39 research outputs found
Efficient Transparent Redactable Signatures with a Single Signature Invocation
A redactable signature scheme is one that allows the original signature to be used, usually along with some additional data, to verify certain carefully` specified changes to the original document that was signed, namely the removal or redaction of subdocuments. For redactable signatures, the term transparency has been used to describe a scheme that hides the number and locations of redacted subdocuments. We present here two efficient transparent redactable signature schemes, which are the first such schemes in the literature that are based solely on tools of symmetric cryptography, along with a single application of an ordinary digital signature.
As with several previous schemes for redactable signatures, we sign a sequence of randomized commitments that depend on the contents of the subdocuments of the document to be signed. In order to hide their number and location, we randomize their order, and mix them with a sequence of dummy nodes that are indistinguishable from commitment values. Our first scheme uses a data structure of size quadratic in the number of subdocuments, encoding all the precedence relations between pairs of subdocuments. By embedding these precedence relations in a smaller family of graphs, our second scheme is more efficient, with expected cost linear in the number of subdocuments in the document to be signed. We introduce a quantified version of the transparency property, precisely describing the uncertainty about the number of redacted subdocuments that is guaranteed by the two schemes.
We prove that our schemes are secure, i.e. unforgeable, private, and transparent, based on the security of collision-free hash functions, pseudorandom generators, and digital signature schemes. While providing such strong security, our scheme is also efficient, in terms of both computation and communication
Policy-Based Redactable Signatures
In this work we make progress towards solving an open problem posed by Bilzhause et. al, to give constructions of redactable signature schemes that allow the signer to limit the possible redactions performed by a third party. A separate, but related notion, called controlled disclosure allows a redactor to limit future redactions. We look at two types of data, sets and linear data (data organized as a sequence). In the case of sets, we limit redactions using a policy modeled by a monotone circuit or any circuit depending on the size of the universe the set is drawn from. In the case of linear data, we give a linear construction from vector commitments that limits redactions using a policy modeled as a monotone circuit. Our constructions have the attractive feature that they are built using only blackbox techniques
Quotable Signatures for Authenticating Shared Quotes
Quotable signature schemes are digital signature schemes with the additional
property that from the signature for a message, any party can extract
signatures for (allowable) quotes from the message, without knowing the secret
key or interacting with the signer of the original message. Crucially, the
extracted signatures are still signed with the original secret key. We define a
notion of security for quotable signature schemes and construct a concrete
example of a quotable signature scheme, using Merkle trees and classical
digital signature schemes. The scheme is shown to be secure, with respect to
the aforementioned notion of security. Additionally, we prove bounds on the
complexity of the constructed scheme and provide algorithms for signing,
quoting, and verifying. Finally, concrete use cases of quotable signatures are
considered, using them to combat misinformation by bolstering authentic content
on social media. We consider both how quotable signatures can be used, and why
using them could help mitigate the effects of fake news.Comment: 29 pages, 7 figure
Privacy, Access Control, and Integrity for Large Graph Databases
Graph data are extensively utilized in social networks, collaboration networks, geo-social networks, and communication networks. Their growing usage in cyberspaces poses daunting security and privacy challenges. Data publication requires privacy-protection mechanisms to guard against information breaches. In addition, access control mechanisms can be used to allow controlled sharing of data. Provision of privacy-protection, access control, and data integrity for graph data require a holistic approach for data management and secure query processing. This thesis presents such an approach. In particular, the thesis addresses two notable challenges for graph databases, which are: i) how to ensure users\u27 privacy in published graph data under an access control policy enforcement, and ii) how to verify the integrity and query results of graph datasets. To address the first challenge, a privacy-protection framework under role-based access control (RBAC) policy constraints is proposed. The design of such a framework poses a trade-off problem, which is proved to be NP-complete. Novel heuristic solutions are provided to solve the constraint problem. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first scheme that studies the trade-off between RBAC policy constraints and privacy-protection for graph data. To address the second challenge, a cryptographic security model based on Hash Message Authentic Codes (HMACs) is proposed. The model ensures integrity and completeness verification of data and query results under both two-party and third-party data distribution environments. Unique solutions based on HMACs for integrity verification of graph data are developed and detailed security analysis is provided for the proposed schemes. Extensive experimental evaluations are conducted to illustrate the performance of proposed algorithms
Verifiable Order Queries and Order Statistics on a List in Zero-Knowledge
Given a list L with n elements, an order query on L asks
whether a given element x in L precedes or follows another
element y in L.
More generally, given a set of m elements from L, an order
query asks for the set ordered according to the positions of the
elements in L.
We introduce two formal models for answering order queries on a list
in a verifiable manner and in zero-knowledge. We also present
efficient constructions for these models.
Our first model, called \emph{zero-knowledge list} (ZKL), generalizes
membership queries on a set to order queries on a list in zero-knowledge.
We present a construction of ZKL based on zero-knowledge
sets and a homomorphic integer commitment scheme.
Our second model, \emph{privacy-preserving authenticated list} (PPAL),
extends authenticated data structures by adding a zero-knowledge
privacy requirement. In this model, a list is outsourced by a trusted
owner to an untrusted cloud server, which answers order queries issued
by clients. The server also returns a proof of the answer, which is
verified by the client using a digest of the list obtained from the
owner. PPAL supports the security properties of data integrity against
a malicious server and privacy protection against a malicious client.
Though PPAL can be implemented using our ZKL construction, this
construction is not as efficient as desired in cloud applications. To
this end, we present an efficient PPAL construction based on
blinded bilinear accumulators and bilinear maps, which is provably
secure and zero-knowledge (e.g., hiding even the size of the list). Our PPAL construction uses proofs of size and allows the client to verify a proof in time.~The owner executes the setup in time and space. The server uses space to store the list and related authentication information, and takes time to answer a query and generate a proof.
Both our ZKL and PPAL constructions have one round of communication
and are secure in the random oracle model.
Finally, we show that our ZKL and PPAL frameworks
can be extended to support fundamental statistical queries (including maximum, minimum, median, threshold and top-t elements) efficiently
and in zero-knowledge