Transforming Asynchronous Systems with Crash-Stop Failures and Failure Detectors to the General Omission Model

This paper studies the impact of omission failures on asynchronous distributed s ystems with crash-stop failures. For the large group of problem specifications that are restricted to correct processes, we show how to transform a crash-stop related problem specification into an equivalent omission one. For that, we provide transformations for algorithms and failure detectors, such that if and only if an algorithm using a failure detector satisfies a problem specification, then the transformed algorithm using the transformed failure detector satisfies the transformed problem specification. Our transformed problem specification is ensured to be non-trivial, and moreover, the transformation reveals itself to be in a reasonable sense weakest failure detector preserving. Our results help to use the power of the well-understood crash-stop model to aut omatically derive solutions for the general omission model, which has recently raised interest for being noticeably applicable for security problems in distributed environments equipped with security modules such as smartcards

TrustedPals: Secure Multiparty Computation Implemented with Smart Cards

We study the problem of Secure Multi-party Computation (SMC) in a model where individual processes contain a tamper-proof security module, and introduce the TrustedPals framework, an efficient smart card based implementation of SMC for any number of participating entities in such a model. Security modules can be trusted by other processes and can establish secure channels between each other. However, their availability is restricted by their host, that is, a corrupted party can stop the computation of its own security module as well as drop any message sent by or to its security module. We show that in this model SMC can be implemented by reducing it to a fault-tolerance problem at the level of security modules. Since the critical part of the computation can be executed locally on the smart card, we can compute any function securely with a protocol complexity which is polynomial only in the number of processes (that is, the complexity does not depend on the function which is computed), in contrast to previous approaches

The Failure Detector Abstraction

A failure detector is a fundamental abstraction in distributed computing. This paper surveys this abstraction through two dimensions. First we study failure detectors as building blocks to simplify the design of reliable distributed algorithms. In particular, we illustrate how failure detectors can factor out timing assumptions to detect failures in distributed agreement algorithms. Second, we study failure detectors as computability benchmarks. That is, we survey the weakest failure detector question and illustrate how failure detectors can be used to classify problems. We also highlight some limitations of the failure detector abstraction along each of the dimensions

Revisiting Failure Detection and Consensus in Omission Failure Environments

Abstract. It has recently been shown that fair exchange, a security problem in distributed systems, can be reduced to a fault tolerance problem, namely a special form of distributed consensus. The reduction uses the concept of security modules which reduce the type and nature of adversarial behavior to two standard fault-assumptions: message omission and process crash. In this paper, we investigate the feasibility of solving consensus in asynchronous systems in which crash and message omission faults may occur. Due to the impossibility result of consensus in such systems, following the lines of unreliable failure detectors of Chandra and Toueg, we add to the system a distributed device that gives information about the failure of other processes. Then we give an algorithm using this device to solve the consensus problem. Finally, we show how to implement such a device in an asynchronous system using some weak timing assumptions.

Revisiting Failure Detection and Consensus in Omission Failure Environments

It has recently been shown that fair exchange, a security problem in distributed systems, can be reduced to a fault tolerance problem, namely a special form of distributed consensus. The reduction uses the concept of security modules which reduce the type and nature of adversarial behavior to two standard faultassumptions: message omission and process crash. In this paper, we investigate the feasibility of solving consensus in asynchronous systems in which crash and message omission faults may occur. Due to the impossibility result of consensus in such systems, following the lines of unreliable failure detectors of Chandra and Toueg, we add to the system a distributed device that gives information about the failure of other processes. Then we give an algorithm using this device to solve the consensus problem. Finally, we show how to implement such a device in an asynchronous system using some weak timing assumptions

Forschungsbericht Universität Mannheim, 2004 / 2005

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