Reification and Truthmaking Patterns

Reification is a standard technique in conceptual modeling, which consists of including in the domain of discourse entities that may otherwise be hidden or implicit. However, deciding what should be rei- fied is not always easy. Recent work on formal ontology offers us a simple answer: put in the domain of discourse those entities that are responsible for the (alleged) truth of our propositions. These are called truthmakers. Re-visiting previous work, we propose in this paper a systematic analysis of truthmaking patterns for properties and relations based on the ontolog- ical nature of their truthmakers. Truthmaking patterns will be presented as generalization of reification patterns, accounting for the fact that, in some cases, we do not reify a property or a relationship directly, but we rather reify its truthmakers

Relationships and events: towards a general theory of reification and truthmaking.

We propose a novel ontological analysis of relations and relationships based on a re-visitation of a classic problem in the practice of knowledge repre- sentation and conceptual modeling, namely relationship reification. Our idea is that a relation holds in virtue of a relationship's existence. Relationships are therefore truthmakers of relations. In this paper we present a general theory or reification and truthmaking, and discuss the interplay between events and rela- tionships, suggesting that relationships are the focus of events, which emerge from the context (the scene) they occur in

Ontological Dependence, Spatial Location, and Part Structure

This paper discusses attributively limited concrete objects such as disturbances (holes, folds, scratches etc), tropes, and attitudinal objects, which lack the sort of spatial location or part structures expected of them as concrete objects. The paper proposes an account in terms of (quasi-Fregean) abstraction, which has so far been applied only to abstract objects

On weak truthmaking

Informally speaking, a truthmaker is something in the world in virtue of which the sentences of a language can be made true. This fundamental philosophical notion plays a central role in applied ontology. In particular, a recent nonorthodox formulation of this notion proposed by the philosopher Josh Parsons, which we labelled weak truthamking, has been shown to be extremely useful in addressing a number of classical problems in the area of Conceptual Modeling. In this paper, after revisiting the classical notion of truthmaking, we conduct an in depth analysis of Parsons’ account of weak truthmaking. By doing that, we expose some difficulties in his original formulation. As the main contribution of this paper, we propose solutions to address these issues which are then integrated in a new precise interpretation of truthmaking that is harmonizable wit

BFO and DOLCE: So Far, So Close…

A survey of the similarities and differences between BFO and DOLCE, and of the mutual interactions between Nicola Guarino and Barry Smit

The Unreality of Realization

This paper argues against the realization principle, which reifies the realization relation between lower-level and higher-level properties. It begins with a review of some principles of naturalistic metaphysics. Then it criticizes some likely reasons for embracing the realization principle, and finally it argues against the principle directly. The most likely reasons for embracing the principle depend on the dubious assumption that special science theories cannot be true unless special science predicates designate properties. The principle itself turns out to be false because the realization relation fails the naturalistic test for reality: it makes no causal difference to the world.1 1This paper resulted from work done at John Heil's 2006 Mind and Metaphysics NEH Summer Seminar at Washington University in St. Louis. An early version of it was presented in a special symposium on realization at the 2007 meeting of the Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology. I owe thanks to all the participants in both events for helpful discussions, and I owe particular thanks to Ken Aizawa, Torin Alter, Jason Ford, Carl Gillett, John Heil, Nicholas Helms, Pete Mandik, John Post, Gene Witmer, Michelle Wrenn, Tad Zawidzki, and two anonymous referees for the AJP

Semantics, Ontology and Explanation

The terms 'semantics' and 'ontology' are increasingly appearing together with 'explanation', not only in the scientific literature, but also in organizational communication. However, all of these terms are also being significantly overloaded. In this paper, we discuss their strong relation under particular interpretations. Specifically, we discuss a notion of explanation termed ontological unpacking, which aims at explaining symbolic domain descriptions (conceptual models, knowledge graphs, logical specifications) by revealing their ontological commitment in terms of their assumed truthmakers, i.e., the entities in one's ontology that make the propositions in those descriptions true. To illustrate this idea, we employ an ontological theory of relations to explain (by revealing the hidden semantics of) a very simple symbolic model encoded in the standard modeling language UML. We also discuss the essential role played by ontology-driven conceptual models (resulting from this form of explanation processes) in properly supporting semantic interoperability tasks. Finally, we discuss the relation between ontological unpacking and other forms of explanation in philosophy and science, as well as in the area of Artificial Intelligence

Formális fogalmak a jogi ontológiákban

Jelen tanulmányunkban az egyes jogi ontológiákban használt vagy használni érdemes „csúcsfogalmakat” elemezzük. Mint látni fogjuk ezek nem kizárólag a jogi minőségre tisztán és közvetlenül reflektáló fogalmak (pl. kötelezettség, jogosultság), hanem olyan általános ontológiai kategóriák, amelyeknek speciális szerepe vagy minősége van a jogi ontológiák kialakításakor

Ontology, Ontologies and the "I" of FAIR

According to the FAIR guiding principles, one of the central attributes for maximizing the added value of information artifacts is interoperability. In this paper, I discuss the importance, and propose a characterization of the notion of Semantic Interoperability. Moreover, I show that a direct consequence of this view is that Semantic Interoperability cannot be achieved without the support of, on one hand, (i) ontologies, as meaning contracts capturing the conceptualizations represented in information artifacts and, on the other hand, of (ii) Ontology, as a discipline proposing formal meth- ods and theories for clarifying these conceptualizations and articulating their representations. In particular, I discuss the fundamental role of formal ontological theories (in the latter sense) to properly ground the construction of representation languages, as well as methodological and computational tools for supporting the engineering of ontologies (in the former sense) in the context of FAIR