1,055 research outputs found

    From IF to BI: a tale of dependence and separation

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    We take a fresh look at the logics of informational dependence and independence of Hintikka and Sandu and Vaananen, and their compositional semantics due to Hodges. We show how Hodges' semantics can be seen as a special case of a general construction, which provides a context for a useful completeness theorem with respect to a wider class of models. We shed some new light on each aspect of the logic. We show that the natural propositional logic carried by the semantics is the logic of Bunched Implications due to Pym and O'Hearn, which combines intuitionistic and multiplicative connectives. This introduces several new connectives not previously considered in logics of informational dependence, but which we show play a very natural role, most notably intuitionistic implication. As regards the quantifiers, we show that their interpretation in the Hodges semantics is forced, in that they are the image under the general construction of the usual Tarski semantics; this implies that they are adjoints to substitution, and hence uniquely determined. As for the dependence predicate, we show that this is definable from a simpler predicate, of constancy or dependence on nothing. This makes essential use of the intuitionistic implication. The Armstrong axioms for functional dependence are then recovered as a standard set of axioms for intuitionistic implication. We also prove a full abstraction result in the style of Hodges, in which the intuitionistic implication plays a very natural r\^ole.Comment: 28 pages, journal versio

    Structural completeness in propositional logics of dependence

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    In this paper we prove that three of the main propositional logics of dependence (including propositional dependence logic and inquisitive logic), none of which is structural, are structurally complete with respect to a class of substitutions under which the logics are closed. We obtain an analogues result with respect to stable substitutions, for the negative variants of some well-known intermediate logics, which are intermediate theories that are closely related to inquisitive logic

    On an Intuitionistic Logic for Pragmatics

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    We reconsider the pragmatic interpretation of intuitionistic logic [21] regarded as a logic of assertions and their justications and its relations with classical logic. We recall an extension of this approach to a logic dealing with assertions and obligations, related by a notion of causal implication [14, 45]. We focus on the extension to co-intuitionistic logic, seen as a logic of hypotheses [8, 9, 13] and on polarized bi-intuitionistic logic as a logic of assertions and conjectures: looking at the S4 modal translation, we give a denition of a system AHL of bi-intuitionistic logic that correctly represents the duality between intuitionistic and co-intuitionistic logic, correcting a mistake in previous work [7, 10]. A computational interpretation of cointuitionism as a distributed calculus of coroutines is then used to give an operational interpretation of subtraction.Work on linear co-intuitionism is then recalled, a linear calculus of co-intuitionistic coroutines is dened and a probabilistic interpretation of linear co-intuitionism is given as in [9]. Also we remark that by extending the language of intuitionistic logic we can express the notion of expectation, an assertion that in all situations the truth of p is possible and that in a logic of expectations the law of double negation holds. Similarly, extending co-intuitionistic logic, we can express the notion of conjecture that p, dened as a hypothesis that in some situation the truth of p is epistemically necessary

    Virtual Evidence: A Constructive Semantics for Classical Logics

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    This article presents a computational semantics for classical logic using constructive type theory. Such semantics seems impossible because classical logic allows the Law of Excluded Middle (LEM), not accepted in constructive logic since it does not have computational meaning. However, the apparently oracular powers expressed in the LEM, that for any proposition P either it or its negation, not P, is true can also be explained in terms of constructive evidence that does not refer to "oracles for truth." Types with virtual evidence and the constructive impossibility of negative evidence provide sufficient semantic grounds for classical truth and have a simple computational meaning. This idea is formalized using refinement types, a concept of constructive type theory used since 1984 and explained here. A new axiom creating virtual evidence fully retains the constructive meaning of the logical operators in classical contexts. Key Words: classical logic, constructive logic, intuitionistic logic, propositions-as-types, constructive type theory, refinement types, double negation translation, computational content, virtual evidenc

    Comparing and evaluating extended Lambek calculi

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    Lambeks Syntactic Calculus, commonly referred to as the Lambek calculus, was innovative in many ways, notably as a precursor of linear logic. But it also showed that we could treat our grammatical framework as a logic (as opposed to a logical theory). However, though it was successful in giving at least a basic treatment of many linguistic phenomena, it was also clear that a slightly more expressive logical calculus was needed for many other cases. Therefore, many extensions and variants of the Lambek calculus have been proposed, since the eighties and up until the present day. As a result, there is now a large class of calculi, each with its own empirical successes and theoretical results, but also each with its own logical primitives. This raises the question: how do we compare and evaluate these different logical formalisms? To answer this question, I present two unifying frameworks for these extended Lambek calculi. Both are proof net calculi with graph contraction criteria. The first calculus is a very general system: you specify the structure of your sequents and it gives you the connectives and contractions which correspond to it. The calculus can be extended with structural rules, which translate directly into graph rewrite rules. The second calculus is first-order (multiplicative intuitionistic) linear logic, which turns out to have several other, independently proposed extensions of the Lambek calculus as fragments. I will illustrate the use of each calculus in building bridges between analyses proposed in different frameworks, in highlighting differences and in helping to identify problems.Comment: Empirical advances in categorial grammars, Aug 2015, Barcelona, Spain. 201
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