Probabilistic basis and assessment methodology for effectiveness of protecting nuclear materials

textSafeguards and security (S&S) systems for nuclear facilities include material control and accounting (MC&A) and a physical protection system (PPS) to protect nuclear materials from theft, sabotage and other malevolent human acts. The PPS for a facility is evaluated using probabilistic analysis of adversary paths on the basis of detection, delay, and response timelines to determine timely detection. The path analysis methodology focuses on systematic, quantitative evaluation of the physical protection component for potential external threats, and often calculates the probability that the PPS is effective (PE) in defeating an adversary who uses that attack path. By monitoring and tracking critical materials, MC&A activities provide additional protection against inside adversaries, but have been difficult to characterize in ways that are compatible with the existing path analysis methods that are used to systematically evaluate the effectiveness of a site’s protection system. This research describes and demonstrates a new method to incorporate MC&A protection elements explicitly within the existing probabilistic path analysis methodology. MC&A activities, from monitoring to inventory measurements, provide many, often recurring opportunities to determine the status of critical items, including detection of missing materials. Human reliability analysis methods are applied to determine human error probabilities to characterize the detection capabilities of MC&A activities. An object-based state machine paradigm was developed to characterize the path elements and timing of an insider theft scenario as a race against MC&A activities that can move a facility from a normal state to a heightened alert state having additional detection opportunities. This paradigm is coupled with nuclear power plant probabilistic risk assessment techniques to incorporate the evaluation of MC&A activities in the existing path analysis methodology. Event sequence diagrams describe insider paths through the PPS and also incorporate MC&A activities as path elements. This work establishes a probabilistic basis for incorporating MC&A activities explicitly within the existing path analysis methodology to extend it to address insider threats. The analysis results for this new method provide an integrated effectiveness measure for a safeguards and security system that addresses threats from both outside and inside adversaries.Mechanical Engineerin

ZINTEGROWANY PROCES DECYZYJNY UWZGLĘDNIAJĄCY RYZYKO W PRZEMYŚLE JĄDROWYM

The regulatory body, established to ensure safety of nuclear facilities, is expected to make right decisions and provide appropriate regulations for the nuclear industry. The traditional manner of its activity has been based on a deterministic approach to safety analyses. However, increased maturity of Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) makes it complementary to deterministic studies. The new IAEA concept, described in this article, is to apply an integrated approach by combining both deterministic and probabilistic insights with other requirements affecting the decision making process.Organ regulacyjny, powołany w celu zapewnienia bezpieczeństwa jądrowego, jest odpowiedzialny za podejmowanie decyzji i wprowadzanie rozporządzeń dla przemysłu jądrowego. Tradycyjny sposób jego funkcjonowania opiera się na deterministycznym podejściu do analiz bezpieczeństwa. Rozwój analiz probabilistycznych (PSA) sprawia jednak, iż są one traktowane jako podejście komplementarne. Nowa koncepcja IAEA, opisana w tym artykule, polega na zintegrowanym podejściu, uwzględniającym analizy deterministyczne, probabilistyczne i inne aspekty procesu decyzyjnego

Computer trading and systemic risk: a nuclear perspective

Financial markets have evolved to become complex adaptive systems highly reliant on the communication speeds and processing power afforded by digital systems. Their failure could cause severe disruption to the provision of financial services and possibly the wider economy. In this study we consider whether a perspective from the nuclear industry can provide additional insights

System effectiveness model formulation with application to nuclear safeguards systems

Evaluation of a given system\u27s effectiveness has numerous pitfalls. System objectives may be poorly defined, may shift during the system life, or may be hard to quantify. Further, individual perceptions of the quantifications may differ. Whatever the cause, system effectiveness has been an elusive term to quantitatively define. This research posits a quantitative system effectiveness model and establishes a utilitarian approach for use with an illustrative application to n operating nuclear safeguards system.The Department of Energy (DOE) defines domestic safeguards, which are applied to nuclear material as; an integrated system of physical protection, material accounting, and material control measures designed to deter, prevent, detect, and respond to unauthorized possession, use, or sabotage of nuclear materials. This research includes the investigation of the utility coefficients and simulation of a domestic nuclear safeguards system, as well as simulation of an airport passenger screening system consisting of: an identification screening system; an X-ray system for checking bags and computers; and a walk through metal detector. Expert judgment was used to determine the relative importance (utility) of the individual subsystems through a statistically analyzed web survey. The survey population is nuclear material protection, control, accounting, and plant management experts.The mean utility coefficients determined during the survey were applied to the system components developed assigned randomly generated values of component effectiveness and combined to produce an overall system effectiveness. Simulated Type I and Type II error rates are used for illustration of the probabilistic methodology currently used by DOE (calculating protection effectiveness) and the posited and heuristically based methodology (system effectiveness). Use of the heuristically based system effectiveness methodology illustrates an approach that combines the subsystem components of plant management, physical protection, material accounting, and material control for a domestic safeguards system. The system effectiveness methodology is complimentary to and more robust than the protection effectiveness calculation and can offer opportunities for cost savings during the system lifecycle

Trafficking in Persons: U.S. Policy and Issues for Congress

[Excerpt] This report focuses on international and domestic human trafficking and U.S. policy responses, with particular emphasis on the TVPA and its subsequent reauthorizations. The report begins with a description of key TIP-related definitions and an overview of the human trafficking problem. It follows with an overview of major foreign policy responses to international human trafficking. The report then focuses on responses to trafficking into and within the United States, examining relief for trafficking victims in the United States and discussing U.S. law enforcement efforts to combat domestic trafficking. The report concludes with an overview of current anti-trafficking legislation and an analysis of policy issues

Environmental Racism and Biased Methods of Risk Assessment

Based on analysis of a risk assessment for a proposed Louisiana uranium enrichment facility, the authors argue that environmental injustice occurs when assessors\u27 scientific methods cause de facto discrimination

Border Security: Understanding Threats at U.S. Borders

[Excerpt] The United States confronts a wide array of threats at U.S. borders, ranging from terrorists who may have weapons of mass destruction, to transnational criminals smuggling drugs or counterfeit goods, to unauthorized migrants intending to live and work in the United States. Given this diversity of threats, how may Congress and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) set border security priorities and allocate scarce enforcement resources? In general, DHS’s answer to this question is organized around risk management, a process that involves risk assessment and the allocation of resources based on a cost-benefit analysis. This report focuses on the first part of this process by identifying border threats and describing a framework for understanding risks at U.S. borders. DHS employs models to classify threats as relatively high- or low-risk for certain planning and budgeting exercises and to implement certain border security programs. Members of Congress may wish to use similar models to evaluate the costs and benefits of potential border security policies and to allocate border enforcement resources. This report discusses some of the issues involved in modeling border-related threats