184,491 research outputs found
Privacy protocols
Security protocols enable secure communication over insecure channels.
Privacy protocols enable private interactions over secure channels. Security
protocols set up secure channels using cryptographic primitives. Privacy
protocols set up private channels using secure channels. But just like some
security protocols can be broken without breaking the underlying cryptography,
some privacy protocols can be broken without breaking the underlying security.
Such privacy attacks have been used to leverage e-commerce against targeted
advertising from the outset; but their depth and scope became apparent only
with the overwhelming advent of influence campaigns in politics. The blurred
boundaries between privacy protocols and privacy attacks present a new
challenge for protocol analysis. Covert channels turn out to be concealed not
only below overt channels, but also above: subversions, and the level-below
attacks are supplemented by sublimations and the level-above attacks.Comment: 38 pages, 6 figure
Minimizing information leakage of tree-based RFID authentication protocols using alternate tree-walking
The privacy of efficient tree-based RFID authentication protocols is heavily dependent on the branching factor on the top layer. Indefinitely increasing the branching factor, however, is not a viable option. This paper proposes the alternate-tree walking scheme as well as two protocols to circumvent this problem. The privacy of the resulting protocols is shown to be comparable to that of linear-time protocols, where there is no leakage of information, whilst reducing the computational load of the database by one-third of what is required of tree-based protocols during authentication. We also identify and address a limitation in quantifying privacy in RFID protocols
A Survey of RFID Authentication Protocols Based on Hash-Chain Method
Security and privacy are the inherent problems in RFID communications. There
are several protocols have been proposed to overcome those problems. Hash chain
is commonly employed by the protocols to improve security and privacy for RFID
authentication. Although the protocols able to provide specific solution for
RFID security and privacy problems, they fail to provide integrated solution.
This article is a survey to closely observe those protocols in terms of its
focus and limitations.Comment: Third ICCIT 2008 International Conference on Convergence and Hybrid
Information Technolog
The Role of Interactivity in Local Differential Privacy
We study the power of interactivity in local differential privacy. First, we
focus on the difference between fully interactive and sequentially interactive
protocols. Sequentially interactive protocols may query users adaptively in
sequence, but they cannot return to previously queried users. The vast majority
of existing lower bounds for local differential privacy apply only to
sequentially interactive protocols, and before this paper it was not known
whether fully interactive protocols were more powerful. We resolve this
question. First, we classify locally private protocols by their
compositionality, the multiplicative factor by which the sum of a
protocol's single-round privacy parameters exceeds its overall privacy
guarantee. We then show how to efficiently transform any fully interactive
-compositional protocol into an equivalent sequentially interactive protocol
with an blowup in sample complexity. Next, we show that our reduction is
tight by exhibiting a family of problems such that for any , there is a
fully interactive -compositional protocol which solves the problem, while no
sequentially interactive protocol can solve the problem without at least an
factor more examples. We then turn our attention to
hypothesis testing problems. We show that for a large class of compound
hypothesis testing problems --- which include all simple hypothesis testing
problems as a special case --- a simple noninteractive test is optimal among
the class of all (possibly fully interactive) tests
Composing security protocols: from confidentiality to privacy
Security protocols are used in many of our daily-life applications, and our privacy largely depends on their design. Formal verification techniques have proved their usefulness to analyse these protocols, but they become so complex that modular techniques have to be developed. We propose several results to safely compose security protocols. We consider arbitrary primitives modeled using an equational theory, and a rich process algebra close to the applied pi calculus.
Relying on these composition results, we derive some security properties on a protocol from the security analysis performed on each of its sub-protocols individually. We consider parallel composition and the case of key-exchange protocols. Our results apply to deal with confidentiality but also privacy-type properties (e.g. anonymity) expressed using a notion of equivalence. We illustrate the usefulness of our composition results on protocols from the 3G phone application and electronic passport
- …