Pricing mechanisms for cooperative state estimation

978-1-4673-0274-6International audienceThe conflict between cooperation in distributed state estimation and the resulting leakage of private state information (competitive privacy) is studied for an interconnected two regional transmission organizations (RTOs) model of the grid. Using an information theoretic rate-distortion-leakage (RDL) tradeoff model, each RTO communicates at a rate chosen to optimize an objective function that is dependent on two opposing quantities: a rate-distortion based pricing function that encourages cooperation, and a leakage function that impedes it. It is shown that strictly non-zero pricing incentives are required to achieve non-trivial target distortions

Improving the Scalability of a Prosumer Cooperative Game with K-Means Clustering

Among the various market structures under peer-to-peer energy sharing, one model based on cooperative game theory provides clear incentives for prosumers to collaboratively schedule their energy resources. The computational complexity of this model, however, increases exponentially with the number of participants. To address this issue, this paper proposes the application of K-means clustering to the energy profiles following the grand coalition optimization. The cooperative model is run with the "clustered players" to compute their payoff allocations, which are then further distributed among the prosumers within each cluster. Case studies show that the proposed method can significantly improve the scalability of the cooperative scheme while maintaining a high level of financial incentives for the prosumers.Comment: 6 pages, 4 figures, 2 tables. Accepted to the 13th IEEE PES PowerTech Conference, 23-27 June 2019, Milano, Ital

Smart Grid Communications: Overview of Research Challenges, Solutions, and Standardization Activities

Optimization of energy consumption in future intelligent energy networks (or Smart Grids) will be based on grid-integrated near-real-time communications between various grid elements in generation, transmission, distribution and loads. This paper discusses some of the challenges and opportunities of communications research in the areas of smart grid and smart metering. In particular, we focus on some of the key communications challenges for realizing interoperable and future-proof smart grid/metering networks, smart grid security and privacy, and how some of the existing networking technologies can be applied to energy management. Finally, we also discuss the coordinated standardization efforts in Europe to harmonize communications standards and protocols.Comment: To be published in IEEE Communications Surveys and Tutorial

An Empirical Analysis of the Determinants of Marketing Contract Structures for Corn and Soybeans

Contracts serve as coordination mechanisms which allocate value, risk, and decision rightsacross buyers and sellers. The use of marketing contracts in agriculture, specifically for crop production,has been increasing over the past decade. This study investigates the determinants ofagricultural marketing contract design employing data from the USDA’s Agricultural ResourceManagement Survey. Models are estimated to analyze the association between producer and contractorcharacteristics, the decision to produce under contract, and the types of contract structuresobserved in practice, while controlling for the potential for endogenous matching betweencontracting parties. Results indicate that while certain producer characteristics are significantlyassociated with the decision to produce corn or soybeans under contract, there is no significantassociation between those characteristics and specific contract attributes.

Empirical Analysis of the Determinants of Marketing Contract Structures

Marketing,

Non-cooperative Feedback Rate Control Game for Channel State Information in Wireless Networks

It has been well recognized that channel state information (CSI) feedback is of great importance for dowlink transmissions of closed-loop wireless networks. However, the existing work typically researched the CSI feedback problem for each individual mobile station (MS), and thus, cannot efficiently model the interactions among self-interested mobile users in the network level. To this end, in this paper, we propose an alternative approach to investigate the CSI feedback rate control problem in the analytical setting of a game theoretic framework, in which a multiple-antenna base station (BS) communicates with a number of co-channel MSs through linear precoder. Specifically, we first present a non-cooperative feedback-rate control game (NFC), in which each MS selects the feedback rate to maximize its performance in a distributed way. To improve efficiency from a social optimum point of view, we then introduce pricing, called the non-cooperative feedback-rate control game with price (NFCP). The game utility is defined as the performance gain by CSI feedback minus the price as a linear function of the CSI feedback rate. The existence of the Nash equilibrium of such games is investigated, and two types of feedback protocols (FDMA and CSMA) are studied. Simulation results show that by adjusting the pricing factor, the distributed NFCP game results in close optimal performance compared with that of the centralized scheme.Comment: 26 pages, 10 figures; IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications, special issue on Game Theory in Wireless Communications, 201

NEW GENERATION CO-OPERATIVES (NGC) AS A MODEL FOR VALUE-ADDED AGRICULTURAL PROCESSING IN ALBERTA: APPLICATIONS TO FACTORS AFFECTING CHOICE OF PRICING AND PAYMENT PRACTICES BY TRADITIONAL MARKETING AND NEW GENERATION CO-OPERATIVES

This study examines the factors affecting choice of pricing and payment practices by traditional marketing and new generation co-operatives for commodities delivered by their members. These factors include the demographic variables related to type of co-operative organization, level of competition in commodity market, and risk-return perceptions of members and co-operatives. Data for the analysis were obtained through a mail survey. Questionnaires were send to one hundred and ninety five (195) co-operatives in mid-west states of the U.S.A. and Canada. Altogether 93 co-operatives responded to the survey. Mean score analysis, factor analysis and multinomial logit analysis were done. The results indicate that traditional marketing co-operatives are more likely to choose spot market cash price, while new generation co-operatives are more likely to choose pooling practices. Traditional marketing co-operatives appear to be concerned about the members' cash flow needs and members' uncertainty of return; they are also more responsive to increased competitive level in commodity market. New generation co-operatives are more concerned with avoiding the risk of co-operatives' operating deficits and survival of co-operatives. This has implications for new co-operatives just beginning in business.Agribusiness,