Categoricity, Open-Ended Schemas and Peano Arithmetic

One of the philosophical uses of Dedekind’s categoricity theorem for Peano Arithmetic is to provide support for semantic realism. To this end, the logical framework in which the proof of the theorem is conducted becomes highly significant. I examine different proposals regarding these logical frameworks and focus on the philosophical benefits of adopting open-ended schemas in contrast to second order logic as the logical medium of the proof. I investigate Pederson and Rossberg’s critique of the ontological advantages of open-ended arithmetic when it comes to establishing the categoricity of Peano Arithmetic and show that the critique is highly problematic. I argue that Pederson and Rossberg’s ontological criterion deliver the bizarre result that certain first order subsystems of Peano Arithmetic have a second order ontology. As a consequence, the application of the ontological criterion proposed by Pederson and Rossberg assigns a certain type of ontology to a theory, and a different, richer, ontology to one of its subtheories

Import‐Export and ‘And’

Import-Export says that a conditional 'If p, if q, r' is always equivalent to the conditional 'If p and q, r'. I argue that Import-Export does not sit well with a classical approach to conjunction: given some plausible and widely accepted principles about conditionals, Import-Export together with classical conjunction leads to absurd consequences. My main goal is to draw out these surprising connections. In concluding I argue that the right response is to reject Import-Export and adopt instead a limited version which better fits natural language data; accounts for all the intuitions that motivate Import-Export in the first place; and fits better with a classical conjunction

Resistance Monitoring

The problem considered was that of estimating the temperature field in a contaminated region of soil, using measurements of electrical potential and current and also of temperature, at accessible points such as the wells and electrodes and the soil surface. On the timescale considered, essentially days, the equation for the electrical potential is static. At any given time the potential $V$ satisfies the equation $\nabla \cdot (\sigma \nabla V ) = 0$. Time enters the equation only as a parameter since $\sigma$ is temperature and hence time dependent. The problem of finding $\sigma$ when both the potential $V$ and the current density $\sigma \partial{V} / \partial{n}$ are known on the boundary of the domain is a standard inverse problem of long standing. It is known that the problem is ill posed and hence that an accurate numerical solution will be difficult especially when the input data is subject to measurement errors. In this report we examine a possible method for solving the electrical inverse problem which could possibly be used in a time stepping algorithm when the conductivity changes little in each step. Since we are also able to make temperature measurements there is also the possibility of examining an inverse problem for the temperature equation. There seems to be much less literature on this problem, which in our case is essentially, a first order equation with a heat source.(We neglect thermal conductivity, which is small compared with the convection). Combining the results of both inverse problems might give a more robust method of estimating the temperature in the soil

A comparison of statistical models for short categorical or ordinal time series with applications in ecology

We study two statistical models for short-length categorical (or ordinal) time series. The first one is a regression model based on generalized linear model. The second one is a parametrized Markovian model, particularizing the discrete autoregressive model to the case of categorical data. These models are used to analyze two data-sets: annual larch cone production and weekly planktonic abundance.Comment: 18 page

Hypatia's silence. Truth, justification, and entitlement.

Hartry Field distinguished two concepts of type-free truth: scientific truth and disquotational truth. We argue that scientific type-free truth cannot do justificatory work in the foundations of mathematics. We also present an argument, based on Crispin Wright's theory of cognitive projects and entitlement, that disquotational truth can do justificatory work in the foundations of mathematics. The price to pay for this is that the concept of disquotational truth requires non-classical logical treatment

Overgeneration in the Higher Infinite

The Overgeneration Argument is a prominent objection against the model-theoretic account of logical consequence for second-order languages. In previous work we have offered a reconstruction of this argument which locates its source in the conflict between the neutrality of second-order logic and its alleged entanglement with mathematics. Some cases of this conflict concern small large cardinals. In this article, we show that in these cases the conflict can be resolved by moving from a set-theoretic implementation of the model-theoretic account to one which uses higher-order resources

Structural Relativity and Informal Rigour

Informal rigour is the process by which we come to understand particular mathematical structures and then manifest this rigour through axiomatisations. Structural relativity is the idea that the kinds of structures we isolate are dependent upon the logic we employ. We bring together these ideas by considering the level of informal rigour exhibited by our set-theoretic discourse, and argue that different foundational programmes should countenance different underlying logics (intermediate between first- and second-order) for formulating set theory. By bringing considerations of perturbations in modal space to bear on the debate, we will suggest that a promising option for representing current set-theoretic thought is given by formulating set theory using quasi-weak second-order logic. These observations indicate that the usual division of structures into \particular (e.g. the natural number structure) and general (e.g. the group structure) is perhaps too coarse grained; we should also make a distinction between intentionally and unintentionally general structures