181 research outputs found
Subgame Perfect Correlated Equilibria in Repeated Games
Subgame Perfect Correlated Equilibria in Repeated Games by Pavlo Prokopovych and Lones Smith ABSTRACT This paper investigates discounted infinitely repeated games with observable actions extended with an extensive form correlation device. Such games capture situations of repeated interaction of many players who choose their individual actions conditional on both public and private information. At the beginning of each stage, the players observe correlated private messages sent by an extensive form correlation device. To secure a recursive structure, we assume that players condition their play on the prior history of action profiles and the latest private message they have received from the device. Given a public history, the probability distribution on the product of the players' message sets, according to which the device randomly selects private messages to the players, is common knowledge. This leads to the existence of proper subgames and the opportunity to utilize the techniques developed by Abreu, Pearce, Stacchetti (1990) for studying infinitely repeated games with imperfect monitoring. The extensive form correlation devices we consider send players messages confidentially and separately and are not necessarily direct devices. Proposition 1 asserts that, in infinitely repeated games, subgame perfect correlated equilibria have a simple intertemporal structure, where play at each stage constitutes a correlated equilibrium of the corresponding one-shot game. An important corollary is that the revelation principle holds for such games --- any subgame perfect correlated equilibrium payoff can be achieved as a subgame perfect direct correlated equilibrium payoff. We can therefore focus on the recursive structure of infinitely repeated games extended with an extensive form direct correlation device and characterize the set of subgame perfect direct correlated equilibrium payoffs. In the spirit of dynamic programming, we decompose an equilibrium into an admissible pair that consists of a probability distribution on the product of the players' action sets and a continuation value function. This generalization has allowed us to obtain a number of characterizations of the set of subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs. To illustrate a number of important properties of this set, we study two infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma games. In the first game, the set of subgame perfect correlated equilibrium payoffs strictly includes not only the set of subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs but also the set of subgame perfect public randomization equilibrium payoffs. In the second game, the set of subgame perfect direct correlated equilibrium payoffs is not convex, strictly includes the set of subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs, and is strictly contained in the set of subgame perfect public randomization equilibrium payoffs. The latter is possible since, in the presence of a public randomization device, the history of public messages observed in previous stages is also common knowledge at the beginning of each stage, which is not the case when messages are private.repeated games with observable actions, correlated equilibrium, private information
Supporting others and the evolution of influence.
In this paper we study environments in which agents can transfer influence to others by supporting them. When planning whom to support, they should take into account the future effect of this, since the receiving agent might use this influence to support others in the future. We show that in the presence of a finite horizon there is an essentially unique optimal support behavior which can be characterized in terms of associated value functions. The analysis of these value functions allows us to derive qualitative properties of optimal support strategies under different specific environments and to explicitly compute the optimal support behavior in some numerical examples. We also investigate the case of an infinite horizon. Examples show that multiple equilibria may appear in this setting, some of wich sustaining a degree of cooperation that would not be possible under a finite horizon.Dynamic games; Value functions; Continuum player set;
NASH EQUILIBRIA IN A MODEL OF MULTIPRODUCT PRICE COMPETITION: AN ASSIGNMENT PROBLEM
We study the market interaction of a finite number of single-product firms and a representative buyer, where the buyer consumes bundles of these goods. The buyers' value function determines their willingness to pay for subsets of goods. We show that subgame perfect Nash-equilibrium outcomes are solutions of the linear relaxation of an integer programming assignment problem and that they always exits. The (subgame perfect) Nash-equilibrium price set is characterized by the Pareto frontier of the associated dual problem's projection on the firms' price vectors. We identify the Nash-equilibrium prices for monotonic buyers' value functions and, more importantly, we show that some central solution concepts in cooperative game theory are (subgame perfect) equilibrium prices of our strategic game.Multiproduct price competition, interger programming, subgame perfect nash equilibria
Applications of Repeated Games in Wireless Networks: A Survey
A repeated game is an effective tool to model interactions and conflicts for
players aiming to achieve their objectives in a long-term basis. Contrary to
static noncooperative games that model an interaction among players in only one
period, in repeated games, interactions of players repeat for multiple periods;
and thus the players become aware of other players' past behaviors and their
future benefits, and will adapt their behavior accordingly. In wireless
networks, conflicts among wireless nodes can lead to selfish behaviors,
resulting in poor network performances and detrimental individual payoffs. In
this paper, we survey the applications of repeated games in different wireless
networks. The main goal is to demonstrate the use of repeated games to
encourage wireless nodes to cooperate, thereby improving network performances
and avoiding network disruption due to selfish behaviors. Furthermore, various
problems in wireless networks and variations of repeated game models together
with the corresponding solutions are discussed in this survey. Finally, we
outline some open issues and future research directions.Comment: 32 pages, 15 figures, 5 tables, 168 reference
Automatic Verification of Concurrent Stochastic Systems
Automated verification techniques for stochastic games allow formal reasoning
about systems that feature competitive or collaborative behaviour among
rational agents in uncertain or probabilistic settings. Existing tools and
techniques focus on turn-based games, where each state of the game is
controlled by a single player, and on zero-sum properties, where two players or
coalitions have directly opposing objectives. In this paper, we present
automated verification techniques for concurrent stochastic games (CSGs), which
provide a more natural model of concurrent decision making and interaction. We
also consider (social welfare) Nash equilibria, to formally identify scenarios
where two players or coalitions with distinct goals can collaborate to optimise
their joint performance. We propose an extension of the temporal logic rPATL
for specifying quantitative properties in this setting and present
corresponding algorithms for verification and strategy synthesis for a variant
of stopping games. For finite-horizon properties the computation is exact,
while for infinite-horizon it is approximate using value iteration. For
zero-sum properties it requires solving matrix games via linear programming,
and for equilibria-based properties we find social welfare or social cost Nash
equilibria of bimatrix games via the method of labelled polytopes through an
SMT encoding. We implement this approach in PRISM-games, which required
extending the tool's modelling language for CSGs, and apply it to case studies
from domains including robotics, computer security and computer networks,
explicitly demonstrating the benefits of both CSGs and equilibria-based
properties
ESTIMATION OF IMPERFECT COMPETITION IN FOOD MARKETING: A DYNAMIC ANALYSIS OF THE GERMAN BANANA MARKET
Several studies have estimated the welfare effects of recent changes in the European Union's common policy on banana imports, based upon the assumption that the market is perfectly competitive. However, if the market is imperfectly competitive, predictions about changes in banana policy may be inaccurate. The objective of this paper is to estimate the degree of market imperfection in the German market for banana imports using dynamic methods. The hypothesis that this market is perfectly competitive is rejected, and, in addition, the degree of market imperfection is estimated to be higher using a dynamic model compared to previous static estimates.Marketing,
- …