Fault Tolerant Scalable Support for Network Portability and Traffic Engineering

The P-SHIM6 architecture provides ISP independence to IPv6 sites without compromising scalability. This architecture is based on a middle-box, the P-SHIM6, which manages the SHIM6 protocol exchange on behalf of the nodes of a site, which are configured with provider independent addresses. Incoming and outgoing packets are processed by the P-SHIM6 box, which can assign different locators to a given communication, either when it is started, or dynamically after the communication has been established. As a consequence, changes required for provider portability are minimized, and fine-grained Traffic Engineering can be enforced at the P-SHIM6 box, in addition to the fault tolerance support provided by SHIM6.This project has been supported by the RiNG project IST-2005-035167 and by the IMPROVISA project TSI2005-07384-C03-02.Publicad

End-Site Routing Support for IPv6 Multihoming

Multihoming is currently widely used to provide fault tolerance and traffic engineering capabilities. It is expected that, as telecommunication costs decrease, its adoption will become more and more prevalent. Current multihoming support is not designed to scale up to the expected number of multihomed sites, so alternative solutions are required, especially for IPv6. In order to preserve interdomain routing scalability, the new multihoming solution has to be compatible with Provider Aggregatable addressing. However, such addressing scheme imposes the configuration of multiple prefixes in multihomed sites, which in turn causes several operational difficulties within those sites that may even result in communication failures when all the ISPs are working properly. In this paper we propose the adoption of Source Address Dependent routing within the multihomed site to overcome the identified difficulties.Publicad

HLOC: Hints-Based Geolocation Leveraging Multiple Measurement Frameworks

Geographically locating an IP address is of interest for many purposes. There are two major ways to obtain the location of an IP address: querying commercial databases or conducting latency measurements. For structural Internet nodes, such as routers, commercial databases are limited by low accuracy, while current measurement-based approaches overwhelm users with setup overhead and scalability issues. In this work we present our system HLOC, aiming to combine the ease of database use with the accuracy of latency measurements. We evaluate HLOC on a comprehensive router data set of 1.4M IPv4 and 183k IPv6 routers. HLOC first extracts location hints from rDNS names, and then conducts multi-tier latency measurements. Configuration complexity is minimized by using publicly available large-scale measurement frameworks such as RIPE Atlas. Using this measurement, we can confirm or disprove the location hints found in domain names. We publicly release HLOC's ready-to-use source code, enabling researchers to easily increase geolocation accuracy with minimum overhead.Comment: As published in TMA'17 conference: http://tma.ifip.org/main-conference

Entropy/IP: Uncovering Structure in IPv6 Addresses

In this paper, we introduce Entropy/IP: a system that discovers Internet address structure based on analyses of a subset of IPv6 addresses known to be active, i.e., training data, gleaned by readily available passive and active means. The system is completely automated and employs a combination of information-theoretic and machine learning techniques to probabilistically model IPv6 addresses. We present results showing that our system is effective in exposing structural characteristics of portions of the IPv6 Internet address space populated by active client, service, and router addresses. In addition to visualizing the address structure for exploration, the system uses its models to generate candidate target addresses for scanning. For each of 15 evaluated datasets, we train on 1K addresses and generate 1M candidates for scanning. We achieve some success in 14 datasets, finding up to 40% of the generated addresses to be active. In 11 of these datasets, we find active network identifiers (e.g., /64 prefixes or `subnets') not seen in training. Thus, we provide the first evidence that it is practical to discover subnets and hosts by scanning probabilistically selected areas of the IPv6 address space not known to contain active hosts a priori.Comment: Paper presented at the ACM IMC 2016 in Santa Monica, USA (https://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=2987445). Live Demo site available at http://www.entropy-ip.com

Measuring exposure in DDoS protection services

Denial-of-Service attacks have rapidly gained in popularity over the last decade. The increase in frequency, size, and complexity of attacks has made DDoS Protection Services (DPS) an attractive mitigation solution to which the protection of services can be outsourced. Despite a thriving market and increasing adoption of protection services, a DPS can often be bypassed, and direct attacks can be launched against the origin of a target. Many protection services leverage the Domain Name System (DNS) to protect, e.g., Web sites. When the DNS is misconfigured, the origin IP address of a target can leak to attackers, which defeats the purpose of outsourcing protection. We perform a large-scale analysis of this phenomenon by using three large data sets that cover a 16-month period: a data set of active DNS measurements; a DNS-based data set that focuses on DPS adoption; and a data set of DoS attacks inferred from backscatter traffic to a sizable darknet. We analyze nearly 11k Web sites on Alexa's top 1M that outsource protection, for eight leading DPS providers. Our results show that 40% of these Web sites expose the origin in the DNS. Moreover, we show that the origin of 19% of these Web sites is targeted after outsourcing protection