On Conceptually Simple Algorithms for Variants of Online Bipartite Matching

We present a series of results regarding conceptually simple algorithms for bipartite matching in various online and related models. We first consider a deterministic adversarial model. The best approximation ratio possible for a one-pass deterministic online algorithm is $1/2$, which is achieved by any greedy algorithm. D\"urr et al. recently presented a $2$-pass algorithm called Category-Advice that achieves approximation ratio $3/5$. We extend their algorithm to multiple passes. We prove the exact approximation ratio for the $k$-pass Category-Advice algorithm for all $k \ge 1$, and show that the approximation ratio converges to the inverse of the golden ratio $2/(1+\sqrt{5}) \approx 0.618$ as $k$ goes to infinity. The convergence is extremely fast --- the $5$-pass Category-Advice algorithm is already within $0.01\%$ of the inverse of the golden ratio. We then consider a natural greedy algorithm in the online stochastic IID model---MinDegree. This algorithm is an online version of a well-known and extensively studied offline algorithm MinGreedy. We show that MinDegree cannot achieve an approximation ratio better than $1-1/e$, which is guaranteed by any consistent greedy algorithm in the known IID model. Finally, following the work in Besser and Poloczek, we depart from an adversarial or stochastic ordering and investigate a natural randomized algorithm (MinRanking) in the priority model. Although the priority model allows the algorithm to choose the input ordering in a general but well defined way, this natural algorithm cannot obtain the approximation of the Ranking algorithm in the ROM model

Some recent results in the analysis of greedy algorithms for assignment problems

We survey some recent developments in the analysis of greedy algorithms for assignment and transportation problems. We focus on the linear programming model for matroids and linear assignment problems with Monge property, on general linear programs, probabilistic analysis for linear assignment and makespan minimization, and on-line algorithms for linear and non-linear assignment problems

Truthful Mechanisms for Matching and Clustering in an Ordinal World

We study truthful mechanisms for matching and related problems in a partial information setting, where the agents' true utilities are hidden, and the algorithm only has access to ordinal preference information. Our model is motivated by the fact that in many settings, agents cannot express the numerical values of their utility for different outcomes, but are still able to rank the outcomes in their order of preference. Specifically, we study problems where the ground truth exists in the form of a weighted graph of agent utilities, but the algorithm can only elicit the agents' private information in the form of a preference ordering for each agent induced by the underlying weights. Against this backdrop, we design truthful algorithms to approximate the true optimum solution with respect to the hidden weights. Our techniques yield universally truthful algorithms for a number of graph problems: a 1.76-approximation algorithm for Max-Weight Matching, 2-approximation algorithm for Max k-matching, a 6-approximation algorithm for Densest k-subgraph, and a 2-approximation algorithm for Max Traveling Salesman as long as the hidden weights constitute a metric. We also provide improved approximation algorithms for such problems when the agents are not able to lie about their preferences. Our results are the first non-trivial truthful approximation algorithms for these problems, and indicate that in many situations, we can design robust algorithms even when the agents may lie and only provide ordinal information instead of precise utilities.Comment: To appear in the Proceedings of WINE 201