The Semantics of Repression: Understanding the Continued Brutality towards LGBTQA Individuals in the Russian Federation

This work serves to examine the linguistic style and choices used by Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin as it pertains to issues of the LGBTQA community in the country and the Anti-Propaganda Law. Using the methodology of Critical Discourse Analysis, the author compares the speeches of Vladimir Putin to those of Western leaders Barack Obama and Ban Ki-moon, drawing conclusions as to why brutality towards LGBTQA individuals in Russia has been allowed to continue relatively unopposed. The author suggests that it may be Vladimir Putin\u27s careful choice in words and speaking styles that allows the issue to persist

The Putin phenomenon

The Putin presidency in Russia became increasingly popular as it progressed and a leadership cult developed around the president himself. Not only was there general satisfaction with the leadership as a whole, there was also evidence that it was regarded as increasingly successful in all fields of policy, particularly in international affairs; and focus group discussions as well as surveys suggested the newly elected president, Dmitri Medvedev, would be expected to continue those policies. A closer examination of the survey evidence suggests that the Putin leadership in fact had relatively weak roots in the wider society, and drew widely but superficially on public support. More than anything else it was the strong economic performance of these years that generated support for the Putin presidency, and this suggested that any future leader would depend for his position on maintaining that economic performance in what were now more difficult circumstances

Contending with Putin's Russia

As President Barack Obama enters his second term, relations with Russia present him with a set of thorny problems. The first-term "reset," a fresh American posture toward the Kremlin that was designed to build productive relations by offering compromises on a range of political and geostrategic issues, has clearly run its course. The Obama administration had partly based its hope for improved ties on the ability of Dmitry Medvedev, who served as Russia's president from 2008 to 2012, to achieve liberal reforms, especially on freedom of expression, the rule of law, and the ability of civil society to function without state intrusion. However, substantive reforms never materialized, former president and then prime minister Vladimir Putin remained the dominant force in government, and Russia moved abruptly in a more repressive direction following his return to the presidency in May 2012. Step by step, Putin has pushed through measures to deter public demonstrations, smear and limit funding for nongovernmental organizations, and place restrictions on the internet. He has also made anti-Americanism a central part of his political message. He has accused the United States of fomenting demonstrations against election fraud, shut down all U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) programs in Russia, withdrawn from a series of cooperative agreements with the United States, and signed a vindictive law that prohibits the adoption of Russian children by citizens of the United States.There can be little doubt that a new American policy toward the Kremlin is needed. To help inform the discussion on a new approach, Freedom House is publishing this package of materials on the state of human rights and democracy in Russia since Putin took power in 2000. In the centerpiece essay, Freedom House president David J. Kramer and Eurasia program director Susan Corke assess the nature of the Putin regime and advance a series of proposals for American policy in the coming period. Katherin Machalek, the research analyst for Freedom House's "Nations in Transit" publication, is the author of a companion piece that lays out the progressive legal restrictions on civil society organizations during the Putin era. The package also includes a chronology of selected developments in Russia from 2000 through 2012 , with a focus on the suppression of the political opposition, independent media, and civil society. The chronology, prepared by Freedom House researcher Marissa Miller, serves as a reminder that the repressive measures enacted over the past eight months do not amount to a new direction for Russia, but rather a continuation, in severe form, of trends that have dominated Russian politics throughout the Putin era. Finally, a series of graphical representations prepared by senior research assistant Bret Nelson illustrate the decline of political rights and civil liberties in Russia as measured by Freedom House's annual reports

Civil Society and Philanthropy Under Putin

"Civil Society and Philanthropy Under Putin," The International Journal of Not-for-Profit Law 8: 3 (May 2006

On the Possible Foreign Policy of the Post-Putin Russia: The Case of Alexei Navalny’s Viewpoints on Foreign Affairs

The study delves into the foreign policy plans of Alexei Navalny, the Russian politician who is currently commonly regarded as the most prominent opposition leader and the sole plausible alternative to Vladimir Putin. Drawing on his interviews, public speeches, media publications and electoral manifestos, the author analyses his foreign policy views alongside three topics, that is, Russia’s policies towards disputed lands and states in the post-Soviet area (Crimea, Donbas, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Transnistria), the country’s foreign policy orientation and priorities (especially regarding relations with the West) and assessment of the Putin regime’s foreign policy. Following this, the author speculates on the likely foundations of Russia’s foreign policy under Navalny’s possible presidency and their implications for the West

The ISCIP Analyst, Volume V, Issue 9

This repository item contains a single issue of The ISCIP Analyst, an analytical review journal published from 1996 to 2010 by the Boston University Institute for the Study of Conflict, Ideology, and Policy

UK-Russia Political Relations

A complex range of issues has undermined high level relations between the UK and Russia in recent years, many of which remain unresolved. Four stand out. First, many of the negative elements souring UK-Russian relations have come about because, despite formal declarations and engagement within multilateral fora such as the EU-Russian partnership framework and the G8, there has increasingly been a focus on bilateral elements in the relationship. Second, decreasing unity on the part of ‘the West’ in the early years of the 21st century has encouraged differentiation in Russia’s foreign policy towards western powers and has intensified competition between European powers with regard to good relations with Russia. Despite frequent arguments by some observers that the era of the nation state is gone and the era of globalisation is here, this is far from the case in Putin’s foreign policy and in UK-Russian relations. Third, the personal impact of Prime Minister Tony Blair as a key interlocutor declined since the beginning of the century. When President Putin came to power in 2000, Tony Blair was seen by many as a man of the future as opposed to the other leaders of key western powers who seemed to be on their way out. Six years later, however, Blair was nearing the end of his prime ministership, there were new leaders in Europe, and any role for Prime Minister Blair as a bridge between Russia and the United States was less necessary. Fourth, and related to the above, there are serious “value” differences between the UK and Russia, for example, over the independence of important elements of non-governmental society, such as the judiciary and big business. The importance of the political relationship between Britain and Russia as a whole, has decreased notably in recent years. This will not remain the case for ever, and even as it has occurred, mutual interests and obligations have continued to keep formal contacts and cooperation on many levels positive