Rhetorical relations for information retrieval

Typically, every part in most coherent text has some plausible reason for its presence, some function that it performs to the overall semantics of the text. Rhetorical relations, e.g. contrast, cause, explanation, describe how the parts of a text are linked to each other. Knowledge about this socalled discourse structure has been applied successfully to several natural language processing tasks. This work studies the use of rhetorical relations for Information Retrieval (IR): Is there a correlation between certain rhetorical relations and retrieval performance? Can knowledge about a document's rhetorical relations be useful to IR? We present a language model modification that considers rhetorical relations when estimating the relevance of a document to a query. Empirical evaluation of different versions of our model on TREC settings shows that certain rhetorical relations can benefit retrieval effectiveness notably (> 10% in mean average precision over a state-of-the-art baseline)

Towards a Principled Representation of Discourse Plans

We argue that discourse plans must capture the intended causal and decompositional relations between communicative actions. We present a planning algorithm, DPOCL, that builds plan structures that properly capture these relations, and show how these structures are used to solve the problems that plagued previous discourse planners, and allow a system to participate effectively and flexibly in an ongoing dialogue.Comment: requires cogsci94.sty, psfig.st

Fiat objects

Human cognitive acts are directed towards entities of a wide range of different types. What follows is a new proposal for bringing order into this typological clutter. A categorial scheme for the objects of human cognition should be (1) critical and realistic. Cognitive subjects are liable to error, even to systematic error of the sort that is manifested by believers in the Pantheon of Olympian gods. Thus not all putative object-directed acts should be recognized as having objects of their own. Broadly, the objects towards which human cognition is directed should be parts of reality in a sense that is at least consistent with the truths of natural science. But such a scheme should also be (2) comprehensive: it should do justice to each sort of object on its own terms, and not attempt to eliminate objects of one sort in favour of objects of other, more favoured sorts. Linguistic and other forms of idealism, as well as Meinongian theories, which assign to each and every referring expression or intentional act an object tailored to fit, yield categorial schemes which fail to satisfy (1). Physicalistic and other forms of reductionism yield categorial schemes which fail to satisfy (2). What follows is a categorial scheme that is both critically realistic and comprehensive. Thus it enjoys some of the benefits of linguistic idealism and physicalism, without (or so it is hoped) the corresponding disadvantages of each