Approximation Bounds For Minimum Degree Matching

We consider the MINGREEDY strategy for Maximum Cardinality Matching. MINGREEDY repeatedly selects an edge incident with a node of minimum degree. For graphs of degree at most $\Delta$ we show that MINGREEDY achieves approximation ratio at least $\frac{\Delta-1}{2\Delta-3}$ in the worst case and that this performance is optimal among adaptive priority algorithms in the vertex model, which include many prominent greedy matching heuristics. Even when considering expected approximation ratios of randomized greedy strategies, no better worst case bounds are known for graphs of small degrees.Comment: % CHANGELOG % rev 1 2014-12-02 % - Show that the class APV contains many prominent greedy matching algorithms. % - Adapt inapproximability bound for APV-algorithms to a priori knowledge on |V|. % rev 2 2015-10-31 % - improve performance guarantee of MINGREEDY to be tigh

Selfish Knapsack

We consider a selfish variant of the knapsack problem. In our version, the items are owned by agents, and each agent can misrepresent the set of items she owns---either by avoiding reporting some of them (understating), or by reporting additional ones that do not exist (overstating). Each agent's objective is to maximize, within the items chosen for inclusion in the knapsack, the total valuation of her own chosen items. The knapsack problem, in this context, seeks to minimize the worst-case approximation ratio for social welfare at equilibrium. We show that a randomized greedy mechanism has attractive strategic properties: in general, it has a correlated price of anarchy of $2$ (subject to a mild assumption). For overstating-only agents, it becomes strategyproof; we also provide a matching lower bound of $2$ on the (worst-case) approximation ratio attainable by randomized strategyproof mechanisms, and show that no deterministic strategyproof mechanism can provide any constant approximation ratio. We also deal with more specialized environments. For the case of $2$ understating-only agents, we provide a randomized strategyproof $\frac{5+4\sqrt{2}}{7} \approx 1.522$-approximate mechanism, and a lower bound of $\frac{5\sqrt{5}-9}{2} \approx 1.09$. When all agents but one are honest, we provide a deterministic strategyproof $\frac{1+\sqrt{5}}{2} \approx 1.618$-approximate mechanism with a matching lower bound. Finally, we consider a model where agents can misreport their items' properties rather than existence. Specifically, each agent owns a single item, whose value-to-size ratio is publicly known, but whose actual value and size are not. We show that an adaptation of the greedy mechanism is strategyproof and $2$-approximate, and provide a matching lower bound; we also show that no deterministic strategyproof mechanism can provide a constant approximation ratio

On Conceptually Simple Algorithms for Variants of Online Bipartite Matching

We present a series of results regarding conceptually simple algorithms for bipartite matching in various online and related models. We first consider a deterministic adversarial model. The best approximation ratio possible for a one-pass deterministic online algorithm is $1/2$, which is achieved by any greedy algorithm. D\"urr et al. recently presented a $2$-pass algorithm called Category-Advice that achieves approximation ratio $3/5$. We extend their algorithm to multiple passes. We prove the exact approximation ratio for the $k$-pass Category-Advice algorithm for all $k \ge 1$, and show that the approximation ratio converges to the inverse of the golden ratio $2/(1+\sqrt{5}) \approx 0.618$ as $k$ goes to infinity. The convergence is extremely fast --- the $5$-pass Category-Advice algorithm is already within $0.01\%$ of the inverse of the golden ratio. We then consider a natural greedy algorithm in the online stochastic IID model---MinDegree. This algorithm is an online version of a well-known and extensively studied offline algorithm MinGreedy. We show that MinDegree cannot achieve an approximation ratio better than $1-1/e$, which is guaranteed by any consistent greedy algorithm in the known IID model. Finally, following the work in Besser and Poloczek, we depart from an adversarial or stochastic ordering and investigate a natural randomized algorithm (MinRanking) in the priority model. Although the priority model allows the algorithm to choose the input ordering in a general but well defined way, this natural algorithm cannot obtain the approximation of the Ranking algorithm in the ROM model