Mind the Gap Between Comprehension and Metacomprehension: Meta-Analysis of Metacomprehension Accuracy and Intervention Effectiveness

Research has consistently demonstrated that learners are strikingly poor at metacognitively monitoring their learning and comprehension of texts. The aim of the present meta-analysis is to explore three important questions about metacomprehension: (a) To what extent can people accurately discriminate well-learned texts from less well learned ones? (b) What are the (meta)cognitive causes of poor metacomprehension accuracy? and (c) What interventions improve the accuracy of metacomprehension judgments? In total, the meta-analysis integrated 502 effects and data from 15,889 participants across 115 studies to assess these questions. The results showed a weighted mean correlation of.178 for nonintervention effects. Many interventions were shown to be effective, such as delayed summary writing and delayed keyword generation. In addition, combining different interventions tended to generate additive benefits. The findings support the transfer-appropriate monitoring account, the situation model framework, and the poor-comprehension theory as explanations for why metacomprehension accuracy is typically poor. Practical implications are discussed

Human metacognition across domains: insights from individual differences and neuroimaging

Metacognition is the capacity to evaluate and control one's own cognitive processes. Metacognition operates over a range of cognitive domains, such as perception and memory, but the neurocognitive architecture supporting this ability remains controversial. Is metacognition enabled by a common, domain-general resource that is recruited to evaluate performance on a variety of tasks? Or is metacognition reliant on domain-specific modules? This article reviews recent literature on the domain-generality of human metacognition, drawing on evidence from individual differences and neuroimaging. A meta-analysis of behavioral studies found that perceptual metacognitive ability was correlated across different sensory modalities, but found no correlation between metacognition of perception and memory. However, evidence for domain-generality from behavioral data may suffer from a lack of power to identify correlations across model parameters indexing metacognitive efficiency. Neuroimaging data provide a complementary perspective on the domain-generality of metacognition, revealing co-existence of neural signatures that are common and distinct across tasks. We suggest that such an architecture may be appropriate for "tagging" generic feelings of confidence with domain-specific information, in turn forming the basis for priors about self-ability and modulation of higher-order behavioral control

Metamemory in multiple sclerosis

This thesis was submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy and awarded by Brunel University.The concept of metamemory proposes that supplementary to typically measured memory abilities, memory monitoring and control processes are used to optimise learning. Accurate memory monitoring appears to be underpinned by a range of cognitive, and possibly affective, contributions. In populations with these deficits, metamemory has been shown to be impaired. In Multiple Sclerosis (MS), only a limited metamemory literature exists, surprising given that MS is a leading cause of disability among people of working age, and cognitive and mood disorder is common. Using structural equation modelling, this study of 100 people with MS explored factors contributing to performance on episodic Judgment of Learning, Retrospective Confidence and Feeling of Knowing. Given its negative influence on cognitive domains in MS, the impact of information processing deficits on metamemory was also investigated. Finally, memory self-report, a frequently used clinical indicator of memory functioning, was assessed. Findings suggest that memory complaint is associated with mood, and is unrelated to tested memory. Second, Retrospective Confidence Judgments were predictive of memory performance, even in the presence of memory impairment. Third, an unusual finding of maintained underconfidence at delay was observed in the Judgment of Learning task. Finally, Feeling of Knowing judgments related to executive, but not to memory ability. A novel finding in respect of this judgment was of processing speed relating negatively to accuracy, in the context of executive dysfunction. This suggests that some top-down direction of processing resources may be a factor in supporting accuracy, rather than the speed at which information is processed. Of all the task-based judgments, accuracy in this judgment was the only one with a reliable association with mood. Faster processing speed, executive dysfunction and least depression symptomatology related to low accuracy, perhaps typifying a profile of disinhibition seen in MS, characterised by poorly constrained processing and apparently elevated mood

Attention Restraint, Working Memory Capacity, and Mind Wandering: Do Emotional Valence or Intentionality Matter?

Attention restraint appears to mediate the relationship between working memory capacity (WMC) and mind wandering (Kane et al., 2016). Prior work has identifed two dimensions of mind wandering—emotional valence and intentionality. However, less is known about how WMC and attention restraint correlate with these dimensions. Te current study examined the relationship between WMC, attention restraint, and mind wandering by emotional valence and intentionality. A confrmatory factor analysis demonstrated that WMC and attention restraint were strongly correlated, but only attention restraint was related to overall mind wandering, consistent with prior fndings. However, when examining the emotional valence of mind wandering, attention restraint and WMC were related to negatively and positively valenced, but not neutral, mind wandering. Attention restraint was also related to intentional but not unintentional mind wandering. Tese results suggest that WMC and attention restraint predict some, but not all, types of mind wandering

Self-Modelling in Inference about Absence

Representing the absence of an object requires one to know that they would know if it were present. This form of second-order, counterfactual reasoning critically relies on access to a mental self-model, specifying expected perceptual and cognitive states under different world states. This thesis addresses open questions regarding inference about absence in perceptual decision making: its reliance on prior metacognitive knowledge, relative encapsulation from metacognitive monitoring, neural underpinning, and relation with default-reasoning. I start by showing that in visual search, implicit metacognitive knowledge about spatial attention supports inference about the absence in the first trial of an experiment, and that this knowledge is dissociable from explicit metacognitive knowledge. Further underscoring the richness and complexity of this knowledge, I find that people are able to accurately predict their future search times, even for complex, unfamiliar displays. Participants’ predictions were better aligned with their own search times than with those of other participants, suggesting that this self-knowledge is person-specific. I then ask what factors contribute to confidence in decisions about presence and absence. Reverse-correlation analysis reveals stimulus features that contribute to detection decisions and confidence. I discuss these findings in the context of sensory noise estimation. Using functional MRI, I find that a network of frontal and parietal regions that are implicated in decision confidence are mostly invariant to whether subjective confidence is rated with respect to decisions about presence or absence. In interpreting these results, I formulate computational models that monitor fluctuations in external stimulus strength and in internal attentional states. Finally, in six behavioural experiments, different levels of the cognitive hierarchy are found to be sensitive to different notions of absence. I conclude with a discussion of ways in which inference about absence can be used by cognitive scientists for probing implicit metacognitive beliefs and studying the mental self-model

Thinking about thinking: A coordinate-based meta-analysis of neuroimaging studies of metacognitive judgements

Metacognition supports reflection upon and control of other cognitive processes. Despite metacognition occupying a central role in human psychology, its neural substrates remain underdetermined, partly due to study-specific differences in task domain and type of metacognitive judgement under study. It is also unclear how metacognition relates to other apparently similar abilities that depend on recursive thought such as theory of mind or mentalising. Now that neuroimaging studies of metacognition are more prevalent, we have an opportunity to characterise consistencies in neural substrates identified across different analysis types and domains. Here we used quantitative activation likelihood estimation methods to synthesise findings from 47 neuroimaging studies on metacognition, divided into categories based on the target of metacognitive evaluation (memory and decision-making), analysis type (judgement-related activation, confidence-related activation, and predictors of metacognitive sensitivity), and, for metamemory judgements, temporal focus (prospective and retrospective). A domain-general network, including medial and lateral prefrontal cortex, precuneus, and insula was associated with the level of confidence in self-performance in both decision-making and memory tasks. We found preferential engagement of right anterior dorsolateral prefrontal cortex in metadecision experiments and bilateral parahippocampal cortex in metamemory experiments. Results on metacognitive sensitivity were inconclusive, likely due to fewer studies reporting this contrast. Finally, by comparing our results to meta-analyses of mentalising, we obtain evidence for common engagement of the ventromedial and anterior dorsomedial prefrontal cortex in both metacognition and mentalising, suggesting that these regions may support second-order representations for thinking about the thoughts of oneself and others

Source Memory Revealed Through Eye Movements and Pupil Dilation

abstract: Current theoretical debate, crossing the bounds of memory theory and mental imagery, surrounds the role of eye movements in successful encoding and retrieval. Although the eyes have been shown to revisit previously-viewed locations during retrieval, the functional role of these saccades is not known. Understanding the potential role of eye movements may help address classic questions in recognition memory. Specifically, are episodic traces rich and detailed, characterized by a single strength-driven recognition process, or are they better described by two separate processes, one for vague information and one for the retrieval of detail? Three experiments are reported, in which participants encoded audio-visual information while completing controlled patterns of eye movements. By presenting information in four sources (i.e., voices), assessments of specific and partial source memory were measured at retrieval. Across experiments, participants' eye movements at test were manipulated. Experiment 1 allowed free viewing, Experiment 2 required externally-cued fixations to previously-relevant (or irrelevant) screen locations, and Experiment 3 required externally-cued new or familiar oculomotor patterns to multiple screen locations in succession. Although eye movements were spontaneously reinstated when gaze was unconstrained during retrieval (Experiment 1), externally-cueing participants to re-engage in fixations or oculomotor patterns from encoding (Experiments 2 and 3) did not enhance retrieval. Across all experiments, participants' memories were well-described by signal-detection models of memory. Source retrieval was characterized by a continuous process, with evidence that source retrieval occurred following item memory failures, and additional evidence that participants partially recollected source, in the absence of specific item retrieval. Pupillometry provided an unbiased metric by which to compute receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curves, which were consistently curvilinear (but linear in z-space), supporting signal-detection predictions over those from dual-process theories. Implications for theoretical views of memory representations are discussed.Dissertation/ThesisPh.D. Psychology 201

Neural Signals of Video Advertisement Liking:Insights into Psychological Processes and their Temporal Dynamics

What drives the liking of video advertisements? The authors analyzed neural signals during ad exposure from three functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) data sets (113 participants from two countries watching 85 video ads) with automated meta-analytic decoding (Neurosynth). These brain-based measures of psychological processes—including perception and language (information processing), executive function and memory (cognitive functions), and social cognition and emotion (social-affective response)—predicted subsequent self-report ad liking, with emotion and memory being the earliest predictorsafter the first three seconds. Over the span of ad exposure, while the predictiveness of emotion peaked early and fell, that of social cognition had a peak-and-stable pattern, followed by a late peak of predictiveness in perception and executive function.At the aggregate level, neural signals—especially those associated with social-affective response—improved the prediction of out-of-sample ad liking compared with traditional anatomically based neuroimaging analysis and self-report liking. Finally, earlyonset social-affective response predicted population ad liking in a behavioral replication. Overall, this study helps delineate the psychological mechanisms underlying ad processing and ad liking and proposes a novel neuroscience-based approach for generating psychological insights and improving out-of-sample predictions