1,189 research outputs found
Spinoza on Composition, Monism, and Beings of Reason
In this paper, I argue that Spinoza holds a perspectivalist view of mereological composition, a form of anti-realism. The paper has two parts: In the first half of the paper, I introduce interpretive puzzles for the standard realist reading of Spinozaâs mereology. In the second half of the paper, I discuss Spinozaâs positive view on mereological composition and present a perspectivalist reading that avoids the interpretive puzzles
Is mereology empirical? Composition for fermions
How best to think about quantum systems under permutation invariance is a
question that has received a great deal of attention in the literature. But
very little attention has been paid to taking seriously the proposal that
permutation invariance reflects a representational redundancy in the formalism.
Under such a proposal, it is far from obvious how a constituent quantum system
is represented. Consequently, it is also far from obvious how quantum systems
compose to form assemblies, i.e. what is the formal structure of their
relations of parthood, overlap and fusion.
In this paper, I explore one proposal for the case of fermions and their
assemblies. According to this proposal, fermionic assemblies which are not
entangled -- in some heterodox, but natural sense of 'entangled' -- provide a
prima facie counterexample to classical mereology. This result is puzzling;
but, I argue, no more intolerable than any other available interpretative
option.Comment: 24 pages, 1 figur
The World Is Either Digital or Analogue
Peer reviewedPreprin
The nonclassical mereology of olfactory experiences
While there is a growing philosophical interest in analysing olfactory experiences, the mereological structure of odours considered in respect of how they are perceptually experienced has not yet been extensively investigated. The paper argues that odours are perceptually experienced as having a mereological structure, but this structure is significantly different from the spatial mereological structure of visually experienced objects. Most importantly, in the case of the olfactory part-structure, the classical weak supplementation principle is not satisfied. This thesis is justified by referring to empirical results in olfactory science concerning the human ability to identify components in complex olfactory stimuli. Further, it is shown how differences between olfactory and visual mereologies may arise from the way in which these modalities represent space
The 1900 Turn in Bertrand Russellâs Logic, the Emergence of his Paradox, and the Way Out
Russellâs initial project in philosophy (1898) was to make mathematics rigorous reducing it to logic. Before August 1900, however, Russellâs logic was nothing but mereology. First, his acquaintance with Peanoâs ideas in August 1900 led him to discard the part-whole logic and accept a kind of intensional predicate logic instead. Among other things, the predicate logic helped Russell embrace a technique of treating the paradox of infinite numbers with the help of a singular concept, which he called âdenoting phraseâ. Unfortunately, a new paradox emerged soon: that of classes. The main contention of this paper is that Russellâs new conception only transferred the paradox of infinity from the realm of infinite numbers to that of class-inclusion.
Russellâs long-elaborated solution to his paradox developed between 1905 and 1908 was nothing but to set aside of some of the ideas he adopted with his turn of August 1900: (i) With the Theory of Descriptions, he reintroduced the complexes we are acquainted with in logic. In this way, he partly restored the pre-August 1900 mereology of complexes and simples. (ii) The elimination of classes, with the help of the âsubstitutional theoryâ, and of propositions, by means of the Multiple Relation Theory of Judgment, completed this process
Cognitive Science for the Revisionary Metaphysician
Many philosophers insist that the revisionary metaphysicianâi.e., the metaphysician who offers a metaphysical theory which conflicts with folk intuitionsâbears a special burden to explain why certain folk intuitions are mistaken. I show how evidence from cognitive science can help revisionist discharge this explanatory burden. Focusing on composition and persistence, I argue that empirical evidence indicates that the folk operate with a promiscuous teleomentalist view of composition and persistence. The folk view, I argue, deserves to be debunked. In this way, I take myself to have illustrated one key role cognitive science can play in metaphysics; namely by helping the revisionary metaphysician discharge the explanatory burden of providing a plausible explanation of how the folk have gone wrong
- âŠ