9,270 research outputs found

    Observability and Estimation of Distributed Space Systems via Local Information-Exchange Networks

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    Spacecraft formation flying involves the coordination of states among multiple spacecraft through relative sensing, inter-spacecraft communication, and control. Most existing formation-flying estimation algorithms can only be supported via highly centralized, all-to-all, static relative sensing. New algorithms are proposed that are scalable, modular, and robust to variations in the topology and link characteristics of the formation exchange network. These distributed algorithms rely on a local information exchange network, relaxing the assumptions on existing algorithms. Distributed space systems rely on a signal transmission network among multiple spacecraft for their operation. Control and coordination among multiple spacecraft in a formation is facilitated via a network of relative sensing and interspacecraft communications. Guidance, navigation, and control rely on the sensing network. This network becomes more complex the more spacecraft are added, or as mission requirements become more complex. The observability of a formation state was observed by a set of local observations from a particular node in the formation. Formation observability can be parameterized in terms of the matrices appearing in the formation dynamics and observation matrices. An agreement protocol was used as a mechanism for observing formation states from local measurements. An agreement protocol is essentially an unforced dynamic system whose trajectory is governed by the interconnection geometry and initial condition of each node, with a goal of reaching a common value of interest. The observability of the interconnected system depends on the geometry of the network, as well as the position of the observer relative to the topology. For the first time, critical GN&C (guidance, navigation, and control estimation) subsystems are synthesized by bringing the contribution of the spacecraft information-exchange network to the forefront of algorithmic analysis and design. The result is a formation estimation algorithm that is modular and robust to variations in the topology and link properties of the underlying formation network

    Deep Reinforcement Learning for Swarm Systems

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    Recently, deep reinforcement learning (RL) methods have been applied successfully to multi-agent scenarios. Typically, these methods rely on a concatenation of agent states to represent the information content required for decentralized decision making. However, concatenation scales poorly to swarm systems with a large number of homogeneous agents as it does not exploit the fundamental properties inherent to these systems: (i) the agents in the swarm are interchangeable and (ii) the exact number of agents in the swarm is irrelevant. Therefore, we propose a new state representation for deep multi-agent RL based on mean embeddings of distributions. We treat the agents as samples of a distribution and use the empirical mean embedding as input for a decentralized policy. We define different feature spaces of the mean embedding using histograms, radial basis functions and a neural network learned end-to-end. We evaluate the representation on two well known problems from the swarm literature (rendezvous and pursuit evasion), in a globally and locally observable setup. For the local setup we furthermore introduce simple communication protocols. Of all approaches, the mean embedding representation using neural network features enables the richest information exchange between neighboring agents facilitating the development of more complex collective strategies.Comment: 31 pages, 12 figures, version 3 (published in JMLR Volume 20

    Timing and Virtual Observability in Ultimatum Bargaining and "Weak Link" Coordination Games

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    Previous studies have shown that simply knowing one player moves first can affect behavior in games, even when the first-mover's moves are known to be unobservable. This observation violates the game-theoretic principle that timing of unobserved moves is irrelevant, but is consistent with virtual observability, a theory of how timing can matter without the ability to observe actions. However, this previous research only shows that timing matters in games where knowledge that one player moved first can help select that player's preferred equilibrium, presenting an alternative explanation to virtual observability. We extend this work by varying timing of unobservable moves in ultimatum bargaining games and “weak link” coordination games. In the latter, the equilibrium selection explanation does not predict any change in behavior due to timing differences. We find that timing without observability affects behavior in both games, but not substantially
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