Facial Data Minimization: Shallow Model as Your Privacy Filter

Face recognition service has been used in many fields and brings much convenience to people. However, once the user's facial data is transmitted to a service provider, the user will lose control of his/her private data. In recent years, there exist various security and privacy issues due to the leakage of facial data. Although many privacy-preserving methods have been proposed, they usually fail when they are not accessible to adversaries' strategies or auxiliary data. Hence, in this paper, by fully considering two cases of uploading facial images and facial features, which are very typical in face recognition service systems, we proposed a data privacy minimization transformation (PMT) method. This method can process the original facial data based on the shallow model of authorized services to obtain the obfuscated data. The obfuscated data can not only maintain satisfactory performance on authorized models and restrict the performance on other unauthorized models but also prevent original privacy data from leaking by AI methods and human visual theft. Additionally, since a service provider may execute preprocessing operations on the received data, we also propose an enhanced perturbation method to improve the robustness of PMT. Besides, to authorize one facial image to multiple service models simultaneously, a multiple restriction mechanism is proposed to improve the scalability of PMT. Finally, we conduct extensive experiments and evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed PMT in defending against face reconstruction, data abuse, and face attribute estimation attacks. These experimental results demonstrate that PMT performs well in preventing facial data abuse and privacy leakage while maintaining face recognition accuracy.Comment: 14 pages, 11 figure

The universe without us: a history of the science and ethics of human extinction

This dissertation consists of two parts. Part I is an intellectual history of thinking about human extinction (mostly) within the Western tradition. When did our forebears first imagine humanity ceasing to exist? Have people always believed that human extinction is a real possibility, or were some convinced that this could never happen? How has our thinking about extinction evolved over time? Why do so many notable figures today believe that the probability of extinction this century is higher than ever before in our 300,000-year history on Earth? Exploring these questions takes readers from the ancient Greeks, Persians, and Egyptians, through the 18th-century Enlightenment, past scientific breakthroughs of the 19th century like thermodynamics and evolutionary theory, up to the Atomic Age, the rise of modern environmentalism in the 1970s, and contemporary fears about climate change, global pandemics, and artificial general intelligence (AGI). Part II is a history of Western thinking about the ethical and evaluative implications of human extinction. Would causing or allowing our extinction be morally right or wrong? Would our extinction be good or bad, better or worse compared to continuing to exist? For what reasons? Under which conditions? Do we have a moral obligation to create future people? Would past “progress” be rendered meaningless if humanity were to die out? Does the fact that we might be unique in the universe—the only “rational” and “moral” creatures—give us extra reason to ensure our survival? I place these questions under the umbrella of Existential Ethics, tracing the development of this field from the early 1700s through Mary Shelley’s 1826 novel The Last Man, the gloomy German pessimists of the latter 19th century, and post-World War II reflections on nuclear “omnicide,” up to current-day thinkers associated with “longtermism” and “antinatalism.” In the dissertation, I call the first history “History #1” and the second “History #2.” A main thesis of Part I is that Western thinking about human extinction can be segmented into five distinction periods, each of which corresponds to a unique “existential mood.” An existential mood arises from a particular set of answers to fundamental questions about the possibility, probability, etiology, and so on, of human extinction. I claim that the idea of human extinction first appeared among the ancient Greeks, but was eclipsed for roughly 1,500 years with the rise of Christianity. A central contention of Part II is that philosophers have thus far conflated six distinct types of “human extinction,” each of which has its own unique ethical and evaluative implications. I further contend that it is crucial to distinguish between the process or event of Going Extinct and the state or condition of Being Extinct, which one should see as orthogonal to the six types of extinction that I delineate. My aim with the second part of the book is to not only trace the history of Western thinking about the ethics of annihilation, but lay the theoretical groundwork for future research on the topic. I then outline my own views within “Existential Ethics,” which combine ideas and positions to yield a novel account of the conditions under which our extinction would be bad, and why there is a sense in which Being Extinct might be better than Being Extant, or continuing to exist