160,467 research outputs found

    Rationality: a social-epistemology perspective

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    Both in philosophy and in psychology, human rationality has traditionally been studied from an "individualistic" perspective. Recently, social epistemologists have drawn attention to the fact that epistemic interactions among agents also give rise to important questions concerning rationality. In previous work, we have used a formal model to assess the risk that a particular type of social-epistemic interactions lead agents with initially consistent belief states into inconsistent belief states. Here, we continue this work by investigating the dynamics to which these interactions may give rise in the population as a whole

    Making Talk Cheap (and Problems Easy): How Legal and Political Institutions Can Facilitate Consensus

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    In many legal, political, and social settings, people must reach a consensus before particular outcomes can be achieved and failing to reach a consensus may be costly. In this article, we present a theory and conduct experiments that take into account the costs associated with communicating, as well as the difficulty of the decisions that groups make. We find that when there is even a small cost (relative to the potential benefit) associated with sending information to others and/or listening, groups are much less likely to reach a consensus, primarily because they are less willing to communicate with one another. We also find that difficult problems significantly reduce group members’ willingness to communicate with one another and, therefore, hinder their ability to reach a consensus

    On Spatial Consensus Formation: Is the Sznajd Model Different from a Voter Model?

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    In this paper, we investigate the so-called ``Sznajd Model'' (SM) in one dimension, which is a simple cellular automata approach to consensus formation among two opposite opinions (described by spin up or down). To elucidate the SM dynamics, we first provide results of computer simulations for the spatio-temporal evolution of the opinion distribution L(t)L(t), the evolution of magnetization m(t)m(t), the distribution of decision times P(τ)P(\tau) and relaxation times P(μ)P(\mu). In the main part of the paper, it is shown that the SM can be completely reformulated in terms of a linear VM, where the transition rates towards a given opinion are directly proportional to frequency of the respective opinion of the second-nearest neighbors (no matter what the nearest neighbors are). So, the SM dynamics can be reduced to one rule, ``Just follow your second-nearest neighbor''. The equivalence is demonstrated by extensive computer simulations that show the same behavior between SM and VM in terms of L(t)L(t), m(t)m(t), P(τ)P(\tau), P(μ)P(\mu), and the final attractor statistics. The reformulation of the SM in terms of a VM involves a new parameter σ\sigma, to bias between anti- and ferromagnetic decisions in the case of frustration. We show that σ\sigma plays a crucial role in explaining the phase transition observed in SM. We further explore the role of synchronous versus asynchronous update rules on the intermediate dynamics and the final attractors. Compared to the original SM, we find three additional attractors, two of them related to an asymmetric coexistence between the opposite opinions.Comment: 22 pages, 20 figures. For related publications see http://www.ais.fraunhofer.de/~fran

    Persistent Disagreement and Polarization in a Bayesian Setting

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    For two ideally rational agents, does learning a finite amount of shared evidence necessitate agreement? No. But does it at least guard against belief polarization, the case in which their opinions get further apart? No. OK, but are rational agents guaranteed to avoid polarization if they have access to an infinite, increasing stream of shared evidence? No
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