Comprensión de textos como una situación de solución de problemas

La investigación en la comprensión de textos ha dado detalles de cómo las características del texto y los procesos cognitivos interactúan con el fin de consituir la comprensión y generar significado. Sin embargo, no existe un vínculo explícito entre los procesos cognitivos desplegados durante la comprensión de textos y su lugar en la cognición de orden superior, como en la resolución de problemas. El propósito de este trabajo es proponer un modelo cognitivo en el que la comprensión de textos se hace similar a una resolución de problemas y la situación que se basa en la investigación actual sobre los procesos cognitivos conocidos como la generación de la inferencia, la memoria y las simulaciones. La característica clave del modelo es que incluye explícitamente la formulación de las preguntas como un componente que aumenta la potencia de representación. Otras características del modelo se especifican y sus extensiones a la investigación básica y en la comprensión de textos y de orden superior los procesos cognitivos se describen aplican.Research in text comprehension has provided details as to how text features and cognitive processes interact in order to build comprehension and generate meaning. However, there is no explicit link between the cognitive processes deployed during text comprehension and their place in higher-order cognition, as in problem solving. The purpose of this paper is to propose a cognitive model in which text comprehension is made analogous to a problem solving situation and that relies on current research on well-known cognitive processes such as inference generation, memory, and simulations. The key characteristic of the model is that it explicitly includes the formulation of questions as a component that boosts representational power. Other characteristics of the model are specified and its extensions to basic and applied research in text comprehension and higher-order cognitive processes are outlined.Fil: Marmolejo Ramos, Fernando. University of Adelaide; AustraliaFil: Yomha Cevasco, Jazmin. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentin

Modeling human intuitions about liquid flow with particle-based simulation

Humans can easily describe, imagine, and, crucially, predict a wide variety of behaviors of liquids--splashing, squirting, gushing, sloshing, soaking, dripping, draining, trickling, pooling, and pouring--despite tremendous variability in their material and dynamical properties. Here we propose and test a computational model of how people perceive and predict these liquid dynamics, based on coarse approximate simulations of fluids as collections of interacting particles. Our model is analogous to a "game engine in the head", drawing on techniques for interactive simulations (as in video games) that optimize for efficiency and natural appearance rather than physical accuracy. In two behavioral experiments, we found that the model accurately captured people's predictions about how liquids flow among complex solid obstacles, and was significantly better than two alternatives based on simple heuristics and deep neural networks. Our model was also able to explain how people's predictions varied as a function of the liquids' properties (e.g., viscosity and stickiness). Together, the model and empirical results extend the recent proposal that human physical scene understanding for the dynamics of rigid, solid objects can be supported by approximate probabilistic simulation, to the more complex and unexplored domain of fluid dynamics.Comment: Under review at PLOS Computational Biolog

Embodying rationality

The current notions of bounded rationality in economics share distinctive features with Simon’s original notion, which still influences the theoretical and experimental research in the fields of choice, judgment, decision making, problem solving, and social cognition. All these notions of bounded rationality are in fact equally rooted in the information-processing approach to human cognition, expressing the view that reasoning is disembodied and that it can be reduced to the processing of abstract symbolic representations of the environment. This is in contrast with the last three-decade advancements in cognitive psychology, where a new view on human cognition has emerged under the general label of ‘embodied cognition’, demonstrating that cognition and reasoning are grounded in the morphological traits of the human body and the sensory-motor system. In this paper we argue that embodied cognition might reform the current notions of bounded rationality and we propose a number of arguments devoted to outline a novel program of research under the label of ‘embodied rationality’: (1) reasoning is situated as it arises from the ongoing interaction between the subject and the environment; (2) reasoning, not being exclusively a mental phenomenon, constitutively relies on the physical resources provided by the environment; (3) the sensory-motor system provides the building blocks for abstract reasoning, (4) automatic thinking is rooted in the evolutionary coupling between the morphological traits of the human body and the environment

Embodying rationality

The current notions of bounded rationality in economics share distinctive features with Simon’s original notion, which still influences the theoretical and experimental research in the fields of choice, judgment, decision making, problem solving, and social cognition. All these notions of bounded rationality are in fact equally rooted in the information-processing approach to human cognition, expressing the view that reasoning is disembodied and that it can be reduced to the processing of abstract symbolic representations of the environment. This is in contrast with the last three-decade advancements in cognitive psychology, where a new view on human cognition has emerged under the general label of ‘embodied cognition’, demonstrating that cognition and reasoning are grounded in the morphological traits of the human body and the sensory-motor system. In this paper we argue that embodied cognition might reform the current notions of bounded rationality and we propose a number of arguments devoted to outline a novel program of research under the label of ‘embodied rationality’: (1) reasoning is situated as it arises from the ongoing interaction between the subject and the environment; (2) reasoning, not being exclusively a mental phenomenon, constitutively relies on the physical resources provided by the environment; (3) the sensory-motor system provides the building blocks for abstract reasoning, (4) automatic thinking is rooted in the evolutionary coupling between the morphological traits of the human body and the environment