Truth-Valued-Flow Inference (TVFI) and its applications in approximate reasoning

The framework of the theory of Truth-valued-flow Inference (TVFI) is introduced. Even though there are dozens of papers presented on fuzzy reasoning, we think it is still needed to explore a rather unified fuzzy reasoning theory which has the following two features: (1) it is simplified enough to be executed feasibly and easily; and (2) it is well structural and well consistent enough that it can be built into a strict mathematical theory and is consistent with the theory proposed by L.A. Zadeh. TVFI is one of the fuzzy reasoning theories that satisfies the above two features. It presents inference by the form of networks, and naturally views inference as a process of truth values flowing among propositions

Resolution in Linguistic Propositional Logic based on Linear Symmetrical Hedge Algebra

The paper introduces a propositional linguistic logic that serves as the basis for automated uncertain reasoning with linguistic information. First, we build a linguistic logic system with truth value domain based on a linear symmetrical hedge algebra. Then, we consider G\"{o}del's t-norm and t-conorm to define the logical connectives for our logic. Next, we present a resolution inference rule, in which two clauses having contradictory linguistic truth values can be resolved. We also give the concept of reliability in order to capture the approximative nature of the resolution inference rule. Finally, we propose a resolution procedure with the maximal reliability.Comment: KSE 2013 conferenc

An epistemic model of an agent who does not reflect on reasoning processes

This paper introduces an epistemic model of a boundedly rational agent under the two assumptions that (i) the agent's reasoning process is in accordance with the model but (ii) the agent does not reflect on these reasoning processes. For such a concept of bounded rationality a semantic interpretation by the possible world semantics of the Kripke (1963) type is no longer available because the definition of knowledge in these possible world semantics implies that the agent knows all valid statements of the model. Key to my alternative semantic approach is the extension of the method of truth tables, first introduced for the propositional logic by Wittgenstein (1922), to an epistemic logic so that I can determine the truth value of epistemic statements for all relevant truth conditions. I also define an axiom system plus inference rules for knowledge- and unawareness statements whereby I drop the inference rule of necessitation, which claims that an agent knows all theorems of the logic. As my main formal result I derive a determination theorem linking my semantic with my syntactic approach.Bounded Rationality, Knowledge, Unawareness, Epistemic Logic, Semantic Interpretation, Iterative Solution Concepts for Strategic Games

Experimental philosophy and moral responsibility

Can experimental philosophy help us answer central questions about the nature of moral responsibility, such as the question of whether moral responsibility is compatible with determinism? Specifically, can folk judgments in line with a particular answer to that question provide support for that answer. Based on reasoning familiar from Condorcet’s Jury Theorem, such support could be had if individual judges track the truth of the matter independently and with some modest reliability: such reliability quickly aggregates as the number of judges goes up. In this chapter, however, I argue, partly based on empirical evidence, that although non-specialist judgments might on average be more likely than not to get things right, their individual likelihoods fail to aggregate because they do not track truth with sufficient independence