160,483 research outputs found
Rationality: a social-epistemology perspective
Both in philosophy and in psychology, human rationality has traditionally been studied from an "individualistic" perspective. Recently, social epistemologists have drawn attention to the fact that epistemic interactions among agents also give rise to important questions concerning rationality. In previous work, we have used a formal model to assess the risk that a particular type of social-epistemic interactions lead agents with initially consistent belief states into inconsistent belief states. Here, we continue this work by investigating the dynamics to which these interactions may give rise in the population as a whole
Making Talk Cheap (and Problems Easy): How Legal and Political Institutions Can Facilitate Consensus
In many legal, political, and social settings, people must reach a consensus before particular outcomes can be achieved and failing to reach a consensus may be costly. In this article, we present a theory and conduct experiments that take into account the costs associated with communicating, as well as the difficulty of the decisions that groups make. We find that when there is even a small cost (relative to the potential benefit) associated with sending information to others and/or listening, groups are much less likely to reach a consensus, primarily because they are less willing to communicate with one another. We also find that difficult problems significantly reduce group members’ willingness to communicate with one another and, therefore, hinder their ability to reach a consensus
On Spatial Consensus Formation: Is the Sznajd Model Different from a Voter Model?
In this paper, we investigate the so-called ``Sznajd Model'' (SM) in one
dimension, which is a simple cellular automata approach to consensus formation
among two opposite opinions (described by spin up or down). To elucidate the SM
dynamics, we first provide results of computer simulations for the
spatio-temporal evolution of the opinion distribution , the evolution of
magnetization , the distribution of decision times and
relaxation times . In the main part of the paper, it is shown that the
SM can be completely reformulated in terms of a linear VM, where the transition
rates towards a given opinion are directly proportional to frequency of the
respective opinion of the second-nearest neighbors (no matter what the nearest
neighbors are). So, the SM dynamics can be reduced to one rule, ``Just follow
your second-nearest neighbor''. The equivalence is demonstrated by extensive
computer simulations that show the same behavior between SM and VM in terms of
, , , , and the final attractor statistics. The
reformulation of the SM in terms of a VM involves a new parameter , to
bias between anti- and ferromagnetic decisions in the case of frustration. We
show that plays a crucial role in explaining the phase transition
observed in SM. We further explore the role of synchronous versus asynchronous
update rules on the intermediate dynamics and the final attractors. Compared to
the original SM, we find three additional attractors, two of them related to an
asymmetric coexistence between the opposite opinions.Comment: 22 pages, 20 figures. For related publications see
http://www.ais.fraunhofer.de/~fran
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