Belief in attacks in epistemic probabilistic argumentation

The epistemic approach to probabilistic argumentation assigns belief to arguments. This is valuable in dialogical argumentation where one agent can model the beliefs another agent has in the arguments and this can be harnessed to make strategic choices of arguments to present. In this paper, we extend this epistemic approach by also representing the belief in attacks. We investigate properties of this proposal and compare it to the constellations approach showing neither subsumes the other

Empirical Evaluation of Abstract Argumentation: Supporting the Need for Bipolar and Probabilistic Approaches

In dialogical argumentation it is often assumed that the involved parties always correctly identify the intended statements posited by each other, realize all of the associated relations, conform to the three acceptability states (accepted, rejected, undecided), adjust their views when new and correct information comes in, and that a framework handling only attack relations is sufficient to represent their opinions. Although it is natural to make these assumptions as a starting point for further research, removing them or even acknowledging that such removal should happen is more challenging for some of these concepts than for others. Probabilistic argumentation is one of the approaches that can be harnessed for more accurate user modelling. The epistemic approach allows us to represent how much a given argument is believed by a given person, offering us the possibility to express more than just three agreement states. It is equipped with a wide range of postulates, including those that do not make any restrictions concerning how initial arguments should be viewed, thus potentially being more adequate for handling beliefs of the people that have not fully disclosed their opinions in comparison to Dung's semantics. The constellation approach can be used to represent the views of different people concerning the structure of the framework we are dealing with, including cases in which not all relations are acknowledged or when they are seen differently than intended. Finally, bipolar argumentation frameworks can be used to express both positive and negative relations between arguments. In this paper we describe the results of an experiment in which participants judged dialogues in terms of agreement and structure. We compare our findings with the aforementioned assumptions as well as with the constellation and epistemic approaches to probabilistic argumentation and bipolar argumentation

Probabilistic Reasoning with Abstract Argumentation Frameworks

Abstract argumentation offers an appealing way of representing and evaluating arguments and counterarguments. This approach can be enhanced by considering probability assignments on arguments, allowing for a quantitative treatment of formal argumentation. In this paper, we regard the assignment as denoting the degree of belief that an agent has in an argument being acceptable. While there are various interpretations of this, an example is how it could be applied to a deductive argument. Here, the degree of belief that an agent has in an argument being acceptable is a combination of the degree to which it believes the premises, the claim, and the derivation of the claim from the premises. We consider constraints on these probability assignments, inspired by crisp notions from classical abstract argumentation frameworks and discuss the issue of probabilistic reasoning with abstract argumentation frameworks. Moreover, we consider the scenario when assessments on the probabilities of a subset of the arguments are given and the probabilities of the remaining arguments have to be derived, taking both the topology of the argumentation framework and principles of probabilistic reasoning into account. We generalise this scenario by also considering inconsistent assessments, i.e., assessments that contradict the topology of the argumentation framework. Building on approaches to inconsistency measurement, we present a general framework to measure the amount of conflict of these assessments and provide a method for inconsistency-tolerant reasoning

Epistemic graphs for representing and reasoning with positive and negative influences of arguments

This paper introduces epistemic graphs as a generalization of the epistemic approach to probabilistic argumentation. In these graphs, an argument can be believed or disbelieved up to a given degree, thus providing a more fine–grained alternative to the standard Dung's approaches when it comes to determining the status of a given argument. Furthermore, the flexibility of the epistemic approach allows us to both model the rationale behind the existing semantics as well as completely deviate from them when required. Epistemic graphs can model both attack and support as well as relations that are neither support nor attack. The way other arguments influence a given argument is expressed by the epistemic constraints that can restrict the belief we have in an argument with a varying degree of specificity. The fact that we can specify the rules under which arguments should be evaluated and we can include constraints between unrelated arguments permits the framework to be more context–sensitive. It also allows for better modelling of imperfect agents, which can be important in multi–agent applications

Probabilistic Abstract Dialectical Frameworks

Although Dung’s frameworks are widely approved tools for abstract argumentation, their abstractness makes expressing notions such as support or uncertainty very difficult. Thus, many of their generalizations were created, including the probabilistic argumentation frameworks (PrAFs) and the abstract dialectical frameworks (ADFs). While the first allow modeling uncertain arguments and attacks, the latter can handle various dependencies between arguments. Although the actual probability layer in PrAFs is independent of the chosen semantics, new relations pose new challenges and new interpretations of what is the probability of a relation. Thus, the methodology for handling uncertainties cannot be shifted to more general structures without any further thought. In this paper we show how ADFs are extended with probabilities