Pricing in Online Auction Procurement: A Review of Empirical Methods and Current Understandings

The online auction has become an important channel for procurement and sourcing management. As firms often expect lower procurement prices through online auctions, how the prices are determined in online auctions should be of major interest to procurement managers and supply chain researchers. Despite the abundant empirical studies on online auction prices, an aggregated view is still absent. This study fills this gap with a review of extant studies. More specifically, this study provides summaries of all major theories behind online auction pricing, defines and analyzes often encountered econometric issues, and discusses how the treatments of these issues have been operationalized. Towards the end, existing findings on determinants of online auction prices are integrated and examined. The purpose of this study is to provide a convenient and precise package of current studies for researchers and professional

Electronic Reverse Auctions: Spawning Procurement Innovation in the Context of Arab Culture

Government e-procurement initiatives have the potential to transform local institutions, but few studies have been published of strategies for implementing specific e-procurement tools, particularly involving procurement by a foreign government adapting to local culture in the Middle East/North Africa (MENA). This case describes procurement at a forward operating base (FOB) in Kuwait in support of operations in Iraq. The government procurers had to deal with a phenomenon unique to the MENA region: wasta. Wasta is a form of social capital that bestows power, influence, and connection to those who possess it, similar to guanxi in China. This study explores the value proposition and limitations of electronic reverse auctions (eRA) with the purpose of sharing best practices and lessons learned for government procurement in a MENA country. The public value framework provides valuable theoretical insights for the implementation of a new government e-procurement tool in a foreign country. In a culture dominated by wasta, the suppliers enjoyed the transparency and merit-based virtues of eRA’s that transferred successfully into the new cultural milieu: potential to increase transparency, competition, efficiency, and taxpayer savings. The practices provided herein are designed specifically to help buyers overcome structural barriers including training, organizational inertia, and a lack of eRA policy and guidance while implementing a new e-procurement tool in a foreign country

AN EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS APPROACH TO ANALYZING PRICE DISCOVERY IN FORWARD AND SPOT MARKETS

Laboratory experiments are used to generate data that facilitate investigation of pricing behavior in forward and spot markets. Results suggest a tendency for prices in a spot market to converge to levels higher than those in a forward market. The difference in these market environments is the supply schedule. Buyers in a spot market are aware that supply is inelastic and become relatively aggressive bidders. Forward markets have a relatively elastic supply schedule and buyers fare better. This may motivate firms to promote forward markets and/or vertically integrate in the procurement of inputs.Experimental economics, Forward market, Price discovery, Spot market, Marketing,

Chain: A Dynamic Double Auction Framework for Matching Patient Agents

In this paper we present and evaluate a general framework for the design of truthful auctions for matching agents in a dynamic, two-sided market. A single commodity, such as a resource or a task, is bought and sold by multiple buyers and sellers that arrive and depart over time. Our algorithm, Chain, provides the first framework that allows a truthful dynamic double auction (DA) to be constructed from a truthful, single-period (i.e. static) double-auction rule. The pricing and matching method of the Chain construction is unique amongst dynamic-auction rules that adopt the same building block. We examine experimentally the allocative efficiency of Chain when instantiated on various single-period rules, including the canonical McAfee double-auction rule. For a baseline we also consider non-truthful double auctions populated with zero-intelligence plus"-style learning agents. Chain-based auctions perform well in comparison with other schemes, especially as arrival intensity falls and agent valuations become more volatile

Online Bargaining as a Form of Dynamic Pricing and the Sellers\u27 Advantage from Information Assymmetry

Among the means of implementing dynamic pricing strategies in e-commerce, online bargaining is found to be better than revenue management and online auction, because each deal actually reaches a “win-win” situation for both the buyer and the seller in the sense that the mutually agreed deal price is higher than the seller’s reserved price but lower than the buyer’s reserved price. Such feature brings profit to the seller, as well as savings to the buyer. Meanwhile when bargaining online, there is an information asymmetry between the seller side, i.e. the company side, and the buyer side, which grants a great advantage to the sellers over the buyers. This information asymmetry can be captured and exploited for financial gains through adopting a properly designed online bargaining algorithm

Bargaining power and supply base diversification

In this paper, the authors examine a supply base diversification problem faced by a buyer who periodically holds auctions to award short term supply contracts among a cohort of suppliers (i.e., the supply base). To mitigate significant cost shocks to procurement, the buyer can diversify her supply base by selecting suppliers from different regions. The authors find that the optimal degree of supply base diversification depends on the buyer’s bargaining power, i.e., the buyer’s ability to choose the auction mechanism. At one extreme, when the buyer has full bargaining power and thus can dictatorially implement the optimal mechanism, she prefers to fully diversify. At the other extreme, when the buyer uses a reverse English auction with no reserve price due to her lack of bargaining power, she may consider protecting herself against potential price escalation from cost-advantaged suppliers by using a less diversified supply base. The authors find that in general the more bargaining power the buyer has to control price escalation from cost-advantaged suppliers the more she prefers a diversified supply base. This insight is shown to be robust to correlation between regional costs, asymmetry across regions, and intermediate levels of bargaining power.supply base diversification; supplier; buyer; procurement; bargaining

Combining Spot and Futures Markets: A Hybrid Market Approach to Dynamic Spectrum Access

Dynamic spectrum access is a new paradigm of secondary spectrum utilization and sharing. It allows unlicensed secondary users (SUs) to exploit opportunistically the under-utilized licensed spectrum. Market mechanism is a widely-used promising means to regulate the consuming behaviours of users and, hence, achieves the efficient allocation and consumption of limited resources. In this paper, we propose and study a hybrid secondary spectrum market consisting of both the futures market and the spot market, in which SUs (buyers) purchase under-utilized licensed spectrum from a spectrum regulator, either through predefined contracts via the futures market, or through spot transactions via the spot market. We focus on the optimal spectrum allocation among SUs in an exogenous hybrid market that maximizes the secondary spectrum utilization efficiency. The problem is challenging due to the stochasticity and asymmetry of network information. To solve this problem, we first derive an off-line optimal allocation policy that maximizes the ex-ante expected spectrum utilization efficiency based on the stochastic distribution of network information. We then propose an on-line VickreyCClarkeCGroves (VCG) auction that determines the real-time allocation and pricing of every spectrum based on the realized network information and the pre-derived off-line policy. We further show that with the spatial frequency reuse, the proposed VCG auction is NP-hard; hence, it is not suitable for on-line implementation, especially in a large-scale market. To this end, we propose a heuristics approach based on an on-line VCG-like mechanism with polynomial-time complexity, and further characterize the corresponding performance loss bound analytically. We finally provide extensive numerical results to evaluate the performance of the proposed solutions.Comment: This manuscript is the complete technical report for the journal version published in INFORMS Operations Researc

Buyers’ Perceptions of the Risks of Internet Enabled Reverse Auctions

In addition to reducing the purchasing cost, Internet Enabled Reverse Auctions (RAs) are now being used by buyer firms toexplore new suppliers. The decision to use RAs is increasingly being recognized for its strategic importance to buyer firms.However, such decisions of strategic importance are presumably accompanied by equally serious risks. The first step tomanaging such risks is identifying what they are. Unfortunately, there is no validated check list of buyer risks that can assistfirms when using RAs. We have taken the first step towards addressing this issue by developing an authoritative list of theimportant risks associated with the use of RAs as a sourcing strategy. By employing a rigorous ranking type Delphi surveymethodology, we developed a comprehensive list of the key risks ranked by their relative importance. Implications of ourfindings for both researchers and sourcing professionals are discussed