An Examination of Privacy Policies of US Government Senate Websites.

US Government websites are rapidly increasing the services they offer, but users express concerns about their personal privacy protection. To earn user's trust, these sites must show that personal data is protected, and the sites contain explicit privacy policies. This research studied privacy policy protection of 50 US Senate sites and found that few had comprehensive elements of privacy policies and a general lack of protection of personal data that could be obtain from the website. The study reviewed which specific privacy elements are most often mishandled, as well as suggestions for improving an overall online privacy practice

Link Before You Share: Managing Privacy Policies through Blockchain

With the advent of numerous online content providers, utilities and applications, each with their own specific version of privacy policies and its associated overhead, it is becoming increasingly difficult for concerned users to manage and track the confidential information that they share with the providers. Users consent to providers to gather and share their Personally Identifiable Information (PII). We have developed a novel framework to automatically track details about how a users' PII data is stored, used and shared by the provider. We have integrated our Data Privacy ontology with the properties of blockchain, to develop an automated access control and audit mechanism that enforces users' data privacy policies when sharing their data across third parties. We have also validated this framework by implementing a working system LinkShare. In this paper, we describe our framework on detail along with the LinkShare system. Our approach can be adopted by Big Data users to automatically apply their privacy policy on data operations and track the flow of that data across various stakeholders.Comment: 10 pages, 6 figures, Published in: 4th International Workshop on Privacy and Security of Big Data (PSBD 2017) in conjunction with 2017 IEEE International Conference on Big Data (IEEE BigData 2017) December 14, 2017, Boston, MA, US

The RFID PIA – developed by industry, agreed by regulators

This chapter discusses the privacy impact assessment (PIA) framework endorsed by the European Commission on February 11th, 2011. This PIA, the first to receive the Commission's endorsement, was developed to deal with privacy challenges associated with the deployment of radio frequency identification (RFID) technology, a key building block of the Internet of Things. The goal of this chapter is to present the methodology and key constructs of the RFID PIA Framework in more detail than was possible in the official text. RFID operators can use this article as a support document when they conduct PIAs and need to interpret the PIA Framework. The chapter begins with a history of why and how the PIA Framework for RFID came about. It then proceeds with a description of the endorsed PIA process for RFID applications and explains in detail how this process is supposed to function. It provides examples discussed during the development of the PIA Framework. These examples reflect the rationale behind and evolution of the text's methods and definitions. The chapter also provides insight into the stakeholder debates and compromises that have important implications for PIAs in general.Series: Working Papers on Information Systems, Information Business and Operation

Sodomy and Prostitution: Laws Protecting the “Fabric of Society”

[Excerpt] “Throughout history many people have viewed sodomy and prostitution as moral evils, because sex has often been linked to sin and, therefore, to immorality and guilt. For example, in ancient Hebrew, a sodomite was known as a qadhesh, a male temple prostitute who was associated with heathen deities and impure forms of worship. The female version of qadhesh, qedheshah, is translated directly as prostitute. This archaic view of labeling prostitution and sodomy as impure has been challenged over time, and both topics are still a source of great controversy. […] This note is a comparative analysis of sodomy and prostitution. This note will examine the history of both topics in the United States and, to a limited extent, in other countries. The primary focus will be on the laws and regulations governing people who engage in either practice, as well as the moral arguments used in opposition to either practice. The note will also look at the change in sodomy laws after Lawrence, current arguments for changing prostitution laws, as well as examine the effect the reasoning of Lawrence may have on future challenges to anti-prostitution laws. This note is intended to show similarities between the moral justifications for banning sodomy and prostitution, as well as the heterosexist influence on society concerning both issues. This note does not advocate for a change in prostitution laws. This note concentrates on a limited aspect of both sodomy and prostitution. In dealing with sodomy, the note discusses only consensual sodomy. Sodomy perpetrated upon a person in the context of rape or coercion is not discussed in this note. Additionally, consensual and voluntary prostitution between adults is the only form of prostitution covered by this note. This note will not address the prostitution of underage people, forced prostitution, or human trafficking. Part II focuses on a general overview of American regulations that are based on moral arguments. Part III provides an overview of sodomy and prostitution, specifically addressing how regulations are used to address moral issues.

Free Speech at What Cost?: Snyder v. Phelps and Speech-Based Tort Liability

It is always a hard case when fundamental interests collide, but the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Snyder v. Phelps, 580 F.3d 206 (4th Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 1737 (2010), tilts doctrine too far in the direction of free speech, upsetting the Supreme Court’s careful weighing of interests that takes into account both the need for robust political debate and the need to protect private individuals from personal abuse. Where speech is directed at a private individual, especially one unwilling to hear but unable to escape the speaker’s message, the elements of the emotional distress claim more than satisfy the appropriate constitutional standard. Indeed, such a standard can help create a civil space where both robust advocacy and the freedom to avoid robust advocacy can flourish. This article makes four points about the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Snyder v. Phelps, each of which addresses the need to secure what is purely private from injurious speech. 1. The Fourth Circuit decided that the issues animating the protest of the Westboro Baptist Church (WBC) were matters of public concern. Of course, the “issue[s] of homosexuals in the military, the sex-abuse scandal within the Catholic Church, and the political and moral conduct of the United States and its citizens” are matters of public concern. But none of these is the issue whose publicness the Fourth Circuit was called upon to consider. That issue is whatever connection Matthew Snyder had to these matters. In the world of speech-based torts, whether a matter is one of legitimate public concern depends on the content, effect, and significance of the plaintiff’s conduct, not the subjective and unilateral assertions of the defendant. WBC must show that that connection is of public concern. Otherwise, every soldier, every Catholic, etc. (no matter how assiduously he or she has avoided the public fray) would be subject to targeted personal assault as long as WBC speaks under the mantle of some public concern (no matter how tenuously connected to the conduct of its target). 2. The Fourth Circuit’s decision turned on the court’s determination that WBC’s speech, even if it was not a matter of public concern, was mere rhetorical hyperbole (and, thus, not provably false; and thus protected opinion). Whatever sense this reasoning makes in the area of public debate, it creates a perverse incentive for WBC to be especially abusive and inflammatory: the more hyperbolically hateful the speech, the more it is constitutionally protected. This doctrinal borrowing from defamation makes little sense where the plaintiff brings an emotional distress claim. First, when the plaintiff’s claim is based on emotional injury caused by non-provable speech, the state’s interest in the protection of private personality is greater. The defamation plaintiff is injured by false statements of fact: where there is no provable factual assertion, there is little chance of reputational injury. No one will believe what is clearly hyperbolic rhetoric. But those same words can heighten a plaintiff’s emotional distress (and the more hyperbolic, the more the harm), whether or not the defendant’s message is verifiable. Second, the value of the speech at issue, and thus the need to offer it constitutional protection, is lesser. Statements meant merely to cause emotional injury to private plaintiffs bear only the most superficial resemblance to protected forms of speech. 3. There is no justification for applying the actual malice standard to emotional distress claims outside the public arena (and little enough inside). The literal application of the actual malice standard offers no protection to the plaintiff claiming emotional injury from rhetorically hyperbolic speech. The victim of a libel can show that the statement was false. The victim of rhetorical hyperbole can prove or disprove nothing that will bring judicial redress. This may be the cost of doing business in the public arena, but there is no reason why a private plaintiff should be left defenseless against emotionally injurious speech that serves no valid communicative purpose. 4. The availability of tort remedies for injurious speech is critical if private individuals are to peacefully exercise their own constitutional rights. The state has a substantial interest in protecting families’ “personal stake in honoring and mourning their dead” and in keeping the most intimate of moments from “unwarranted public exploitation.” Mr. Snyder should have the opportunity to show that WBC’s targeted picketing “was intended to cause him and his family substantial psychological distress,” not to disseminate a public message. Matthew Snyder died in service to his country, but the injuries that took his life left a legacy of trauma for his family. It is now the Supreme Court’s opportunity to decide whether our nation’s profound commitment to the contentious discussion of public issues is also a license for egregiously intrusive and injurious speech