Probability Logic for Harsanyi Type Spaces

Probability logic has contributed to significant developments in belief types for game-theoretical economics. We present a new probability logic for Harsanyi Type spaces, show its completeness, and prove both a de-nesting property and a unique extension theorem. We then prove that multi-agent interactive epistemology has greater complexity than its single-agent counterpart by showing that if the probability indices of the belief language are restricted to a finite set of rationals and there are finitely many propositional letters, then the canonical space for probabilistic beliefs with one agent is finite while the canonical one with at least two agents has the cardinality of the continuum. Finally, we generalize the three notions of definability in multimodal logics to logics of probabilistic belief and knowledge, namely implicit definability, reducibility, and explicit definability. We find that S5-knowledge can be implicitly defined by probabilistic belief but not reduced to it and hence is not explicitly definable by probabilistic belief

Quantum Team Logic and Bell's Inequalities

A logical approach to Bell's Inequalities of quantum mechanics has been introduced by Abramsky and Hardy [2]. We point out that the logical Bell's Inequalities of [2] are provable in the probability logic of Fagin, Halpern and Megiddo [4]. Since it is now considered empirically established that quantum mechanics violates Bell's Inequalities, we introduce a modified probability logic, that we call quantum team logic, in which Bell's Inequalities are not provable, and prove a Completeness Theorem for this logic. For this end we generalise the team semantics of dependence logic [7] first to probabilistic team semantics, and then to what we call quantum team semantics

Probability Logic and Logical Probability

Authors like Keynes, H. Jeffreys and Carnap advocated using a concept of "logical probability". Logical probability had the following properties: (a) it was representable as a function from potential states of full belief (or "evidence") to states of subjective or credal probability judgment. (b) Such functions were alleged to be constrained by principles of probability logic. (c) All rational agents were supposed to be obliged to adopt the standard function that probability logic prescribed. In this essay, it is argued that these three requirements could be satisfied only if probability logic prescribed that credal probability should be numerically determinate. Keynes denied that it should numerically determinate and Carnap abandoned the idea that probability logic could supply a determinate function from states of full belief to numerically determinate credal states that all rational agents ought to adopt. The paper explains that once this is conceded, logical probability ought to be interpreted rather differently than it is customarily is

Approximate equivalence relations

Generalizing results for approximate subgroups, we study approximate equivalence relations up to commensurability, in the presence of a definable measure. As a basic framework, we give a presentation of probability logic based on continuous logic. Hoover’s normal form is valid here; if one begins with a discrete logic structure, it reduces arbitrary formulas of probability logic to correlations between quantifier-free formulas. We completely classify binary correlations in terms of the Kim–Pillay space, leading to strong results on the interpretative power of pure probability logic over a binary language. Assuming higher amalgamation of independent types, we prove a higher stationarity statement for such correlations. We also give a short model-theoretic proof of a categoricity theorem for continuous logic structures with a measure of full support, generalizing theorems of Gromov–Vershik and Keisler, and often providing a canonical model for a complete pure probability logic theory. These results also apply to local probability logic, providing in particular a canonical model for a local pure probability logic theory with a unique 1-type and geodesic metric. For sequences of approximate equivalence relations with an “approximately unique” probability logic 1-type, we obtain a structure theorem generalizing the “Lie model” theorem for approximate subgroups (Theorem 5.5). The models here are Riemannian homogeneous spaces, fibered over a locally finite graph. Specializing to definable graphs over finite fields, we show that after a finite partition, a definable binary relation converges in finitely many self-compositions to an equivalence relation of geometric origin. This generalizes the main lemma for strong approximation of groups. For NIP theories, pursuing a question of Pillay’s, we prove an archimedean finite-dimensionality statement for the automorphism groups of definable measures, acting on a given type of definable sets. This can be seen as an archimedean analogue of results of Macpherson and Tent on NIP profinite groups