A Critical Commentary on the Zwolinski 2013 "Libertarianism and Liberty" Essays

The Zwolinski 2013 "libertarianism and liberty" essays on libertarianism_org are argued to have the following problems: taking libertarianism to be a "commitment" to the view that "liberty is the highest political value" ; examining and rejecting the maximization of liberty without a libertarian theory of liberty; accepting a persuasive sense of "coercion" ; misunderstandingliberty in the work place; conflating, to varying degrees, freedom of action and freedom from aggression and justice/rights/morals; focusing on logically possible clashes instead of practically possible congruence among utility, liberty, and justice – in particular, that "rule (preference-)utilitarianism" fits "rule libertarianism" ; failing to distinguish liberty from license (and power) concerning slavery, and so-called "civil and democratic liberties" (and everything else); the idea that any coherent reference to a quantity of liberty requires precise cardinality; failing to see that the quantity of liberty has an inherently qualitative aspect; misunderstanding property as about limiting freedom; mistaking clashing Hobbesian freedom for non-clashing Lockean liberty; adopting G. A. Cohen's confusion about freedom as the libertarian conception of freedom; assuming the – illogical – epistemology of justification" ; not realizing that both allowing and prohibiting pollution "aggresses" and so "aggressions" need to be minimized; the failure of all six of its reasons for rejecting the non-aggression principle

Microfoundations: a decisive dividing line between Keynesian and new classical macroeconomics?

It is often argued that what marks the difference between Keynesian macroeconomics and new classical macroeconomics (the first installment of dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models) is the presence of microfoundations. These are deemed to be absent in the Keynesian approach, but central to the new classical one. The aim of my paper is to critically discuss this view. Lucas and Sargent defined the microfoundations requirement as consisting of two elements, optimizing behavior and market clearing. I claim that an alternative, weaker, definition is conceivable, which can be traced back to Hayek and Patinkin. According to them, the microfoundations requirement consists of a single criterion, optimizing planning. This definition, I claim, is better than the new classical one. Next, I examine whether Keynesian macroeconomics, which admittedly does not abide by the Lucas-Sargent definition, does accord with the Hayek-Patinkin approach. My conclusion is that Keynes’s General Theory is indeed microfounded in this sense, although no single conclusion can be drawn for Keynesian models in general.microfoundations, Keynes, new classical macroeconomics

Defence of Absurd Theories in Economics

Theories that involve plainly false and even bizarre assumptions are argued to have an important role in bundling empirical facts in a way that allows these to be understood, handled and used as modules in the construction of mechanisms by economists with human cognitive limits. Absurd theories are subcomponents used in a valid explanatory strategy as long as the mechanisms only derive the implications of the facts summarised. This provides a defence and explanation of many economic theories, but also imposes hard limits on such theorising.As-if theory; Economic methodology; welfare economics

Applying Behavioural Economics to International Development Policy

behavioural economics, policy

Common sense philosophy and politics in America: John Witherspoon, James McCosh, and William James

This dissertation examines the political significance of the two leading strains of common sense thought in the history of American philosophy—Scottish Common Sense and Pragmatism—as suggested in the writings of John Witherspoon and James McCosh in the Scottish Common Sense line, and of the more famous co-founder of Pragmatism, William James. These two strains of American common sense are placed in context of the larger Western common sense tradition. Each is shown to aim at finding a solid middle ground epistemologically between skeptical doubt and idealistic certitude that could serve as a stable basis for moral and political life. Witherspoon, the first great advocate and popularizer of Scottish Common Sense in America, gave the United States its first coherent, systematic common sense political theory, and that theory is here traced out as a common sense theory of politics for the first time. The first systematic text-based treatment of the moral and social thought of McCosh, the last great proponent of Scottish Common Sense in the American setting, is also provided. In James’ case, the first systematic treatment of the place of common sense in his philosophic worldview is rendered, and it is argued in the process that he is rightly understood as a kind of common sense philosopher. Together, Witherspoon, McCosh, and James offer a vision of man and society that avoids the rigidity of dogmatic foundationalism, on the one hand, and the slackness of foundationless ethics and politics, on the other

Risk-Smoothing Across Time and the Demand for Inventories: A Mean-Variance Approach

The standard production smoothing model of inventory demand cannot represent the added incentives for smoothing risks or explain the impact of market shocks that independently affect expectations and uncertainty. Those limitations are overcome by modeling inventory demand as a problem in deterministic optimal control, with the risk-averse firm maximizing utility that is a separable function of the mean and variance of returns and the firm controlling on two decision variables, production and inventory investment. Support for the mean-variance approach comes from regressions using Survey of Professional Forecasters data to show how changes in the mean forecasts of the GDP price deflator and changes in the disagreement among deflator forecasts can explain changes in aggregate inventory investment over time. Further support comes from the ability of the model to explain the excess volatility of industry output over sales—a fact at odds with the production smoothing theory.

_Adversus “Adversus Homo Economicus_”: Critique of the “Critique of Lester’s Account of Instrumental Rationality”

This essay goes through Frederick 2015 (the critique) in some detail, responding to the various paraphrases and criticisms therein. It is argued that in each case the critique is mistaken about what Lester 2012 (Escape from Leviathan: EfL) says, or about what the critique presents as a sound criticism, or both. Introduction: the three problems with the critique and the philosophical problem that EfL is attempting to solve. “Abstract”: the critique’s confusion about EfL’s aprioristic theory of instrumental rationality. There are then detailed replies (too many and too diverse to summarise) to quotations from the critique’s confused interpretations and criticisms under the following headings (quoted from the critique): “2. Instrumental Rationality”; 3. Weakness of Will”; “4. Desires and Values”; “5. Free Will”; “6. Self-Interest”; “7. Maximisation”; “8. Morals”. Finally, in “9. Conclusion”, the philosophical problem for economics is briefly restated. The philosophical interpretation of homo economicus in EfL (as with its overall philosophical theory of libertarianism) has yet to be given adequate critical consideration