24,830 research outputs found
Public Evidence from Secret Ballots
Elections seem simple---aren't they just counting? But they have a unique,
challenging combination of security and privacy requirements. The stakes are
high; the context is adversarial; the electorate needs to be convinced that the
results are correct; and the secrecy of the ballot must be ensured. And they
have practical constraints: time is of the essence, and voting systems need to
be affordable and maintainable, and usable by voters, election officials, and
pollworkers. It is thus not surprising that voting is a rich research area
spanning theory, applied cryptography, practical systems analysis, usable
security, and statistics. Election integrity involves two key concepts:
convincing evidence that outcomes are correct and privacy, which amounts to
convincing assurance that there is no evidence about how any given person
voted. These are obviously in tension. We examine how current systems walk this
tightrope.Comment: To appear in E-Vote-Id '1
Labor Union Recognition Procedures: Use of Secret Ballots and Card Checks
CRS_May_2005__Labor_Recognition_Procedures.pdf: 1237 downloads, before Oct. 1, 2020
Vote buying and redistribution
Vote buying is a form of political clientelism involving pre-electoral transfers of money or material benefits from candidates to voters. Despite the presence of secret ballots, vote buying remains a pervasive phenomenon during elections in developing countries. While prior literature has focused on how vote buying is enforced by parties and political candidates and which types of voters are most likely targeted, we know much less about the behavioral spillover effects of vote buying on citizens’ demand for redistribution and contributions to the provision of public goods. In this paper, we provide evidence on how vote buying causally affects voters’ candidate choice, support for redistribution, and public goods provision. Using data from a laboratory experiment in Kenya, we find that vote buying is a double-edged sword for candidates using clientelist strategies: it attracts votes from those who were offered money and accepted it, but it also leads to negative reactions from those who rejected the offer as well as those who were not offered money. In line with its effect on voting behavior, vote buying has negative effects on subjects’ evaluations of the vote-buying candidate. Vote buying significantly reduces individuals’ stated preferences for more government spending on police and law enforcement—yet, surprisingly, not on other welfare areas such as unemployment benefits or health. We also find that open ballots—but not vote-buying campaigns—reduce individuals’ willingness to contribute to public goods provisions
Quantum protocols for anonymous voting and surveying
We describe quantum protocols for voting and surveying. A key feature of our
schemes is the use of entangled states to ensure that the votes are anonymous
and to allow the votes to be tallied. The entanglement is distributed over
separated sites; the physical inaccessibility of any one site is sufficient to
guarantee the anonymity of the votes. The security of these protocols with
respect to various kinds of attack is discussed. We also discuss classical
schemes and show that our quantum voting protocol represents a N-fold reduction
in computational complexity, where N is the number of voters.Comment: 8 pages. V2 includes the modifications made for the published versio
Your Ballot's In the Mail: Vote By Mail and Absentee Voting
Convenience voting, defined as access to voting at a time and place of the voter's choosing, has grown exponentially in the United States within the last two decades. A majority of states now permit "no-fault" or "no excuse" absentee voting, early in person voting, and vote-by-mail (VBM). This report will discuss the advantages and disadvantages of convenience voting in the form of no excuse absentee voting, permanent no excuse absentee voting, and VBM, all of which use the United States Postal Service as a central component. It will also discuss the concerns of proponents and opponents of mail balloting. Finally, it will suggest methods intended to address concerns about mail-in balloting expressed by legislators, administrators, election advocates, and scholars. Early in person voting, which may or may not include use of the mails as a component, is beyond the scope of this report
Combatting electoral traces: the Dutch tempest discussion and beyond
In the Dutch e-voting debate, the crucial issue leading to the abandonment of all electronic voting machines was compromising radiation, or tempest. Other countries, however, do not seem to be bothered by this risk. In this paper, we use actor-network theory to analyse the socio-technical origins of the Dutch tempest issue in e-voting, and its consequences for e-voting beyond the Netherlands. We introduce the term electoral traces to denote any physical, digital or social evidence of a voter's choices in an election. From this perspective, we provide guidelines for risk analysis as well as an overview of countermeasures
History of the Debate Surrounding the 2004 Presidential Election
This paper presents a time-line of events, articles, academic papers, and findings surrounding debate about the 2004 U.S. Presidential election
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