Epistemic Logic for Communication Chains

The paper considers epistemic properties of linear communication chains. It describes a sound and complete logical system that, in addition to the standard axioms of S5 in a multi-modal language, contains two non-trivial axioms that capture the linear structure of communication chains.Comment: 7 pages, Contributed talk at TARK 2013 (arXiv:1310.6382) http://www.tark.or

Complementary expressions for the entropy-from-work theorem

We establish an expression of the entropy-from-work theorem that is complementary to the one originally proposed in [P. Talkner, P. Hanggi and M. Morillo, arXiv:0707.2307]. In the original expression the final energy is fixed whereas in the present expression the initial energy is fixed.Comment: 2 Page

Information complexity is computable

The information complexity of a function $f$ is the minimum amount of information Alice and Bob need to exchange to compute the function $f$. In this paper we provide an algorithm for approximating the information complexity of an arbitrary function $f$ to within any additive error $\alpha > 0$, thus resolving an open question as to whether information complexity is computable. In the process, we give the first explicit upper bound on the rate of convergence of the information complexity of $f$ when restricted to $b$-bit protocols to the (unrestricted) information complexity of $f$.Comment: 30 page

Comment on "Quantum key distribution for d-level systems with generalized Bell states" [Phys. Rev. A 65, 052331 (2002)]

In the paper [Phys. Rev. A 65, 052331(2002)], an entanglement-based quantum key distribution protocol for d-level systems was proposed. However, in this Comment, it is shown that this protocol is insecure for a special attack strategy.Comment: 4 pages, 4 figure

Device-Independent Relativistic Quantum Bit Commitment

We examine the possibility of device-independent relativistic quantum bit commitment. We note the potential threat of {\it location attacks}, in which the behaviour of untrusted devices used in relativistic quantum cryptography depends on their space-time location. We describe relativistic quantum bit commitment schemes that are immune to these attacks, and show that these schemes offer device-independent security against hypothetical post-quantum adversaries subject only to the no-signalling principle. We compare a relativistic classical bit commitment scheme with similar features, and note some possible advantages of the quantum schemes

Effects of depolarizing quantum channels on BB84 and SARG04 quantum cryptography protocols

We report experimental studies on the effect of the depolarizing quantum channel on weak-pulse BB84 and SARG04 quantum cryptography. The experimental results show that, in real world conditions in which channel depolarization cannot be ignored, BB84 should perform better than SARG04.Comment: 4 pages, 4 figure

State based model of long-term potentiation and synaptic tagging and capture

Recent data indicate that plasticity protocols have not only synapse-specific but also more widespread effects. In particular, in synaptic tagging and capture (STC), tagged synapses can capture plasticity-related proteins, synthesized in response to strong stimulation of other synapses. This leads to long-lasting modification of only weakly stimulated synapses. Here we present a biophysical model of synaptic plasticity in the hippocampus that incorporates several key results from experiments on STC. The model specifies a set of physical states in which a synapse can exist, together with transition rates that are affected by high- and low-frequency stimulation protocols. In contrast to most standard plasticity models, the model exhibits both early- and late-phase LTP/D, de-potentiation, and STC. As such, it provides a useful starting point for further theoretical work on the role of STC in learning and memory

Security bounds for continuous variables quantum key distribution

Security bounds for key distribution protocols using coherent and squeezed states and homodyne measurements are presented. These bounds refer to (i) general attacks and (ii) collective attacks where Eve interacts individually with the sent states, but delays her measurement until the end of the reconciliation process. For the case of a lossy line and coherent states, it is first proven that a secure key distribution is possible up to 1.9 dB of losses. For the second scenario, the security bounds are the same as for the completely incoherent attack.Comment: See also F. Grosshans, quant-ph/040714