Subgame Perfect Correlated Equilibria in Repeated Games

Abstract

Subgame Perfect Correlated Equilibria in Repeated Games by Pavlo Prokopovych and Lones Smith ABSTRACT This paper investigates discounted infinitely repeated games with observable actions extended with an extensive form correlation device. Such games capture situations of repeated interaction of many players who choose their individual actions conditional on both public and private information. At the beginning of each stage, the players observe correlated private messages sent by an extensive form correlation device. To secure a recursive structure, we assume that players condition their play on the prior history of action profiles and the latest private message they have received from the device. Given a public history, the probability distribution on the product of the players' message sets, according to which the device randomly selects private messages to the players, is common knowledge. This leads to the existence of proper subgames and the opportunity to utilize the techniques developed by Abreu, Pearce, Stacchetti (1990) for studying infinitely repeated games with imperfect monitoring. The extensive form correlation devices we consider send players messages confidentially and separately and are not necessarily direct devices. Proposition 1 asserts that, in infinitely repeated games, subgame perfect correlated equilibria have a simple intertemporal structure, where play at each stage constitutes a correlated equilibrium of the corresponding one-shot game. An important corollary is that the revelation principle holds for such games --- any subgame perfect correlated equilibrium payoff can be achieved as a subgame perfect direct correlated equilibrium payoff. We can therefore focus on the recursive structure of infinitely repeated games extended with an extensive form direct correlation device and characterize the set of subgame perfect direct correlated equilibrium payoffs. In the spirit of dynamic programming, we decompose an equilibrium into an admissible pair that consists of a probability distribution on the product of the players' action sets and a continuation value function. This generalization has allowed us to obtain a number of characterizations of the set of subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs. To illustrate a number of important properties of this set, we study two infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma games. In the first game, the set of subgame perfect correlated equilibrium payoffs strictly includes not only the set of subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs but also the set of subgame perfect public randomization equilibrium payoffs. In the second game, the set of subgame perfect direct correlated equilibrium payoffs is not convex, strictly includes the set of subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs, and is strictly contained in the set of subgame perfect public randomization equilibrium payoffs. The latter is possible since, in the presence of a public randomization device, the history of public messages observed in previous stages is also common knowledge at the beginning of each stage, which is not the case when messages are private.repeated games with observable actions, correlated equilibrium, private information