What’s in it for me? Incentive-compatible route coordination of crowdsourced resources

With the recent trend in crowdsourcing, i.e., using the power of crowds to assist in satisfying demand, the pool of resources suitable for GeoPresence-capable systems has expanded to include already roaming devices, such as mobile phones, and moving vehicles. We envision an environment, in which the motion of these crowdsourced mobile resources is coordinated, according to their preexisting schedules to satisfy geo-temporal demand on a mobility field. In this paper, we propose an incentive compatible route coordination mechanism for crowdsourced resources, in which participating mobile agents satisfy geo-temporal requests in return for monetary rewards. We define the Flexible Route Coordination (FRC) problem, in which an agent’s flexibility is exploited to maximize the coverage of a mobility field, with an objective to maximize the revenue collected from satisfied paying requests. Given that the FRC problem is NP-hard, we define an optimal algorithm to plan the route of a single agent on a graph with evolving labels, then we use that algorithm to define a 1/2-approximation algorithm to solve the problem in its general model, with multiple agents. Moreover, we define an incentive compatible, rational, and cash-positive payment mechanism, which guarantees that an agent’s truthfulness about its flexibility is an ex-post Nash equilibrium strategy. Finally, we analyze the proposed mechanisms theoretically, and evaluate their performance experimentally using real mobility traces from urban environments.Supported in part by NSF Grants, #1430145, #1414119, #1347522, #1239021, and #1012798

Incentive-compatible route coordination of crowdsourced resources

Technical ReportWith the recent trend in crowdsourcing, i.e., using the power of crowds to assist in satisfying demand, the pool of resources suitable for GeoPresen-ce-capable systems has expanded to include already roaming devices, such as mobile phones, and moving vehicles. We envision an environment, in which the motion of these crowdsourced mobile resources is coordinated, according to their preexisting schedules to satisfy geo-temporal demand on a mobility field. In this paper, we propose an incentive compatible route coordination mechanism for crowdsourced resources, in which participating mobile agents satisfy geo-temporal requests in return for monetary rewards. We define the Flexible Route Coordination (FRC) problem, in which an agent’s flexibility is exploited to maximize the coverage of a mobility field, with an objective to maximize the revenue collected from satisfied paying requests. Given that the FRC problem is NP-hard, we define an optimal algorithm to plan the route of a single agent on a graph with evolving labels, then we use that algorithm to define a 1-approximation algorithm to solve the 2 problem in its general model, with multiple agents. Moreover, we define an incentive compatible, rational, and cash-positive payment mechanism, which guarantees that an agent’s truthfulness about its flexibility is an ex-post Nash equilibrium strategy. Finally, we analyze the proposed mechanisms theoretically, and evaluate their performance experimentally using real mobility traces from urban environments

Profit-based latency problems on the line.

The latency problem with profits is a generalization of the minimum latency problem. In this generalization it is not necessary to visit all clients, however, visiting a client may bring a certain revenue. More precisely, in the latency problem with profits, a server and a set of n clients, each with corresponding profit p_i (1 ≤ i ≤ n), are given. The single server is positioned at the origin at time t = 0 and travels with unit speed. When visiting a client, the server receives a revenue of p_i - t, with t the time at which the server reaches client i (1 ≤ i ≤ n). The goal is to select clients and find a route for the server such that total collected revenue is maximized. We formulate a dynamic programming algorithm to solve this problem when all clients are located on a line. We also consider the problem on the line with k servers and prove NP-completeness for the latency problem on the line with k non-identical servers and release dates. In this proof we also settle the complexity of an open problem in de Paepe et al. [4].Minimum latency; Traveling repairman; Dynamic programming; Complexity;

A two-stage approach to ridesharing assignment and auction in a crowdsourcing collaborative transportation platform.

Collaborative transportation platforms have emerged as an innovative way for firms and individuals to meet their transportation needs through using services from external profit-seeking drivers. A number of collaborative transportation platforms (such as Uber, Lyft, and MyDHL) arise to facilitate such delivery requests in recent years. A particular collaborative transportation platform usually provides a two sided marketplace with one set of members (service seekers or passengers) posting tasks, and the another set of members (service providers or drivers) accepting on these tasks and providing services. As the collaborative transportation platform attracts more service seekers and providers, the number of open requests at any given time can be large. On the other hand, service providers or drivers often evaluate the first couple of pending requests in deciding which request to participate in. This kind of behavior made by the driver may have potential detrimental implications for all parties involved. First, the drivers typically end up participating in those requests that require longer driving distance for higher profit. Second, the passengers tend to overpay under a competition free environment compared to the situation where the drivers are competing with each other. Lastly, when the drivers and passengers are not satisfied with their outcomes, they may leave the platforms. Therefore the platform could lose revenues in the short term and market share in the long term. In order to address these concerns, a decision-making support procedure is needed to: (i) provide recommendations for drivers to identify the most preferable requests, (ii) offer reasonable rates to passengers without hurting driver’s profit. This dissertation proposes a mathematical modeling approach to address two aspects of the crowdsourcing ridesharing platform. One is of interest to the centralized platform management on the assignment of requests to drivers; and this is done through a multi-criterion many to many assignment optimization. The other is of interest to the decentralized individual drivers on making optimal bid for multiple assigned requests; and this is done through the use of prospect theory. To further validate our proposed collaborative transportation framework, we analyze the taxi yellow cab data collected from New York city in 2017 in both demand and supply perspective. We attempt to examine and understand the collected data to predict Uber-like ridesharing trip demands and driver supplies in order to use these information to the subsequent multi-criterion driver-to-passenger assignment model and driver\u27s prospect maximization model. Particularly regression and time series techniques are used to develop the forecasting models so that centralized module in the platform can predict the ridesharing demands and supply within certain census tracts at a given hour. There are several future research directions along the research stream in this dissertation. First, one could investigate to extend the models to the emerging concept of Physical Internet on commodity and goods transportation under the interconnected crowdsourcing platform. In other words, integrate crowdsourcing in prevalent supply chain logistics and transportation. Second, it\u27s interesting to study the effect of Uber-like crowdsourcing transportation platforms on existing traffic flows at the various levels (e.g., urban and regional)

On green routing and scheduling problem

The vehicle routing and scheduling problem has been studied with much interest within the last four decades. In this paper, some of the existing literature dealing with routing and scheduling problems with environmental issues is reviewed, and a description is provided of the problems that have been investigated and how they are treated using combinatorial optimization tools

Hybrid Mechanisms for On-Demand Transport

Peer reviewedPostprin

Incentive compatible route coordination of crowdsourced resources and its application to GeoPresence-as-a-Service

With the recent trend in crowdsourcing, i.e., using the power of crowds to assist in satisfying demand, the pool of resources suitable for GeoPresen- ce-capable systems has expanded to include already roaming devices, such as mobile phones, and moving vehicles. We envision an environment, in which the motion of these crowdsourced mobile resources is coordinated, according to their preexisting schedules to satisfy geo-temporal demand on a mobility field. In this paper, we propose an incentive compatible route coordination mechanism for crowdsourced resources, in which participating mobile agents satisfy geo-temporal requests in return for monetary rewards. We define the Flexible Route Coordination (FRC) problem, in which an agent's exibility is exploited to maximize the coverage of a mo- bility field, with an objective to maximize the revenue collected from sat- isfied paying requests. Given that the FRC problem is NP-hard, we define an optimal algorithm to plan the route of a single agent on a graph with evolving labels, then we use that algorithm to define a 1 2 -approximation algorithm to solve the problem in its general model, with multiple agents. Moreover, we define an incentive compatible, rational, and cash-positive payment mechanism, which guarantees that an agent's truthfulness about its exibility is an ex-post Nash equilibrium strategy. Finally, we analyze the proposed mechanisms theoretically, and evaluate their performance experimentally using real mobility traces from urban environments.Supported in part by NSF Grants, #1430145, #1414119, #1347522, #1239021, and #1012798