Towards Scalable Network Traffic Measurement With Sketches

Driven by the ever-increasing data volume through the Internet, the per-port speed of network devices reached 400 Gbps, and high-end switches are capable of processing 25.6 Tbps of network traffic. To improve the efficiency and security of the network, network traffic measurement becomes more important than ever. For fast and accurate traffic measurement, managing an accurate working set of active flows (WSAF) at line rates is a key challenge. WSAF is usually located in high-speed but expensive memories, such as TCAM or SRAM, and thus their capacity is quite limited. To scale up the per-flow measurement, we pursue three thrusts. In the first thrust, we propose to use In-DRAM WSAF and put a compact data structure (i.e., sketch) called FlowRegulator before WSAF to compensate for DRAM\u27s slow access time. Per our results, FlowRegulator can substantially reduce massive influxes to WSAF without compromising measurement accuracy. In the second thrust, we integrate our sketch into a network system and propose an SDN-based WLAN monitoring and management framework called RFlow+, which can overcome the limitations of existing traffic measurement solutions (e.g., OpenFlow and sFlow), such as a limited view, incomplete flow statistics, and poor trade-off between measurement accuracy and CPU/network overheads. In the third thrust, we introduce a novel sampling scheme to deal with the poor trade-off that is provided by the standard simple random sampling (SRS). Even though SRS has been widely used in practice because of its simplicity, it provides non-uniform sampling rates for different flows, because it samples packets over an aggregated data flow. Starting with a simple idea that independent per-flow packet sampling provides the most accurate estimation of each flow, we introduce a new concept of per-flow systematic sampling, aiming to provide the same sampling rate across all flows. In addition, we provide a concrete sampling method called SketchFlow, which approximates the idea of the per-flow systematic sampling using a sketch saturation event

Attacking and securing Network Time Protocol

Network Time Protocol (NTP) is used to synchronize time between computer systems communicating over unreliable, variable-latency, and untrusted network paths. Time is critical for many applications; in particular it is heavily utilized by cryptographic protocols. Despite its importance, the community still lacks visibility into the robustness of the NTP ecosystem itself, the integrity of the timing information transmitted by NTP, and the impact that any error in NTP might have upon the security of other protocols that rely on timing information. In this thesis, we seek to accomplish the following broad goals: 1. Demonstrate that the current design presents a security risk, by showing that network attackers can exploit NTP and then use it to attack other core Internet protocols that rely on time. 2. Improve NTP to make it more robust, and rigorously analyze the security of the improved protocol. 3. Establish formal and precise security requirements that should be satisfied by a network time-synchronization protocol, and prove that these are sufficient for the security of other protocols that rely on time. We take the following approach to achieve our goals incrementally. 1. We begin by (a) scrutinizing NTP's core protocol (RFC 5905) and (b) statically analyzing code of its reference implementation to identify vulnerabilities in protocol design, ambiguities in specifications, and flaws in reference implementations. We then leverage these observations to show several off- and on-path denial-of-service and time-shifting attacks on NTP clients. We then show cache-flushing and cache-sticking attacks on DNS(SEC) that leverage NTP. We quantify the attack surface using Internet measurements, and suggest simple countermeasures that can improve the security of NTP and DNS(SEC). 2. Next we move beyond identifying attacks and leverage ideas from Universal Composability (UC) security framework to develop a cryptographic model for attacks on NTP's datagram protocol. We use this model to prove the security of a new backwards-compatible protocol that correctly synchronizes time in the face of both off- and on-path network attackers. 3. Next, we propose general security notions for network time-synchronization protocols within the UC framework and formulate ideal functionalities that capture a number of prevalent forms of time measurement within existing systems. We show how they can be realized by real-world protocols (including but not limited to NTP), and how they can be used to assert security of time-reliant applications-specifically, cryptographic certificates with revocation and expiration times. Our security framework allows for a clear and modular treatment of the use of time in security-sensitive systems. Our work makes the core NTP protocol and its implementations more robust and secure, thus improving the security of applications and protocols that rely on time