Referenda as a Catch-22

The result of a referendum delivers a significant amount of information about social preferences to each composite member of the society. This paper argues that, beyond this obvious fact, the choice not to offer a referendum by an authority, although permitted to do so, may enhance as well the information individuals posses about social preferences. The addition of a referendum option in the rules of a game, that is, by enabling the authority to offer referenda at will, results in an assured re-election of authorities that implement socially beneficial policies, and in a decrease of the re-election probability of authorities that implement socially obnoxious policies. In a sense, by allowing an authority to offer referenda, an inescapable Catch-22 is introduced in the game, which inhibits the re-election of a measure of "bad" authorities and, thus, confirms that one of the main benefits of a democratic institution is the preservation of "good" authorities in power.referendum, democracy, catch-22

Referenda as a Catch-22

The result of a referendum delivers a significant amount of information about social preferences to each composite member of the society. This paper argues that, beyond this obvious fact, the choice not to offer a referendum by an authority, although permitted to do so, may enhance as well the information individuals posses about social preferences. The addition of a referendum option in the rules of a game, that is, by enabling the authority to offer referenda at will, results in an assured re-election of authorities that implement socially beneficial policies, and in a decrease of the re-election probability of authorities that implement socially obnoxious policies. In a sense, by allowing an authority to offer referenda, an inescapable Catch-22 is introduced in the game, which inhibits the re-election of a measure of "bad" authorities and, thus, confirms that one of the main benefits of a democratic institution is the preservation of "good" authorities in power

Referenda as a Catch-22

The result of a referendum delivers a significant amount of information about social preferences to each composite member of the society. This paper argues that, beyond this obvious fact, the choice not to offer a referendum by an authority, although permitted to do so, may enhance as well the information individuals posses about social preferences. The addition of a referendum option in the rules of a game, that is, by enabling the authority to offer referenda at will, results in an assured re-election of authorities that implement socially beneficial policies, and in a decrease of the re-election probability of authorities that implement socially obnoxious policies. In a sense, by allowing an authority to offer referenda, an inescapable Catch-22 is introduced in the game, which inhibits the re-election of a measure of "bad" authorities and, thus, confirms that one of the main benefits of a democratic institution is the preservation of "good" authorities in power

The Constitution and the Citizens – (Not) Much Ado about Nothing. Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series, Vol. 4 No. 7, August 2004

While the Convention on the Future of Europe and its product, the Draft Constitution, might be considered a successful endeavor by many European policy-makers and other academic and socio-economic elites, it received little positive attention by the citizens. Aside from being a highly specialized and, for the ordinary citizen, complicated matter, few people actually are aware of the Convention process and the content of the Constitution. In this paper, I will locate the public awareness of the Constitution among the EU’s population, lay out some basic ideas about the democratic legitimacy this act entails and look at ways that could facilitate the Constitution’s acceptance in the future. Finally, I argue that, given the institutional structure of the EU and organizational constraints of the Convention, so far the democratic legitimacy has been sufficient but still awaits the challenge of ratification

10 Reasons to Oppose Virginia Sales Tax Increases

Northern and southeastern Virginians will vote in referenda this November to approve or reject increases in the retail sales tax to fund transportation projects. Northern Virginians will decide whether to increase the sales tax from 4.5 percent to 5.0 percent, an 11 percent increase. Virginians in the Hampton Roads area will decide whether to increase the sales tax from 4.5 percent to 5.5 percent, a 22 percent increase. Proponents of tax increases point to unmet transportation needs to support their cause. Yet state spending increased 13 percent in 1999, 7 percent in 2000, and 9 percent in 2001. If key transportation needs have not been met, the problem is not a lack of funds but legislators who have not properly prioritized the budget. If the sales tax referenda are passed, the state government will have a strong incentive to reduce what it would otherwise spend on transportation in northern Virginia and Hampton Roads. By some measures, northern Virginia already gets the short end of the stick with regard to the state budget. Tax increases are not just bad budget policy; they are also bad economic policy. Since higher taxes reduce economic growth, an added cost of higher sales taxes would be lower incomes for Virginians. During the 1990s Virginia taxes grew faster than incomes, and local property taxes have soared recently. Even modest restraint in nontransportation spending could save enough money to fund priority highway projects without tax increases. Further, the state could adopt a spending growth cap that channels excess future tax revenues to transportation needs and tax cuts

The performance of techniques for estimating the number of eligible signatories to a large petition on the basis of a sample of signatures : a thesis presented in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Science in Statistics at Massey University, Palmerston North, New Zealand

The New Zealand Citizens' Initiated Referenda Act, 1993, states that if a petition signed by at least 10 percent of eligible electors is presented to the House of Representatives, then parliament is required to hold an indicative referendum on the petition. Normal practice at present is to check a sample of the signatures and from that estimate the number of eligible electors who have signed a petition, making allowance for signatories who are not eligible and multiple signatures from eligible electors. We review a number of techniques used for similar problems such as estimating the size of a population through capture-recapture studies, or estimating the number of duplicate entries in a mailing list. One suitable estimator was developed by Goodman (1949). A number of variants on it are reported by Smith-Cayama & Thomas (1999). An estimator proposed by Esty (1985) was found to give unreasonable estimates, and so a modification was developed. In order to test the performance of the modified estimator, simulations, drawing repeated samples from artificial petitions with known distributions of multiple signatures, were performed. The simulation results allowed us to investigate bias in the estimators and the accuracy of the variance estimates proposed by Hass & Stokes (1998). The effect of sampling fraction on bias, variability and estimated variance of the estimators was also investigated. The simulation program was modified to include ineligible signatures. Results of these simulations showed that estimating the number of ineligible signatures added to the variability of the overall estimate of number of eligible signatories. Although Smith-Cayama & Thomas (1999) mention that the estimated number of multiple eligible signatures and the estimated number of ineligible signatures are correlated, the simulations suggest the correlation is small and makes little difference to the final estimate of variability

Who Is in Favor of Enlargement? Determinants of Support for EU Membership in the Candidate Countries’ Referenda

We analyze support for EU membership as expressed in voting patterns in the candidate countries’ referenda on EU membership, using regional referendum results and individual survey data on voting intentions. We find that favorable individual and regional characteristics are positively correlated with support for accession and voter participation. In contrast, those who should benefit from future EU transfers are less likely to vote and/or support EU membership. We argue that voters in the candidate countries assign greater weight on future benefits from liberalization and integration than on potential gains through redistribution.http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/40046/3/wp660.pd

Who is in favor of enlargement? Determinants of support for EU membership in the candidate countries' referenda

We analyze support for EU membership as expressed in voting patterns in the candidate countries’ referenda on EU membership, using regional referendum results and individual survey data on voting intentions. We find that favorable individual and regional characteristics are positively correlated with support for accession and voter participation. In contrast, those who should benefit from future EU transfers are less likely to vote and/or support EU membership. We argue that voters in the candidate countries assign greater weight on future benefits from liberalization and integration than on potential gains through redistribution. --Voting,referendum,EU enlargement,integration

Who is in Favour of Enlargement? Determinants of Support for EU Membership in the Candidate's Countries Referenda

This paper investigates both the macro and micro determinants of EU support as expressed in the 2003 referenda on EU membership and the 2002 Candidate Countries Eurobarometer survey data. It is found that favourable individual and regional characteristics, i.e., the “winners” of the transition process, are positively correlated with support for accession and voter participation. In contrast, those who should benefit from future EU transfers, i.e., the “losers” of the process, are less likely to vote and/or support EU membership. It is therefore argued that voters in the new member states assign greater weight on future benefits from liberalization and integration than on potential gains through redistribution. Classification-Financial integration, capital flows, external assets and liabilities

Past, Present and Future of Democracy - Policy Review

The EU’s framework programmes for research and innovation have devoted significant investments towards the study of democracy. This review presents findings from framework programme projects and in general takes stock of European research on the subject matter. It provides a mapping of results, evidence and recommendations, and assesses the needs and pertinent foci for future European research. It aims to build on areas of research where there is already a good deal of knowledge. At the same time, it focuses on those areas where there are gaps in our knowledge about the workings of and present threats to democracy