Diversification Preferences in the Theory of Choice

Diversification represents the idea of choosing variety over uniformity. Within the theory of choice, desirability of diversification is axiomatized as preference for a convex combination of choices that are equivalently ranked. This corresponds to the notion of risk aversion when one assumes the von-Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility model, but the equivalence fails to hold in other models. This paper studies axiomatizations of the concept of diversification and their relationship to the related notions of risk aversion and convex preferences within different choice theoretic models. Implications of these notions on portfolio choice are discussed. We cover model-independent diversification preferences, preferences within models of choice under risk, including expected utility theory and the more general rank-dependent expected utility theory, as well as models of choice under uncertainty axiomatized via Choquet expected utility theory. Remarks on interpretations of diversification preferences within models of behavioral choice are given in the conclusion

A distributed adaptive steplength stochastic approximation method for monotone stochastic Nash Games

We consider a distributed stochastic approximation (SA) scheme for computing an equilibrium of a stochastic Nash game. Standard SA schemes employ diminishing steplength sequences that are square summable but not summable. Such requirements provide a little or no guidance for how to leverage Lipschitzian and monotonicity properties of the problem and naive choices generally do not preform uniformly well on a breadth of problems. While a centralized adaptive stepsize SA scheme is proposed in [1] for the optimization framework, such a scheme provides no freedom for the agents in choosing their own stepsizes. Thus, a direct application of centralized stepsize schemes is impractical in solving Nash games. Furthermore, extensions to game-theoretic regimes where players may independently choose steplength sequences are limited to recent work by Koshal et al. [2]. Motivated by these shortcomings, we present a distributed algorithm in which each player updates his steplength based on the previous steplength and some problem parameters. The steplength rules are derived from minimizing an upper bound of the errors associated with players' decisions. It is shown that these rules generate sequences that converge almost surely to an equilibrium of the stochastic Nash game. Importantly, variants of this rule are suggested where players independently select steplength sequences while abiding by an overall coordination requirement. Preliminary numerical results are seen to be promising.Comment: 8 pages, Proceedings of the American Control Conference, Washington, 201

On Sharp Identification Regions for Regression Under Interval Data

The reliable analysis of interval data (coarsened data) is one of the most promising applications of imprecise probabilities in statistics. If one refrains from making untestable, and often materially unjustified, strong assumptions on the coarsening process, then the empirical distribution of the data is imprecise, and statistical models are, in Manski’s terms, partially identified. We first elaborate some subtle differences between two natural ways of handling interval data in the dependent variable of regression models, distinguishing between two different types of identification regions, called Sharp Marrow Region (SMR) and Sharp Collection Region (SCR) here. Focusing on the case of linear regression analysis, we then derive some fundamental geometrical properties of SMR and SCR, allowing a comparison of the regions and providing some guidelines for their canonical construction. Relying on the algebraic framework of adjunctions of two mappings between partially ordered sets, we characterize SMR as a right adjoint and as the monotone kernel of a criterion function based mapping, while SCR is indeed interpretable as the corresponding monotone hull. Finally we sketch some ideas on a compromise between SMR and SCR based on a set-domained loss function. This paper is an extended version of a shorter paper with the same title, that is conditionally accepted for publication in the Proceedings of the Eighth International Symposium on Imprecise Probability: Theories and Applications. In the present paper we added proofs and the seventh chapter with a small Monte-Carlo-Illustration, that would have made the original paper too long