characterization and show how it simplifies when Pareto-optima are comonotone. We use this result to characterize Pareto-optima when agents have capacities that are the convex transform of some probability distribution. comonotonicity of Pareto-optima is also shown to be true in the two-state case if the intersection of the core of agents' capacities is non-empty; Pareto-optima may then be fully characterized in the two-agent, two-state case. This comonotonicity result does not generalize to more than two states as we show with a counter-example. Finally, if there is no-aggregate risk, we show thatnon-empty core intersection is enough to guarantee that optimal allocations are full-insurance allocation. This result does not require convexity of preferences.Choquet expected utility; comonotonicity; risk-sharing; equilibrium

Optimal risk-sharing rules and equilibria with Choquet-expected-utility.

This paper explores risk-sharing and equilibrium in a general equilibrium set-up wherein agents are non-additive expected utility maximizers. We show that when agents have the same convex capacity, the set of Pareto-optima is independent of it and identical to the set of optima of an economy in which agents are expected utility maximizers and have the same probability. Hence, optimal allocations are comonotone. This enables us to study the equilibrium set. When agents have different capacities, the matters are much more complex (as in the vNM case). We give a general characterization and show how it simplifies when Pareto-optima are comonotone. We use this result to characterize Pareto-optima when agents have capacities that are the convex transform of some probability distribution. Comonotonicity of Pareto-optima is also shown to be true in the two-state case if the intersection of the core of agents' capacities is non-empty; Pareto-optima may then be fully characterized in the two-agent, two-state case. This comonotonicity result does not generalize to more than two states as we show with a counter-example. Finally, if there is no-aggregate risk, we show that non-empty core intersection is enough to guarantee that optimal allocations are full-insurance allocation. This result does not require convexity of preferences.Equilibrium; Risk-sharing; Comonotonicity; Choquet expected utility;

Understanding Ownership Residual Rights of Control and Appropriable Control Rights

We discuss the notion of ownership in economics, taking our point of departure in the Grossman-Hart-Moore property rights approach. We criticize the exclusive identification of ownership with residual rights to control in this approach, and argue that economic organization may be rendered determinate under complete contracting (contrary to the GHM approach). Crucially, we argue that under complete contracting, some control rights may be appropriable because of measurement and enforcement costs. This holds the key to a theory of ownership that is not dependent on the notion of residual rights to control, but rather relies on appropriable control rights. However, the two perspectives may be complementary rather than rival.Ownership, property rights, complete and incomplete contracts