Proving unprovability

This paper addresses the question: given some theory T that we accept, is there some natural, generally applicable way of extending T to a theory S that can prove a range of things about what it itself (i.e., S) can prove, including a range of things about what it cannot prove, such as claims to the effect that it cannot prove certain particular sentences (e.g., 0 = 1), or the claim that it is consistent? Typical characterizations of Gödel’s second incompleteness theorem, and its significance, would lead us to believe that the answer is ‘no’. But the present paper explores a positive answer. The general approach is to follow the lead of recent (and not so recent) approaches to truth and the Liar paradox

Separating Bounded Arithmetics by Herbrand Consistency

The problem of $\Pi_1-$separating the hierarchy of bounded arithmetic has been studied in the paper. It is shown that the notion of Herbrand Consistency, in its full generality, cannot $\Pi_1-$separate the theory ${\rm I\Delta_0+\bigwedge_j\Omega_j}$ from ${\rm I\Delta_0}$; though it can $\Pi_1-$separate ${\rm I\Delta_0+Exp}$ from ${\rm I\Delta_0}$. This extends a result of L. A. Ko{\l}odziejczyk (2006), by showing the unprovability of the Herbrand Consistency of ${\rm I\Delta_0}$ in the theory ${\rm I\Delta_0+\bigwedge_j\Omega_j}$.Comment: Published by Oxford University Press. arXiv admin note: text overlap with arXiv:1005.265

Resource Bounded Unprovability of Computational Lower Bounds

This paper introduces new notions of asymptotic proofs, PT(polynomial-time)-extensions, PTM(polynomial-time Turing machine)-omega-consistency, etc. on formal theories of arithmetic including PA (Peano Arithmetic). This paper shows that P not= NP (more generally, any super-polynomial-time lower bound in PSPACE) is unprovable in a PTM-omega-consistent theory T, where T is a consistent PT-extension of PA. This result gives a unified view to the existing two major negative results on proving P not= NP, Natural Proofs and relativizable proofs, through the two manners of characterization of PTM-omega-consistency. We also show that the PTM-omega-consistency of T cannot be proven in any PTM-omega-consistent theory S, where S is a consistent PT-extension of T.Comment: 78 page

Consistency of circuit lower bounds with bounded theories

Proving that there are problems in $\mathsf{P}^\mathsf{NP}$ that require boolean circuits of super-linear size is a major frontier in complexity theory. While such lower bounds are known for larger complexity classes, existing results only show that the corresponding problems are hard on infinitely many input lengths. For instance, proving almost-everywhere circuit lower bounds is open even for problems in $\mathsf{MAEXP}$. Giving the notorious difficulty of proving lower bounds that hold for all large input lengths, we ask the following question: Can we show that a large set of techniques cannot prove that $\mathsf{NP}$ is easy infinitely often? Motivated by this and related questions about the interaction between mathematical proofs and computations, we investigate circuit complexity from the perspective of logic. Among other results, we prove that for any parameter $k \geq 1$ it is consistent with theory $T$ that computational class ${\mathcal C} \not \subseteq \textit{i.o.}\mathrm{SIZE}(n^k)$, where $(T, \mathcal{C})$ is one of the pairs: $T = \mathsf{T}^1_2$ and ${\mathcal C} = \mathsf{P}^\mathsf{NP}$, $T = \mathsf{S}^1_2$ and ${\mathcal C} = \mathsf{NP}$, $T = \mathsf{PV}$ and ${\mathcal C} = \mathsf{P}$. In other words, these theories cannot establish infinitely often circuit upper bounds for the corresponding problems. This is of interest because the weaker theory $\mathsf{PV}$ already formalizes sophisticated arguments, such as a proof of the PCP Theorem. These consistency statements are unconditional and improve on earlier theorems of [KO17] and [BM18] on the consistency of lower bounds with $\mathsf{PV}$

Herbrand Consistency of Some Arithmetical Theories

G\"odel's second incompleteness theorem is proved for Herbrand consistency of some arithmetical theories with bounded induction, by using a technique of logarithmic shrinking the witnesses of bounded formulas, due to Z. Adamowicz [Herbrand consistency and bounded arithmetic, \textit{Fundamenta Mathematicae} 171 (2002) 279--292]. In that paper, it was shown that one cannot always shrink the witness of a bounded formula logarithmically, but in the presence of Herbrand consistency, for theories ${\rm I\Delta_0+\Omega_m}$ with $m\geqslant 2$, any witness for any bounded formula can be shortened logarithmically. This immediately implies the unprovability of Herbrand consistency of a theory $T\supseteq {\rm I\Delta_0+\Omega_2}$ in $T$ itself. In this paper, the above results are generalized for ${\rm I\Delta_0+\Omega_1}$. Also after tailoring the definition of Herbrand consistency for ${\rm I\Delta_0}$ we prove the corresponding theorems for ${\rm I\Delta_0}$. Thus the Herbrand version of G\"odel's second incompleteness theorem follows for the theories ${\rm I\Delta_0+\Omega_1}$ and ${\rm I\Delta_0}$