9,909 research outputs found
Re-feedback: freedom with accountability for causing congestion in a connectionless internetwork
This dissertation concerns adding resource accountability to a simplex internetwork such as the Internet,
with only necessary but sufficient constraint on freedom. That is, both freedom for applications to evolve
new innovative behaviours while still responding responsibly to congestion; and freedom for network
providers to structure their pricing in any way, including flat pricing.
The big idea on which the research is built is a novel feedback arrangement termed ‘re-feedback’.
A general form is defined, as well as a specific proposal (re-ECN) to alter the Internet protocol so that
self-contained datagrams carry a metric of expected downstream congestion.
Congestion is chosen because of its central economic role as the marginal cost of network usage.
The aim is to ensure Internet resource allocation can be controlled either by local policies or by market
selection (or indeed local lack of any control).
The current Internet architecture is designed to only reveal path congestion to end-points, not networks.
The collective actions of self-interested consumers and providers should drive Internet resource
allocations towards maximisation of total social welfare. But without visibility of a cost-metric, network
operators are violating the architecture to improve their customer’s experience. The resulting fight
against the architecture is destroying the Internet’s simplicity and ability to evolve.
Although accountability with freedom is the goal, the focus is the congestion metric, and whether
an incentive system is possible that assures its integrity as it is passed between parties around the system,
despite proposed attacks motivated by self-interest and malice.
This dissertation defines the protocol and canonical examples of accountability mechanisms. Designs
are all derived from carefully motivated principles. The resulting system is evaluated by analysis
and simulation against the constraints and principles originally set. The mechanisms are proven to be
agnostic to specific transport behaviours, but they could not be made flow-ID-oblivious
Congestion, Private Peering and Capacity Investment on the Internet.
This paper presents a model of private bilateral and multilateral peering arrangements between Internet backbone providers when the network is congested. We study how different forms of interconnection and the competitive conditions of the market affect backbones' investments in network and peering point capacities. We show that network and peering point capacities are equilibrium complements; increasing competition reduces capacity investments (under-investment), thus worsening the quality of service both with multilateral and bilateral peering; under bilateral peering the inefficiency is less severe. Because of under-investment, welfare may be lower when the market is more competitive. We also show that asymmetries between backbones, which can take the form of uneven content distribution or product differentiation, may reduce under-investment and improve the quality of service. The introduction of an "inverse capacity interconnection fee" where providers pay each other a fee which is negatively correlated with their installed capacity may play the role of a coordinating mechanism towards a Pareto superior outcome.Internet, peering, congestion, QoS, capacity investment, interconnection
Congestion pricing, infrastructure investment and redistribution
We study congestion pricing by a government that has redistributive concerns, in the presence of optimal income taxation. Individuals differ in (unobservable) earning ability and consumption technology for commodities using a congestible network (e.g. roads, Internet). We find, assuming separable preferences, that when efficiency of consumption technology is either invariant or postively correlated with earning ability, low ability individuals should face higher marginal congestion charges than high ability ones. Moreover, reducing congestion (by raising charges or expanding network capacity) enables government to increase redistribution. We also find that means tested congestion pricing may be necessary to implement the second-best allocation.congestion pricing; income taxation; redistribution; infrastructure investment
Subsidization Competition: Vitalizing the Neutral Internet
Unlike telephone operators, which pay termination fees to reach the users of
another network, Internet Content Providers (CPs) do not pay the Internet
Service Providers (ISPs) of users they reach. While the consequent cross
subsidization to CPs has nurtured content innovations at the edge of the
Internet, it reduces the investment incentives for the access ISPs to expand
capacity. As potential charges for terminating CPs' traffic are criticized
under the net neutrality debate, we propose to allow CPs to voluntarily
subsidize the usagebased fees induced by their content traffic for end-users.
We model the regulated subsidization competition among CPs under a neutral
network and show how deregulation of subsidization could increase an access
ISP's utilization and revenue, strengthening its investment incentives.
Although the competition might harm certain CPs, we find that the main cause
comes from high access prices rather than the existence of subsidization. Our
results suggest that subsidization competition will increase the
competitiveness and welfare of the Internet content market; however, regulators
might need to regulate access prices if the access ISP market is not
competitive enough. We envision that subsidization competition could become a
viable model for the future Internet
Network Neutrality or Internet Innovation?
Over the past two decades, the Internet has undergone an extensive re-ordering of its topology that has resulted in increased variation in the price and quality of its services. Innovations such as private peering, multihoming, secondary peering, server farms, and content delivery networks have caused the Internet’s traditionally hierarchical architecture to be replaced by one that is more heterogeneous. Relatedly, network providers have begun to employ an increasingly varied array of business arrangements and pricing. This variation has been interpreted by some as network providers attempting to promote their self interest at the expense of the public. In fact, these changes reflect network providers’ attempts to reduce cost, manage congestion, and maintain quality of service. Current policy proposals to constrain this variation risk harming these beneficial developments.
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