1,055 research outputs found
From IF to BI: a tale of dependence and separation
We take a fresh look at the logics of informational dependence and
independence of Hintikka and Sandu and Vaananen, and their compositional
semantics due to Hodges. We show how Hodges' semantics can be seen as a special
case of a general construction, which provides a context for a useful
completeness theorem with respect to a wider class of models. We shed some new
light on each aspect of the logic. We show that the natural propositional logic
carried by the semantics is the logic of Bunched Implications due to Pym and
O'Hearn, which combines intuitionistic and multiplicative connectives. This
introduces several new connectives not previously considered in logics of
informational dependence, but which we show play a very natural role, most
notably intuitionistic implication. As regards the quantifiers, we show that
their interpretation in the Hodges semantics is forced, in that they are the
image under the general construction of the usual Tarski semantics; this
implies that they are adjoints to substitution, and hence uniquely determined.
As for the dependence predicate, we show that this is definable from a simpler
predicate, of constancy or dependence on nothing. This makes essential use of
the intuitionistic implication. The Armstrong axioms for functional dependence
are then recovered as a standard set of axioms for intuitionistic implication.
We also prove a full abstraction result in the style of Hodges, in which the
intuitionistic implication plays a very natural r\^ole.Comment: 28 pages, journal versio
Structural completeness in propositional logics of dependence
In this paper we prove that three of the main propositional logics of
dependence (including propositional dependence logic and inquisitive logic),
none of which is structural, are structurally complete with respect to a class
of substitutions under which the logics are closed. We obtain an analogues
result with respect to stable substitutions, for the negative variants of some
well-known intermediate logics, which are intermediate theories that are
closely related to inquisitive logic
On an Intuitionistic Logic for Pragmatics
We reconsider the pragmatic interpretation of intuitionistic logic [21]
regarded as a logic of assertions and their justications and its relations with classical
logic. We recall an extension of this approach to a logic dealing with assertions
and obligations, related by a notion of causal implication [14, 45]. We focus on
the extension to co-intuitionistic logic, seen as a logic of hypotheses [8, 9, 13] and on
polarized bi-intuitionistic logic as a logic of assertions and conjectures: looking at the
S4 modal translation, we give a denition of a system AHL of bi-intuitionistic logic
that correctly represents the duality between intuitionistic and co-intuitionistic logic,
correcting a mistake in previous work [7, 10]. A computational interpretation of cointuitionism
as a distributed calculus of coroutines is then used to give an operational
interpretation of subtraction.Work on linear co-intuitionism is then recalled, a linear
calculus of co-intuitionistic coroutines is dened and a probabilistic interpretation
of linear co-intuitionism is given as in [9]. Also we remark that by extending the
language of intuitionistic logic we can express the notion of expectation, an assertion
that in all situations the truth of p is possible and that in a logic of expectations
the law of double negation holds. Similarly, extending co-intuitionistic logic, we can
express the notion of conjecture that p, dened as a hypothesis that in some situation
the truth of p is epistemically necessary
Virtual Evidence: A Constructive Semantics for Classical Logics
This article presents a computational semantics for classical logic using
constructive type theory. Such semantics seems impossible because classical
logic allows the Law of Excluded Middle (LEM), not accepted in constructive
logic since it does not have computational meaning. However, the apparently
oracular powers expressed in the LEM, that for any proposition P either it or
its negation, not P, is true can also be explained in terms of constructive
evidence that does not refer to "oracles for truth." Types with virtual
evidence and the constructive impossibility of negative evidence provide
sufficient semantic grounds for classical truth and have a simple computational
meaning. This idea is formalized using refinement types, a concept of
constructive type theory used since 1984 and explained here. A new axiom
creating virtual evidence fully retains the constructive meaning of the logical
operators in classical contexts.
Key Words: classical logic, constructive logic, intuitionistic logic,
propositions-as-types, constructive type theory, refinement types, double
negation translation, computational content, virtual evidenc
Comparing and evaluating extended Lambek calculi
Lambeks Syntactic Calculus, commonly referred to as the Lambek calculus, was
innovative in many ways, notably as a precursor of linear logic. But it also
showed that we could treat our grammatical framework as a logic (as opposed to
a logical theory). However, though it was successful in giving at least a basic
treatment of many linguistic phenomena, it was also clear that a slightly more
expressive logical calculus was needed for many other cases. Therefore, many
extensions and variants of the Lambek calculus have been proposed, since the
eighties and up until the present day. As a result, there is now a large class
of calculi, each with its own empirical successes and theoretical results, but
also each with its own logical primitives. This raises the question: how do we
compare and evaluate these different logical formalisms? To answer this
question, I present two unifying frameworks for these extended Lambek calculi.
Both are proof net calculi with graph contraction criteria. The first calculus
is a very general system: you specify the structure of your sequents and it
gives you the connectives and contractions which correspond to it. The calculus
can be extended with structural rules, which translate directly into graph
rewrite rules. The second calculus is first-order (multiplicative
intuitionistic) linear logic, which turns out to have several other,
independently proposed extensions of the Lambek calculus as fragments. I will
illustrate the use of each calculus in building bridges between analyses
proposed in different frameworks, in highlighting differences and in helping to
identify problems.Comment: Empirical advances in categorial grammars, Aug 2015, Barcelona,
Spain. 201
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