17 research outputs found
Modeling Adversaries in a Logic for Security Protocol Analysis
Logics for security protocol analysis require the formalization of an
adversary model that specifies the capabilities of adversaries. A common model
is the Dolev-Yao model, which considers only adversaries that can compose and
replay messages, and decipher them with known keys. The Dolev-Yao model is a
useful abstraction, but it suffers from some drawbacks: it cannot handle the
adversary knowing protocol-specific information, and it cannot handle
probabilistic notions, such as the adversary attempting to guess the keys. We
show how we can analyze security protocols under different adversary models by
using a logic with a notion of algorithmic knowledge. Roughly speaking,
adversaries are assumed to use algorithms to compute their knowledge; adversary
capabilities are captured by suitable restrictions on the algorithms used. We
show how we can model the standard Dolev-Yao adversary in this setting, and how
we can capture more general capabilities including protocol-specific knowledge
and guesses.Comment: 23 pages. A preliminary version appeared in the proceedings of
FaSec'0