Rejoinder: Quantifying the Fraction of Missing Information for Hypothesis Testing in Statistical and Genetic Studies

Rejoinder to "Quantifying the Fraction of Missing Information for Hypothesis Testing in Statistical and Genetic Studies" [arXiv:1102.2774]Comment: Published in at http://dx.doi.org/10.1214/08-STS244REJ the Statistical Science (http://www.imstat.org/sts/) by the Institute of Mathematical Statistics (http://www.imstat.org

Rejoinder of: Statistical analysis of an archeological find

Rejoinder of ``Statistical analysis of an archeological find'' [arXiv:0804.0079]Comment: Published in at http://dx.doi.org/10.1214/08-AOAS99REJ the Annals of Applied Statistics (http://www.imstat.org/aoas/) by the Institute of Mathematical Statistics (http://www.imstat.org

The Debate Widens - Introduction

Shortly after Don Patinkin’s initial assault on Milton Friedman, Thomas Humphrey (chapter 14 [1971], 12) highlighted the importance of the contributions (“overlooked by both Patinkin and Friedman”) made to the quantity theory between 1930-50 by four non-Chicagoan economists: Carl Synder, Lionel Edie, Lauchlin Currie and Clark Warburton. There are similarities between Friedman’s version of the Chicago monetary tradition and Currie’s Supply and Control of Money in the United States (1934). Also, Currie’s (1962 [1934]) essay on ‘The Failure of Monetary Policy to Prevent the Depression of 1929-32’ interpreted the Great Depression as a Great Contraction in a manner which foreshadowed the later work by Friedman and Anna Schwartz (1963). Humphrey commented that “oddly enough, however, [Lloyd] Mints and Friedman do not seem to be aware of the extent to which their criticisms were anticipated by Currie, for they cite him infrequently”. In the exchange that followed two further names were added to the list of overlooked quantity theorists: Arthur Marget and James Angell (Patinkin chapter 16 [1974], 28; Humphrey chapter 17 [1973], 462). Both Patinkin and Humphrey expressed curiosity about these omissions. Currie (chapter 15 [1972]) provides an additional perspective on Humphrey’s contribution in a note that is published here for the first time. ISBN: 185196767

Rejoinder: Microarrays, Empirical Bayes and the Two-Groups Model

Rejoinder to ``Microarrays, Empirical Bayes and the Two-Groups Model'' [arXiv:0808.0572]Comment: Published in at http://dx.doi.org/10.1214/08-STS236REJ the Statistical Science (http://www.imstat.org/sts/) by the Institute of Mathematical Statistics (http://www.imstat.org

Rejoinder on: queueing models for the analysis of communication systems

In this rejoinder, we respond to the comments and questions of three discussants of our paper on queueing models for the analysis of communication systems. Our responses are structured around two main topics: discrete-time modeling and further extensions of the presented queueing analysis

On what we experience when we hear people speak

According to perceptualism, fluent comprehension of speech is a perceptual achievement, in as much as it is akin to such high-level perceptual states as the perception of objects as cups or trees, or of people as happy or sad. According to liberalism, grasp of meaning is partially constitutive of the phenomenology of fluent comprehension. I here defend an influential line of argument for liberal perceptualism, resting on phenomenal contrasts in our comprehension of speech, due to Susanna Siegel and Tim Bayne, against objections from Casey O'Callaghan and Indrek Reiland. I concentrate on the contrast between the putative immediacy of meaning-assignment in fluent comprehension, as compared with other, less ordinary, perhaps translation-based ways of getting at the meaning of speech. I argue this putative immediacy is difficult to capture on a non-perceptual view (whether liberal or non-liberal), and that the immediacy in question has much in common with that which applies in other, less controversial cases of high-level perception