Advances in negotiation theory : bargaining, coalitions, and fairness

Bargaining is ubiquitous in real life. It is a major dimension of political and business activities. It appears at the international level, when governments negotiate on matters ranging from economic issues (such as the removal of trade barriers), to global security (such as fighting against terrorism) to environmental and related issues (such as climate change control). What factors determinethe outcomes of such negotiations? What strategies can help reach an agreement? How should the parties involved divide the gains from cooperation? With whom will one make alliances? The authors address these questions by focusing on a noncooperative approach to negotiations, which is particularly relevant for the study of international negotiations. By reviewing noncooperative bargaining theory, noncooperative coalition theory, and the theory of fair division, they try to identify the connections among these different facets of the same problem in an attempt to facilitate progress toward a unified framework.Economic Theory&Research,Social Protections&Assistance,Environmental Economics&Policies,Scientific Research&Science Parks,Science Education

Perfection and Stability of Stationary Points with Applications in Noncooperative Games

It is well known that an upper semi-continuous compact- and convex-valued mapping ö from a nonempty compact and convex set X to the Euclidean space of which X is a subset has at least one stationary point, being a point in X at which the image ö (x)has a nonempty intersection with the normal cone at x.In many circumstances there may be more than one stationary point.In this paper we refine the concept of stationary point by perturbing simultaneously both the set X and the solution concept.In case a stationary point is the limit of a sequence of perturbed solutions on a sequence of sets converging continuously to X we say that the stationary point is stable with respect to this sequence of sets and the mapping which defines the perturbed solution.It is shown that stable stationary points exist for a large class of perturbations.A specific refinement, called robustness, is obtained if a stationary point is the limit of stationary points on a sequence of sets converging to X.It is shown that a robust stationary point always exists for any sequence of sets which starts from an interior point and converges to X in a continuous way.We also discuss several applications in noncooperative game theory.We first show that two well known refinements of the Nash equilibrium, namely, perfect Nash equilibrium and proper Nash equilibrium, are special cases of our robustness concept.Further, a third special case of robustness refines the concept of properness and a robust Nash equilibrium is shown to exist for every game.In symmetric bimatrix games, our results imply the existence of a symmetric proper equilibrium.Applying our results to the field of evolutionary game theory yields a refinement of the stationary points of the replicator dynamics.We show that the refined solution always exists, contrary to many well known refinement concepts in the field that may fail to exist under the same conditions.

The Present and Future of Game Theory

A broad nontechnical coverage of many of the developments in game theory since the 1950s is given together with some comments on important open problems and where some of the developments may take place. The nearly 90 references given serve only as a minimal guide to the many thousands of books and articles that have been written. The purpose here is to present a broad brush picture of the many areas of study and application that have come into being. The use of deep techniques flourishes best when it stays in touch with application. There is a vital symbiotic relationship between good theory and practice. The breakneck speed of development of game theory calls for an appreciation of both the many realities of conflict, coordination and cooperation and the abstract investigation of all of them.Game theory, Application and theory, Social sciences, Law, Experimental gaming, conflict, Coordination and cooperation

Noncooperative Models of Bargaining

Chapter 07 in Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, 1992, vol. 1, pp 179-225 from ElsevierCenter for Research on Economic and Social Theory, Department of Economics, University of Michiganhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/100631/1/ECON108.pd

A procedure for finding Nash equilibria in bi-matrix games

Game Theory;operations research

Signaling and forward induction in a market entry context

Game Theory;Market Structure