4 research outputs found
Reciprocity-based cooperative phalanx maintained by overconfident players
According to the evolutionary game theory principle, a strategy representing
a higher payoff can spread among competitors. But there are cases when a player
consistently overestimates or underestimates her own payoff, which undermines
proper comparison. Interestingly, both underconfident and overconfident
individuals are capable of elevating the cooperation level significantly. While
former players stimulate a local coordination of strategies, the presence of
overconfident individuals enhances the spatial reciprocity mechanism. In both
cases the propagations of competing strategies are influenced in a biased way
resulting in a cooperation supporting environment. These effects are strongly
related to the nonlinear character of invasion probabilities which is a common
and frequently observed feature of microscopic dynamics.Comment: 7 two-column pages, 6 figure
When greediness and self-confidence meet in a social dilemma
A greedy personality is usually accompanied by arrogance and confidence. This
work investigates the cooperation success condition in the context of biased
payoff allocation and self-confidence. The first component allows the organizer
in a spatial public goods game to receive a different proportion of goods than
other participants. The second aspect influences the micro-level dynamics of
strategy updates, wherein players can maintain their strategy with a certain
weight. Analytical results are obtained on square lattices under the weak
selection limit. If the organizer attempts to monopolize the public goods,
cooperation becomes more attainable. If the confidence increases, cooperation
is inhibited. Consequently, these elements have conflicting effects on
cooperation, and their simultaneous presence can result in a heterogeneous
change of the critical synergy factor. Our theoretical findings underscore the
subtle implications of a mutual trait that may manifest as greediness or
self-confidence under different circumstances, which are validated through
Monte Carlo simulations.Comment: 15 pages, 7 figures, accepted for publication in Physica
Inertia in spatial public goods games under weak selection
Due to limited cognitive skills for perceptual error or other emotional
reasons, players may keep their current strategies even if there is a more
promising choice. Such behavior inertia has already been studied, but its
consequences remained unexplored in the weak selection limit. To fill this gap,
we consider a spatial public goods game model where inertia is considered
during the imitation process. By using the identity-by-descent method, we
present analytical forms of the critical synergy factor , which
determines when cooperation is favored. We find that inertia hinders
cooperation, which can be explained by the decelerated coarsening process under
weak selection. Interestingly, the critical synergy conditions for different
updating protocols, including death-birth and birth-death rules, can be
formally linked by the extreme limits of the inertia factor. To explore the
robustness of our observations, calculations are made for different lattices
and group sizes. Monte Carlo simulations also confirm the results