Rationality and Self-Interest in Peer to Peer Networks

Much of the existing work in peer to peer networking assumes that users will follow prescribed protocols without deviation. This assumption ignores the userr's ability to modify the behavior of an algorithm for self-interested reasons. We advocate a different model in which peer to peer users are expected to be rational and self-interested. This model is found in the emergent fields of Algorithmic Mechanism Design (AMD) and Distributed Algorithmic Mechanism Design (DAMD), both of which introduce game-theoretic ideas into a computational system. We, as designers, must create systems (peer to peer search, routing, distributed auctions, resource allocation, etc.) that allow nodes to behave rationally while still achieving good overall system outcomes. This paper has three goals. The first is to convince the reader that rationality is a real issue in peer to peer networks. The second is to introduce mechanism design as a tool that can be used when designing networks with rational nodes. The third is to describe three open problems that are relevant in the peer to peer setting but are unsolved in existing AMD/DAMD work. In particular, we consider problems that arise when a networking infrastructure contains rational agents.Engineering and Applied Science

A Game Theoretic Analysis of Incentives in Content Production and Sharing over Peer-to-Peer Networks

User-generated content can be distributed at a low cost using peer-to-peer (P2P) networks, but the free-rider problem hinders the utilization of P2P networks. In order to achieve an efficient use of P2P networks, we investigate fundamental issues on incentives in content production and sharing using game theory. We build a basic model to analyze non-cooperative outcomes without an incentive scheme and then use different game formulations derived from the basic model to examine five incentive schemes: cooperative, payment, repeated interaction, intervention, and enforced full sharing. The results of this paper show that 1) cooperative peers share all produced content while non-cooperative peers do not share at all without an incentive scheme; 2) a cooperative scheme allows peers to consume more content than non-cooperative outcomes do; 3) a cooperative outcome can be achieved among non-cooperative peers by introducing an incentive scheme based on payment, repeated interaction, or intervention; and 4) enforced full sharing has ambiguous welfare effects on peers. In addition to describing the solutions of different formulations, we discuss enforcement and informational requirements to implement each solution, aiming to offer a guideline for protocol designers when designing incentive schemes for P2P networks.Comment: 31 pages, 3 figures, 1 tabl

Strategies for cooperation emergence in distributed service discovery

This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in Cybernetics and Systems on APR 3 2014], available online:http://www.tandfonline.com/10.1080/01969722.2014.894848[EN] In distributed environments where entities only have a partial view of the system, cooperation plays a key issue. In the case of decentralized service discovery in open agent societies, agents only know about the services they provide and who are their direct neighbors. Therefore, they need the cooperation of their neighbors in order to locate the required services. However, cooperation is not always present in open systems. Non-cooperative agents pursuing their own goals could refuse to forward queries from other agents to avoid the cost of this action; therefore, the efficiency of the decentralized service discovery could be seriously damaged. In this paper, we propose the ombination of incentives and local structural changes in order to promote cooperation in the service discovery process. The results show that, even in scenarios where the predominant behavior is not collaborative cooperation emerges.The work was partially supported by the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation through grants TIN2009-13839-C03-01, TIN2012-36586-C03-01, CSD2007-0022 (CONSOLIDER-INGENIO 2010).Del Val Noguera, E.; Rebollo Pedruelo, M.; Botti, V. (2014). Strategies for cooperation emergence in distributed service discovery. Cybernetics and Systems. 45(3):220-240. https://doi.org/10.1080/01969722.2014.894848S220240453Blanc , A. , Y.K. Liu , and A. Vahdat . “Designing Incentives for Peer-to-Peer Routing.” InProceedings of the 24th Annual Joint Conference of the IEEE Computer and Communications Societies, Vol. 1, pp. 374–385, 2005 .del Val , E. “Semantic Service Management in Service-Oriented Multi-Agent Systems.” Ph.D. thesis, Departament de Sistemes Informàtics i Computació, Universitat Politècnica de València, 2013 .Del Val, E., Rebollo, M., & Botti, V. (2012). Enhancing decentralized service discovery in open service-oriented multi-agent systems. Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems, 28(1), 1-30. doi:10.1007/s10458-012-9210-0DORAN, J. E., FRANKLIN, S., JENNINGS, N. R., & NORMAN, T. J. (1997). On cooperation in multi-agent systems. The Knowledge Engineering Review, 12(3), 309-314. doi:10.1017/s0269888997003111Eguíluz, V. M., Zimmermann, M. G., Cela‐Conde, C. J., & Miguel, M. S. (2005). Cooperation and the Emergence of Role Differentiation in the Dynamics of Social Networks. American Journal of Sociology, 110(4), 977-1008. doi:10.1086/428716Griffiths , N. and M. Luck . “Changing Neighbours: Improving Tag-Based Cooperation.” InProceedings of the 9th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems: volume 1.(AAMAS'10), 249–256. Richland, SC: International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, 2010 .Gu , B. and S. Jarvenpaa . “Are Contributions to p2p Technical Forums Private or Public Goods? An Empirical Investigation.” Paper presented at the 1st Workshop on Economics of Peer-to-Peer Systems, June 4–5, 2004, Harvard University .Hauert, C., Traulsen, A., Brandt, H., Nowak, M. A., & Sigmund, K. (2007). Via Freedom to Coercion: The Emergence of Costly Punishment. Science, 316(5833), 1905-1907. doi:10.1126/science.1141588Hofmann , L.M. , N. Chakraborty , and K. Sycara . “The Evolution of Cooperation in Self-Interested Agent Societies: A Critical Study.” InProceedings of the 10th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, Volume 2 , edited by K. Tumer , P. Yolum , L. Sonenberg , and P. Stone , 685–692. IFAAMAS, 2011 .Lin, W. S., Zhao, H. V., & Liu, K. J. R. (2009). Incentive Cooperation Strategies for Peer-to-Peer Live Multimedia Streaming Social Networks. IEEE Transactions on Multimedia, 11(3), 396-412. doi:10.1109/tmm.2009.2012915Nowak, M. A. (2006). Five Rules for the Evolution of Cooperation. Science, 314(5805), 1560-1563. doi:10.1126/science.1133755Nowak, M. A., & Sigmund, K. (1998). Evolution of indirect reciprocity by image scoring. Nature, 393(6685), 573-577. doi:10.1038/31225Ohtsuki, H., Hauert, C., Lieberman, E., & Nowak, M. A. (2006). A simple rule for the evolution of cooperation on graphs and social networks. Nature, 441(7092), 502-505. doi:10.1038/nature04605Santos, F. C., Santos, M. D., & Pacheco, J. M. (2008). Social diversity promotes the emergence of cooperation in public goods games. Nature, 454(7201), 213-216. doi:10.1038/nature06940Shneidman , J. and D. C. Parkes . “Rationality and Self-Interest in Peer to Peer Networks.” Paper presented at the 2nd Int. Workshop on Peer-to-Peer Systems (IPTPS’03), February 20–21, 2003, Berkeley, CA .Sigmund, K. (2007). Punish or perish? Retaliation and collaboration among humans. Trends in Ecology & Evolution, 22(11), 593-600. doi:10.1016/j.tree.2007.06.012Sigmund, K. (2009). Sympathy and similarity: The evolutionary dynamics of cooperation. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 106(21), 8405-8406. doi:10.1073/pnas.0903947106Sigmund, K., Hauert, C., & Nowak, M. A. (2001). Reward and punishment. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 98(19), 10757-10762. doi:10.1073/pnas.161155698Sun , Q. and H. Garcia-Molina . “Slic: A Selfish Link-Based Incentive Mechanism for Unstructured Peer-To-Peer Networks.” Paper presented at the 24th International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems (ICDCS’04), March 23–26, 2004, Washington, DC .Villatoro , D. , J. Sabater-Mir , and S. Sen . “Social Instruments for Robust Convention Emergence.”Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, edited by T. Walsh, 420–425, 2011

Problematizing Choice: Responsible consumers and sceptical citizens

About the book: Governance, Consumers and Citizens is the first book to bring together a study of governance with consumption, examining the changing place of the consumer as citizen in recent trends in governance, the tensions between competing ideas and practices of consumerism and the active role consumers play in the construction and practice of governance. Radically pushing forward the debate on consumers and governance, this collection outlines new conceptions and posits new policy agendas. Bringing together international experts from political science, history, geography, social policy and media studies, this study shows how governance and consumption are intertwined in crucial aspects of public policy and contemporary politics

Breaking up is hard to do: Irrational inconsistency in commitment to an industry peer network

This paper strengthens the basis for a key claim of contemporary economic sociology — that strong ties among capitalists cannot be reduced to rational considerations. Support for this claim has been limited by reliance on an external standard of rationality, whereby irrationality in commitment to a partner or network is based on an observer’s evaluation of an actor’s interests. In this article we address this limitation by developing an internal standard for assessing the rationality of an actor’s commitment, which is derived from Davidson’s (1980) definition of akrasia or ‘incontinence.’ In addition, we clarify the mechanisms that produce ‘akratic’ commitment among capitalists: (a) short-term emotions that overwhelm rational calculation; and (b) a sense of loyalty that leads one to incorporate others’ interests into one’s own. Finally, we provide systematic evidence of akratic commitment and the proposed mechanisms from studies of an industry peer network in the remodeling construction industry

Peer-to-peer and community-based markets: A comprehensive review

The advent of more proactive consumers, the so-called "prosumers", with production and storage capabilities, is empowering the consumers and bringing new opportunities and challenges to the operation of power systems in a market environment. Recently, a novel proposal for the design and operation of electricity markets has emerged: these so-called peer-to-peer (P2P) electricity markets conceptually allow the prosumers to directly share their electrical energy and investment. Such P2P markets rely on a consumer-centric and bottom-up perspective by giving the opportunity to consumers to freely choose the way they are to source their electric energy. A community can also be formed by prosumers who want to collaborate, or in terms of operational energy management. This paper contributes with an overview of these new P2P markets that starts with the motivation, challenges, market designs moving to the potential future developments in this field, providing recommendations while considering a test-case