8 research outputs found
Cohabiting with the Logical Paradoxes: A Negative Assessment and a Proposal
At the commonsensical level of the manifest image, we seem to take for granted
logical laws of all sorts, including classical logic (CL) and naive principles of truth
and predication (TP), which, however, generate logical paradoxes such as the liar,
Russell’s paradox and Curry’s paradox. The formal logic of the scientific image
comes to the rescue by proposing many competing formal systems that restore consistency,
by sacrificing either principles of CL or principles of TP. We wish to explore
a different path, which aims at saving both CL and TP, and deals with the
paradoxes when they come to the fore, without swallowing contradictions or explosion.
We consider the viability of Batens’ Inconsistency-Adaptive Logic (IAL)
to pursue this goal and we end up with a negative assessment. We then sketch an
alternative proposal that incorporates IAL’s distinction between provisional and
final derivability
A new bridge principle for the normativity of logic
Logic appears to be normative for rational belief. The thesis
of the normativity of logic holds that indeed logic has
such a normative status. Gilbert Harman has questioned
it, thereby giving rise to what has been called “Harman’s
skeptical challenge”. MacFarlane has clarified that in
order to answer this challenge and support the normativity
of logic, one needs a “bridge principle” that appropriately
connects logical entailments and norms for
belief, as well as relevant desiderata for the evaluation
of candidate bridge principles. Steinberger has identified
a list of desiderata, on the basis of which he has proposed
his own bridge principle and shown the inadequacy
of previous proposals. This paper argues that
Steinberger’s list is in need of revision and his principle
is unsatisfactory, and then puts forward a revised list of
desiderata and a new bridge principle in support of the
normativity of logic
Properties
Panorama aggiornato delle principali teorie filosofiche su propriet\ue0 e relazioni intese come universal
Properties
survey of major approaches to properties understood as universal
The Lambda Calculus
The λ-calculus is, at heart, a simple notation for functions and application. The main ideas are applying a function to an argument and forming functions by abstraction. The syntax of basic λ-calculus is quite sparse, making it an elegant, focused notation for representing functions. Functions and arguments are on a par with one another. The result is a non-extensional theory of functions as rules of computation, contrasting with an extensional theory of functions as sets of ordered pairs. Despite its sparse syntax, the expressiveness and flexibility of the λ-calculus make it a cornucopia of logic and mathematics. This entry develops some of the central highlights of the field and prepares the reader for further study of the subject and its applications in philosophy, linguistics, computer science, and logic
Singular reference. A descriptivist perspective
Singular reference to ourselves and the ordinary objects surrounding us is a most crucial
philosophical topic, for it looms large in any attempt to understand how language
and mind connect to the world. This book explains in detail why in the past philosophers
such as Frege, Russell and Reichenbach have favoured a descriptivist approach to this
matter and why in more recent times Donnellan, Kripke, Kaplan and others have rather
favoured a referentialist standpoint. The now dominant referentialist theories however
still have a hard time in addressing propositional attitudes and empty singular terms.
Here a way out of this difficulty emerges in an approach that incorporates aspects of the
old-fashioned descriptivist views of Frege, Russell and Reichenbach without succumbing
to the anti-descriptivist arguments that back up the current referentialist trend. The
resulting theory features a novel approach to the semantics and pragmatics of determiner
phrases, definite descriptions, proper names and indexicals, all treated in uniform
fashion in both their anaphoric and non-anaphoric uses. This work will be of interest to
researchers in philosophy of language, philosophy of mind and theoretical linguistics