Are the Communists Dying Out in Russia?

Many predicted that the strength of the Communist Party in Russia would wane as the elderly pensioners who disproportionately supported the party died off. Contrary to this prediction, the findings of our analysis indicate that voters who reached retirement age during the past decade were even more supportive of the communists than the cohort of pensioners who preceded them. We believe this occurred because it was workers approaching retirement, not pensioners per se, who were disproportionately injured by the transition to a more market-oriented economy. Like pensioners they lost savings, but in many cases they also lost their jobs. They also had little opportunity to learn the new skills that the Russian economy increasingly calls for. There is as yet no indication that the communists have begun to die out

FDI another day: Russian reliance on European investment. Bruegel Policy Contribution Issue n˚3 | February 2020

Most foreign direct investment into Russia originates in the European Union: European investors own between 55 percent and 75 percent of Russian FDI stock. This points to a Russian dependence on European investment, making the EU paramount for Russian medium-term growth. Even if we consider ‘phantom’ FDI that transits through Europe, the EU remains the primary investor in Russia. Most phantom FDI into Russia is believed to originate from Russia itself and thus is by construction not foreign

Parting with Illusions: Developing a Realistic Approach to Relations with Russia

A review of America's post-Soviet strategy toward Russia is long overdue. The illusions that once guided policy are now at an end. What is needed is a dispassionate approach to Russia, wherein Americans would neither magnify nor excuse the virtues and vices of the Russian Federation but would accept the following realities: Russia is unlikely to become integrated into the Euro-Atlantic community and is unwilling to adjust its foreign policy priorities accordingly; There is broad-based support within Russia for the direction in which Vladimir Putin has taken the country;Russia has undergone a genuine -- if limited -- recovery from the collapse of the 1990s; Washington lacks sufficient leverage to compel Russian acquiescence to its policy preferences; and On a number of critical foreign policy issues, there is no clear community of interests that allows for concepts of "selective partnership" to be effective. Any approach to Russia must be based on realistic expectations about the choices confronting Washington. The United States has two options. It can forgo the possibility of Russian assistance in achieving its key foreign policy priorities in an effort to retain complete freedom of action vis-a-vis Moscow. Or it can prioritize its objectives and negotiate a series of quid pro quos with Russia. The latter choice, however, cannot be indefinitely postponed. Seeking an accommodation with Russia is more likely to guarantee American success in promoting its core national interests while minimizing costs -- but will require U.S. policymakers to accept limits on what can be demanded of Russia

Russia’s Contract Arbitrage

Ukraine is poised to restructure its debt, but Russia may hold the best cards in the negotiation. Russia bought $3 billion in Ukrainian Eurobonds in late 2013 to prop up a political ally, since-deposed. As Russian President Vladimir Putin himself has pointed out, these bonds have unique terms that let Russia call for early repayment, putting it ahead of Ukraine’s private creditors. Meanwhile, Russia and its proxies hold enough bonds to block a restructuring vote or hold out, sticking more losses on other creditors. Russia has refused to restructure the bonds in the Paris Club of government-to-government creditors, claiming that they are commercial debt. In all, Russia has effectively arbitraged the prevailing sovereign debt regime, where public and private lending to sovereigns are separated by legal form and restructuring institutions. Because the bonds in question are governed by English law, the U.K. Parliament can limit the scope for abuse by making them unenforceable. Such legislation has ample precedent, and would compare favorably to traditional sanctions. Uniquely among sanctions, it would not only punish Russia, but could deliver immediate financial relief for Ukraine

The European Union-Russia- China energy triangle. Bruegel Policy Contribution Issue #16 December 2019

Concern is growing in the European Union that a rapprochement between Russia and China could have negative implications for the EU. We argue that energy relations between the EU and Russia and between China and Russia influence each other. We analyse their interactions in terms of four areas: oil and gas trading, electricity exchanges, energy technology exports and energy investments. We discuss five key hypotheses that describe the likely developments in these four areas in the next decade and their potential impact on Europe: 1. There is no direct competition between the EU and China for Russian oil and gas; 2. China and the EU both have an interest in curbing excessive Russian energy rents; 3. The EU, Russia and China compete on the global energy technology market, but specialise in different technologies; 4. Intercontinental electricity exchange is unlikely; 5. Russia seems more worried about Chinese energy investments with strategic/political goals, than about EU investments. We find no evidence of a negative spillover for the EU from the developing Russia-China energy relationship.But, eventually, if these risks – and in particular the risk of structural financial disintermediation – do materialise, central banks would have various instruments to counter them

Russia Giving: Research on individual giving in Russia

This report presents the findings of research into individual giving in Russia and analyses the common giving patterns and habits of Russians -- the frequency and size of donations to NGOs, the ways in which donations are made, the main sources of information about NGOs, and which causes attract the most support, as well as the obstacles to and drivers for individual giving. The report draws parallels with the corresponding UK data and provides conclusions and recommendations for promoting individual giving to NGOs in Russia