Towards quantum-based privacy and voting

The privacy of communicating participants is often of paramount importance, but in some situations it is an essential condition. A typical example is a fair (secret) voting. We analyze in detail communication privacy based on quantum resources, and we propose new quantum protocols. Possible generalizations that would lead to voting schemes are discussed.Comment: 5 pages, improved description of the protoco

Quantum Private Information Retrieval with Sublinear Communication Complexity

This note presents a quantum protocol for private information retrieval, in the single-server case and with information-theoretical privacy, that has O(\sqrt{n})-qubit communication complexity, where n denotes the size of the database. In comparison, it is known that any classical protocol must use \Omega(n) bits of communication in this setting.Comment: 4 page

Interaction in Quantum Communication

In some scenarios there are ways of conveying information with many fewer, even exponentially fewer, qubits than possible classically. Moreover, some of these methods have a very simple structure--they involve only few message exchanges between the communicating parties. It is therefore natural to ask whether every classical protocol may be transformed to a ``simpler'' quantum protocol--one that has similar efficiency, but uses fewer message exchanges. We show that for any constant k, there is a problem such that its k+1 message classical communication complexity is exponentially smaller than its k message quantum communication complexity. This, in particular, proves a round hierarchy theorem for quantum communication complexity, and implies, via a simple reduction, an Omega(N^{1/k}) lower bound for k message quantum protocols for Set Disjointness for constant k. Enroute, we prove information-theoretic lemmas, and define a related measure of correlation, the informational distance, that we believe may be of significance in other contexts as well.Comment: 35 pages. Uses IEEEtran.cls, IEEEbib.bst. Submitted to IEEE Transactions on Information Theory. Strengthens results in quant-ph/0005106, quant-ph/0004100 and an earlier version presented in STOC 200

Quantifying the Leakage of Quantum Protocols for Classical Two-Party Cryptography

We study quantum protocols among two distrustful parties. By adopting a rather strict definition of correctness - guaranteeing that honest players obtain their correct outcomes only - we can show that every strictly correct quantum protocol implementing a non-trivial classical primitive necessarily leaks information to a dishonest player. This extends known impossibility results to all non-trivial primitives. We provide a framework for quantifying this leakage and argue that leakage is a good measure for the privacy provided to the players by a given protocol. Our framework also covers the case where the two players are helped by a trusted third party. We show that despite the help of a trusted third party, the players cannot amplify the cryptographic power of any primitive. All our results hold even against quantum honest-but-curious adversaries who honestly follow the protocol but purify their actions and apply a different measurement at the end of the protocol. As concrete examples, we establish lower bounds on the leakage of standard universal two-party primitives such as oblivious transfer.Comment: 38 pages, completely supersedes arXiv:0902.403

On the power of two-party quantum cryptography

We study quantum protocols among two distrustful parties. Under the sole assumption of correctness - guaranteeing that honest players obtain their correct outcomes - we show that every protocol implementing a non-trivial primitive necessarily leaks information to a dishonest player. This extends known impossibility results to all non-trivial primitives. We provide a framework for quantifying this leakage and argue that leakage is a good measure for the privacy provided to the players by a given protocol. Our framework also covers the case where the two players are helped by a trusted third party. We show that despite the help of a trusted third party, the players cannot amplify the cryptographic power of any primitive. All our results hold even against quantum honest-but-curious adversaries who honestly follow the protocol but purify their actions and apply a different measurement at the end of the protocol. As concrete examples, we establish lower bounds on the leakage of standard universal two-party primitives such as oblivious transfer